THE FIRST REPUBLIC AND THE INTERESTS OF THE GREAT POWERS

In the article published in the previous edition of R+ ("From May to April", No 10 (54), 15 May 2008), we dwelt on some aspects of the ideology and the domestic and foreign policy of the ADR and touched on the main reasons for its fall. In this article, we will continue this subject and describe it in more detail.

It is important to stress that the de facto recognition of the ADR in January 1920 did not imply Azerbaijan's transformation into a full subject of international law, able to enjoy full legal, political and military support from other states. Unlike de jure or full and final recognition, upon which diplomatic and other relations are established, de facto recognition had a temporary, incomplete and limited nature. Thus, although this form of recognition was of an official nature, it did not lead to the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the leading states of Europe and the ADR and indicated only their readiness to interact and cooperate with the Azerbaijani government.

A usual consequence of such recognition is the establishment of trade, consular and limited political relations, which was the case then. De facto recognition could - in certain favourable foreign and domestic conditions - become a transitional stage towards de jure recognition, but the real situation from 1918-1920, in which Azerbaijani statehood developed, did not provide such conditions. Most European countries (Belgium, Switzerland, Holland, Finland, Poland and others) opened only consular missions in Baku. Full diplomatic relations were established much later with neighbouring Georgia (the military-defence pact of 16 June 1919) which was in a state of "intermediate recognition" like the ADR and was interested in joint political, diplomatic and military efforts with Azerbaijan to counter foreign threats.

It should be noted that even Turkey, despite signing an agreement on peace and friendship with the ADR on 4 June 1918, had not ratified it and had not recognized Azerbaijan as an independent state until the end of September. The Young Turks saw the emergence of the ADR at that stage as a factor helping their long-term, pan-Turkist policy. The well-known American scientist of Polish origin, Tadeusz Swietochowski, said in this regard that "the Turks looked upon Eastern Transcaucasia as part of the emerging Turan Empire which would also include the North Caucasus, the northern part of Persia and Turkestan". The official recognition of Azerbaijan by Ottoman Turkey was endorsed only by a secret German-Turkish protocol signed on 23 September 1918. The first point of this protocol said that Turkey recognized Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan and withdrew its troops from Azerbaijan and Armenia, while Germany recognized only Georgia and appointed consuls to Armenia and Azerbaijan. But despite that, Turkey postponed the appointment of its diplomatic representative to Baku for the whole period of the ADR's existence, explaining its decision by the absence of consent from the allies.

The only country to fully recognize the ADR was Persia. On 20 March 1920, at the final session of the Azerbaijani-Persian conference held in Baku, with intervals, from December 1919 to March 1920 and as a result of which an agreement on friendship, a transit and trade agreement and consular and post-telegraph conventions were drafted and signed, the head of the Persian delegation, Tabataba'i, announced the de jure recognition of the ADR on behalf of his government. But despite the precedent set by Persian diplomacy, this event had only "moral significance" for the Azerbaijani political elite, as its representative admitted - it did not and could not influence the strengthening of the positions of the Azerbaijani authorities in respect of foreign policy.

The lack of full political and diplomatic support for the ADR from the leading powers of the Entente which won the First World War (USA, Britain, France and Italy) was related to the fact that within the strategy of the "Great Four" countries, recognition of the independence of the ADR and other republics established on the periphery of the former Russian Empire was not seen as an independent issue, but as a by-product of relations with Soviet Russia. The recognition of the independence of the ADR depended heavily on settlement of the so-called "Russian question", by which the Entente meant the success or failure of its policy to restore the monarchy or a bourgeois-democratic system in Russia.

The level of political and diplomatic support for the independence of Azerbaijan was "linked" to a solution of this strategically important problem by the Entente. Thus, even after de facto recognition of the ADR, representatives of leading allied states made elusive and, at times, very contradictory statements on this issue, considering the fact of recognition as an important element of their diplomatic game with the main participants in the political fight over the former Russian Empire (the Bolsheviks and domestic and foreign opposition on the periphery of the republic). They assured the ADR leadership that their political support would not change, and its adversaries that it was not the republic, but its government, that had been recognized.

This specific feature of Entente, and especially British, policy was reflected in Denikin's memoirs. The former commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Southern Russia, who favoured only autonomy for the Russian "periphery", or, as he called them, "new formations", said on this issue: "Since the position taken by the conference (the Paris Peace Conference - author) on Azerbaijan and Georgia allowed the latter to think that these new formations would be recognized, I expressed my protest. But today I received an official explanation that the powers recognized the independence of de facto governments, not of the periphery itself." De facto recognition exempted European diplomacy from any obligations with regard to the ADR government, as was graphically demonstrated during the "replacement" of the democratic system in Azerbaijan with Bolshevik rule.

An analysis of archive documents brings us to assume that the Entente and Russian anti-Bolsheviks understood what place the "new formations" would occupy on the political map of the world. As we can see from reports by Alimardanbay Topcubasov on his meetings in Istanbul with the former foreign minister of Russia, S. Sazonov, (1910-1916, he also represented the interests of Denikin and Kochak in Paris later), on 9 January 1919 the latter also indicated that independent status for the Transcaucasian republics, including Azerbaijan, was not acceptable to non-Bolshevik Russia and its European allies: "Once we get rid of the Bolsheviks, we will tell the peoples that want to break away from Russia, please come back home," said the former Russian minister in conversation with the head of the peaceful ADR delegation. "First of all, the allies are unlikely to accept the secession of the Caucasus from Russia. Believe me, they will tell you, the Georgians and the Armenians before we do. Their interest here coincides with the interests of Russia and all the peoples of the Caucasus."

Thus the Entente supported the ADR just because this policy met its interests in the economic blockade of Bolshevik Russia, in depriving Russia of important economic and strategic regions, in narrowing the sphere of its influence in Europe and the South Caucasus and finally in dismembering Russia as a rival state. It was quite natural that with the change of priorities in relations with the Bolsheviks in the early 1920s, the allied states lost interest in the national republics and, specifically, the ADR.

In the initial stages - 1918-1919 - the leading allied states saw eye-to-eye on the need to weaken the geopolitical positions of Soviet Russia around the entire length of its borders, considering it to be a source of Bolshevik threat to the civilized West. The most active supporter of the Entente's anti-Russian policy was London. It was London which had the strongest reasons to weaken Russia as Britain had traditionally regarded Russia as its geopolitical rival around the edges of the Eurasian continent and had no interest in a strong centralized state emerging in place of tsarist Russia, as it could lay claim to the British zone of interest in the Balkans, the Middle East and India. Specifically, British Defence Minister Winston Churchill thought that subjugating the former Russian Empire was not just a matter of a military expedition, but also an issue for world politics. He also coined the well-known phrase about Soviet Russia - "to strangle communism in its cradle".

As a result, London became the main initiator and a leader of the armed invasion of Soviet Russia. After the war with Germany, the British government made a number of decisions directed at continuing the invasion of Russia (British troops were sent to Russia in the spring and summer of 1918). A decision was made to help and support General Denikin and Admiral Kolchak. On 30 November 1918, the British government informed its representatives in Arkhangelsk and Vladivostok that it intended to conduct the following policy with regard to Russia: "To continue to control Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, to continue the Siberian expedition, to try to persuade the Czechs to remain in Western Siberia and take control of the Batum-Baku railway line (with the help of five British brigades), give General Denikin in Novorossiysk every assistance in terms of military supplies and provide the Baltic states with military equipment."

Altogether, by March 1919, the allies had sent up to one million soldiers to Russia, including 200,000 Greek, 190,000 Romanian, 140,000 British, 140,000 French, 140,000 Serbian and 40,000 Italian soldiers. But despite his strong and growing involvement in Russian affairs, the British prime minister doubted the effectiveness of an armed military solution to the "Russian question". In early 1919, Lloyd George, mulling the best policy with regard to Soviet Russia, wondered how "profitable" a policy of invading the huge, uncontrollable Russia could be. Noting the dangerous susceptibility of British workers to Bolshevik propaganda, Lloyd George stressed the social-political vulnerability of his country: "We are an industrial nation, and we are defenceless against fire. Perhaps only a spark is needed to trigger an explosion." The calculations of the British politician took in geopolitical considerations: "…If Russia retreats into the steppe, who will establish the limit of Drang nach Osten - the spread of Germany's influence to the East, who will prevent Berlin from dominating the Eurasian area and hold it back in the Balkans and the Middle East?" In preparing for Versailles, the second greatest power in the West - Britain - was trying to take a constructive approach.

As for the USA, it was much more concerned about the progress at the Paris conference of their new project for a new world order - the League of Nations. Upon the insistence of President Wilson, in January 1919 the supreme military council of the allies outlined an agenda for the Paris Peace Conference which clearly showed the priorities of American diplomacy:

1.The League of Nations;

2.The issue of reparations;

3.New states;

4.Territorial problems;

5.Colonial possessions.

The basis of Washington's European policy from the end of 1918 to early 1920 was a desire to create a balanced system in which the Germans would hold back the British and French, while the small nations of Europe would hold back bigger ones. Only this kind of system could secure a leading role for the United States in the post-war world and their role as European and world arbiter. "To make devastated Europe dependent on the colossal economic power of the USA, to create a world organization led by the United States, to strengthen the shift in world politics which results from the weakening of Europe from1914-1918, to stop and block the social revolution in Eastern and Central Europe and, after that, to return victoriously to the USA, leaving our name in the annals of history and the USA at the head of the world," this was the philosophy and political line of Woodrow Wilson in Paris.

As for the American policy on Russia, it was a by-product of this line. Russia was becoming an element of the European system of deterrents and counter-balances against Germany. For this reason, the matter of the new republics proclaimed on the territory of the former Russian Empire was not considered in terms of their recognition, but within the context of counterbalancing Central Russia and prompting the Bolshevik government to play its role. It is no accident that in the early stages of preparing for the Paris Conference, comments on the US "peace programme" (Wilson's 14 Points), approved by the American president on 30 October 1918 and which became a guideline for American diplomats, said that the "essence of the Russian problem is probably the following: 1) the recognition of provisional governments; 2) assistance to these governments and through these governments".

A determinant of US policy on Russia was also that, unlike their European allies, they had a relatively small stake in Russia - in terms of the volume of trade, capital investment and security interests. According to US historian Arthur Meier, Russia was of little interest to America. "In light of the fact that America is mainly a military naval power and Russia a continental power, it does not pose a threat to America. In this sense, Washington's main purpose is to expel Japan from Eastern Siberia as soon as possible, rather than to create a US influence zone there". Noting Wilson's indecision with regard to an armed invasion of Russia, Meier stressed that with Germany's defeat and with the actual break-up of the German state, this indecision "caused Wilson to protect the existing situation rather than immediately use force and launch a decisive offensive."

In this connection, the USA was in no hurry to recognize or give political support to the new independent republics on the territory of the former Russian Empire, including the ADR. The chairman of the Azerbaijani delegation to the Versailles peace conference, Alimardanbay Topcubasov, drew attention to the position of the United States in his reports from Paris to Baku. He noted that at the 28 May 1919 meeting of members of the delegation with US President Wilson, the latter presented the position of his country clearly and unambiguously:

1.The USA does not want to divide the world into small bits;

2.For Azerbaijan it would be better to accept the idea of establishing a confederation in the Caucasus;

3.This confederation could be protected by some power acting on instruction from the League of Nations;

4.The issue of recognizing the ADR cannot be solved before that of the Russian question.

Archive documents confirm that the USA kept to this policy throughout the whole period of the existence of the ADR. On 13 August when a fact-finding visit to Transcaucasia by US General James G. Harbord was being prepared, the head of the US delegation at the Paris conference asked Topcubasov to assist in the success of this mission and stressed the following: "Of course, the dispatch of this mission and its various official activities should not be seen as official recognition by the US administration of the Azerbaijani government or any other government that exists in Azerbaijan."

Until the end of 1919, the USA and its European allies continued to bank on the victory of the anti-Bolshevik opposition forces and linked the fate of the new republics to the outcome of the Bolshevik-White Army confrontation. On 10 November 1919, US Congressman Chandler, while informing Topcubasov about the position of the US Secretary of State on the issue of independence for "small countries", said that the State Department "is not against the idea of final independence for small nations", but stressed that "recognition is impossible at the moment before the US administration finally resolves the issue of the League of Peoples (Nations - author) and gives Kolchak the full opportunity to prove what (he) can do to destroy Bolshevism."

However, the success of the Red Army in autumn 1919 caused a gradual shift in the political mood in Washington and changed its approach to the issue of recognizing the independence of "small countries". Chandler also noted this peculiarity of the prevailing situation. "It seems that a question crosses the minds of senators and officials from the ministry of the States (perhaps the State Department - author): what are we to do after the final defeat of Kolchak, Denikin and Yudenich? It is not a question of obeying the Bolshevik regime. My opinion is that the government will immediately recognize the independence of Azerbaijan and other small states as soon as it becomes clear that Kolchak and other generals are unable to win. My opinion is that small nations will have to wait for several more months to have their independence recognized." Going forward, we should point out that the US politician's prediction proved to be accurate in January 1920 when the allies, concerned about the Bolsheviks' victorious advance on the Caucasus, recognized de facto the independence of the ADR and Georgia.

Representatives of another European country - Italy - even said in conversation with members of the ADR delegation at the Paris Conference that if "a Russian federal republic is formed (they meant a bourgeois-democratic republic, not a Bolshevik one - author), then the Caucasus confederation will probably be incorporated into the Russian federation". In June 1919, as an extension of this approach, with the initiative coming from Britain, the allied powers considered recognizing Kolchak as ruler in the territory of the former Russian Empire, which caused notes of protest from the delegations of Estonia, Latvia, Georgia, Belarus, Ukraine and Azerbaijan at the Paris Conference.

France was even less willing than its allies to support the independence of the ADR. First, in December 1917 France and Britain divided up "spheres of responsibility" for the territory of the former Russian Empire (London confirmed the validity of this agreement on 13 November 1918). According to this "division", Britain was "given" the North and South Caucasus, while Ukraine, Crimea and Bessarabia were incorporated into the French zone of responsibility. Moreover, supporting the anti-Russian policy of its allies (USA, Britain and Italy), Paris had set itself slightly different goals. As the country which had sustained the greatest damage in the war, France was more concerned about neutralizing Germany in European affairs, which is why it was not so much against Russia as against its Bolshevik government's alliance with Germany in the Treaty of Brest. France was interested in restoring to Russia a regime that would serve as a counterbalance to Germany. But, understanding that the establishment of such a regime in Russia was not for the near future, Paris banked on Poland as its outpost in Eastern Europe and a European counterbalance to Germany and, from this point of view, tended to support Polish claims to the territories of neighbouring Lithuania and Ukraine. On the other hand, within the framework of its strategic confrontation with Germany, France was interested in supporting the separatism of the Baltic States and Ukraine, considering the independent status of these countries a barrier to a possible German-Russian rapprochement and to the strengthening of its Rhine neighbour.

There is no doubt that within the context of the emerging post-war rivalry between France and Britain, which could already be felt at the Paris peace talks, Paris was more concerned about London's attempts to take control of the oil riches of the Baku region, which could give Britain an oil monopoly, as Britain already dominated the Persian Gulf. However, this concern had no serious practical consequences for French policy in the South Caucasus. For this reason, the ADR was not a subject of close interest for French diplomacy. An eloquent reflection of the French position on Azerbaijan's independence was that the ADR delegation, which left Baku for the Paris Peace Conference on 4 January 1919, had to wait for entry visas from the French Foreign Ministry for more than three months. Only on 22 April did the Azerbaijani delegation get a chance to travel to Rome from Constantinople, on board an Italian ship, and then head for Paris.

Thus although the Western allies, especially Britain which had interests in Persia, Turkey, India and the South Caucasus, still considered Bolshevism to be a serious destabilising factor in their regional positions, they were in no hurry to tie their hands with regard to Russia - possibly friendly towards the West - by recognizing the ADR. Such a development of events allowed Topcubasov, at the end of September 1919, to draw a conclusion that was not favourable to the Azerbaijani leadership: "The allies not only do not discuss our independence; apparently, they do not even want to do so. But during meetings with their representatives, everyone had a positive attitude and expressed their sympathy, as if they approved of our steps and actions towards independence. The same thing can also be heard from representatives of the press, deputies and economic and other organizations. But in terms of our issue moving towards a favourable solution, the situation remains the way I wrote to you in June and July. Or, to be more precise, the leitmotif is the same, i.e. until settlement of the Russian question, which we have to hear from everyone and very often." 

"Such an answer undoubtedly contains the plans, tasks, ideas and wishes of the allies, of whom some (Italy and France) really want to restore a united Russia and others (Britain and America) pretend that they want it," the head of the ADR delegation stressed.