FROM MAY TO APRIL

The "First Republic", which existed for almost two years, marked a summit in the development of the national-democratic movement among the Azerbaijani people. Foreign influences on the evolution of this movement combined with the particular ideological-political orientation of the leaders of Azerbaijani society to shape the ideology and practice of state building based upon Azerbaijanis' threefold affiliations: their ethnic links to the Turkic world, confessional links to the Islamic world and their civic links to European values and ideals. These characteristics were reflected in the philosophy of the building of the "First Republic", based upon and identified as "Azerbaijanism" - a synthesis of the principles of Turkism, Islamism and modernism, i.e. a consistent combination of the ethnic, confessional and European origin of the Azerbaijanis. Noting that, apart from European and Russian influences, other aims determining national self-consciousness in Azerbaijan were the "establishment of unity with the Islamic world, an ethnic relationship with the Turks and community with Persian Azerbaijanis", the American researcher into Azerbaijan's modern history, Tadeusz Swietochowski, writes that "at the same time, Azerbaijani leaders were distinguished by national characteristics which prevented them from submitting to wider movements such as the All-Russian Union of Muslims, pan-Turkism and Transcaucasian federalism".

The ideology of Azerbaijani statehood followed a difficult and twisting path during its short development. In autumn 1917, state independence was not identified as an aim in the programmes of leading Azerbaijani parties and movements. For example, the programme of the Turkic Federalist Party (Musavat), which gained 28 seats in the ADR parliament and formed the largest parliamentary faction (46 of the 96 deputies) together with independent deputies (18 seats), said in the chapter "The State System" that the party's goal was to establish: "a) a democratic republic on a national-territorial-federal basis within Russia and, in particular, b) territorial autonomy for Azerbaijan, Turkestan, Kyrgyzstan and Bashkiria and c) national autonomy for the Volga and Crimean Tatars and all Turkic peoples in general." Territorial autonomy was also the end goal for other political forces in Azerbaijani society.

However, the development of centrifugal tendencies in Russia and the disorganized administrative system in Transcaucasia resulted in the goal of "territorial autonomy" (i.e. independence for Azerbaijani society within a democratic and federal Russia) being replaced by the idea of the independent development of Azerbaijan within a confederation of Transcaucasian republics; this idea developed as the Transcaucasia Federation in April-May 1918. After the break-up of the Transcaucasia Federation, Azerbaijani representatives to the Sejm of the defunct federation formed the Azerbaijani National Council, which proclaimed the ADR on 28 May.

Even after the proclamation of independence, however - until the holding of the Paris conference - the idea of an alliance between the Caucasian republics was central to ADR programmes and the work of its leaders and diplomats. In a "Memorandum" drawn up by Ali Mardanbay Topcubasov (November 1918), which was delivered to the diplomatic representatives of Entente countries in Istanbul, this idea was expressed thus: "Close relations between the nations of Transcaucasia… coupled with the community of their interests, which are especially significant in the economic sphere, insistently require the establishment of a political alliance based upon the principles of confederation which underlie the current Swiss union… The idea of a confederation for Transcaucasia is rapidly gaining support, not only among moderate liberals, Azerbaijani, Georgian and Armenian nationalists, but also among social democrats who also desire an alliance of all nations in the Transcaucasian region." Believing, wrongly, that this idea would not only be supported by the Georgian and Armenian delegations at the Paris conference but would also evolve through the transformation of the confederation "by including the newly-established states of the North Caucasus", Topcubasov expressed the hope that "this salvational alliance" would be supported and approved by European states.

Analyzing now - 90 years later - the reasons for such a strong belief among ADR leaders in the idea of a "Caucasian confederation", it should be noted that the leadership of the "First Republic" was trying to create favourable regional and international conditions for the preservation of the independence of the ADR. Georgia enjoyed greater support from the leaders of the socialist parties of European states and was treated more tolerantly by Russia; Armenia was supported by the political activity of its diaspora and benefited from the interest European countries had in solving the "Armenian question". The Azerbaijani state, however, did not have the strong and effective resources necessary to ensure its foreign policy, military and economic independence. In these conditions, the appeal of the ADR leaders to the alliance of Caucasian peoples and the confederation of Caucasian republics, which they believed would fulfil at least two functions, was quite explicable and natural. The first function was a unifying-protective one (this is the origin of the idea of a "salvational alliance") in the face of the growing Bolshevik threat, and the second function was a political-diplomatic one, intended to facilitate a joint solution for Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in their attempts to achieve recognition of their independence at the Paris peace conference.

It has to be said that the Azerbaijani leadership itself, despite the unity of its approach, had different views on the future of such a confederation. For Topcubasov, an intellectual who headed the ADR delegation at the Paris conference and who embodied the allegiance to national ideas (he was not a member of any party and remained non-partisan in 1917-1920), a European orientation and oriental pragmatism, as well as for the government and Foreign Ministry of Azerbaijan, the issue of paramount importance was the achievement of recognition of the republic's independence. Also, being chairman of parliament and head of state (the post of chairman was the highest state position in the ADR), Topcubasov realized the special importance of Russia to the future of his country. In his view the confederation was of secondary importance and would no longer matter once the European countries and Russia had recognized the ADR.

For other politicians, first of all Mammad Amin Rasulzada and representatives of the right-wing radical section of the country's leadership, who did not trust Bolshevik Russia and oriented themselves mainly towards Turkey, the main consideration was the protective function of the confederation that could and should determine the confederative nature of the Caucasus in the face of the permanent (in their view) threat from Russia. On 30 November 1922, while in exile in Turkey and commenting on the issue of the incorporation of the Transcaucasian republics into the USSR in an interview with the Turkish newspaper Yeni Sark (New East), Rasulzada formulated his own approach to the issue in the following way: "The current federation was created against the will of those who joined Russia. Meanwhile, the federation that the Caucasians dreamt of was to be a wall that would protect the Caucasus from the avalanche descending from the north." He expressed the same views later - while an immigrant in Paris. In the booklet "On Pan-Turanism - In Connection With the Caucasus Problem", which was published in Paris in 1930, one of the former leaders of the ADR still emphasized the consolidatory and protective aspect of the confederation: "Whereas in the good old days the Caucasus was an arena of joint struggle for neighbouring peoples, the recent period in our joint lives and the suffering of this region have graphically proved that separate action by individual Caucasian peoples brings trouble not just to one people, but to all people of the Caucasus. The community of history and suffering or, to be more precise, the community of fate has created a common and more or less similar psychology in all the peoples of the Caucasus. The terrible years of terror and red imperialism, which has had a similar bloody impact on the peoples of the Caucasus, brought these peoples even closer and strengthened within their consciousness the community of their national-political interests."

However, expressing what he thought was the mood of politically aware Caucasian peoples and Caucasian emigration, Rasulzada drew far-reaching conclusions different from his traditional approach. "An independent Caucasus is the key not just to the welfare of its peoples, but also an important component of international peace," he wrote. "Our southern neighbours, who constantly face danger from the north, could be confident about their fate only if there was a free, confederated Caucasus. There is no doubt that our work to secure statehood for the whole Caucasus could instil in our southern neighbours appropriate respect for us and our work." As we can see, the idea of the Caucasian confederation here goes beyond economic and political expediency, its protective and diplomatic function and acquires wider geopolitical importance as a "buffer" to protect "southern neighbours" (probably Turkey and Iran) from "the northern danger" (probably Soviet Russia).

However, events that actually occurred in Transcaucasia in 1918-1921 left no hope for the implementation of the desire of ADR leaders for a confederation in the region. From 1918-1920, Armenia continued its policy of deportation and terror with regard to the peaceful Azerbaijani population in regions heavily populated by Azerbaijanis, both in Armenia itself and in the Goyca-Zangazur and Karabakh regions of Azerbaijan. Moreover, in November 1918, its armed forces invaded Georgian territory, provoking a bloody military conflict with that republic. These events made illusory in theory, and impossible in practice, not only any attempt to form a confederation of the three Caucasus republics, but also any joint diplomatic action in the international arena, principally towards securing recognition of their independence.

Without analyzing the main directions and achievements of the domestic and foreign policy of the government of the "First Republic", it must be noted that it left a valuable legacy of the building of a secular, democratic state, combining positive gains with failures and defeats. The ADR became the first democratic parliamentary republic in the Muslim world. Its domestic and foreign policy reflected the allegiance of the Azerbaijani people and their intellectual elite to the progressive ideas and values of the early 20th century, cultural pluralism and religious and political tolerance. Thus it was that the ADR was the first country in the East to grant electoral rights to women and one of the first European countries to secure electoral rights for all citizens, irrespective of sex, language or national affiliation (the 20 November 1918 law "On the establishment of the Azerbaijani parliament" and the 21 July 1919 statute "On elections to the constituent assembly of the Azerbaijan Republic")

In this respect, the policy of the ADR, based on principles of democracy and pluralism, was in stark contrast to the policy of the government of Dashnaktsakan Armenia which conducted a policy of deportation and genocide against the Azerbaijani and also the Russian and Kurdish populations on its territory throughout the whole period of its existence from May 1918 to December 1920. Thus it is no accident that a confidential report on the domestic political situation in Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1919, written by the British Foreign Office for the government on 24 December 1919, said in part that Armenia's ruling party Dashnaktsutyun held extreme social views and, according on its own interests, associated itself either with Bolshevism or with reaction in an unprincipled manner. Regarding the Usubbayov government which was in power from 14 April 1919 to April 1920, the report said that "it had achieved significant success". Taking into account the achievements of the ADR in stabilizing the economic and political situation, the report also came to the conclusion that the Azerbaijanis, led by the British, "could turn into a powerful police force of the region".

It is notable that the British diplomatic assessment coincided with that of Russian Bolshevik leaders, specifically Anastas Mikoyan, a leading light in the regional organization of Bolsheviks in the Caucasus. In an article with the characteristic headline "Armenian Imperialism" (1919), he stressed that "the presence of Armenian imperialism is surprising and comic and even tragicomic for the Armenian people". Pointing out the "specific and reactionary nature and content" of this phenomenon, the author also drew the following conclusion: "Currently, Armenia in fact occupies the territory of the Iravan region, the Muslim population of which is slightly outnumbered by Armenians. But this is the only territory which is heavily populated by Armenians and where Armenians form the majority of the population. As a result of the reactionary-chauvinist policy of the Armenian government, Muslims, who comprise two fifths of the entire population, have not only been sidelined from any form of participation in the government and rule of the country, but have also ended up in a situation where they have no rights, along with foreigners."

Touching on the main reasons for the fall of the ADR, we should note first of all that there were not the conditions for the development of a stable Azerbaijani state or the prerequisites for the lasting existence of the ADR either in Azerbaijan itself (which was at a stage of post-colonial development in typical socio-economic crisis, with domestic political instability), in the region (unsettled border problems, territorial claims by neighbouring republics on each other) or in the wider international environment (conflicting interests of the world's leading powers).

But what was much more important for the fate of the "First Republic" was the fact that its independent orientation, ideology and practice conflicted with the long-term geopolitical and economic interests of Soviet Russia, which remained the leading influence on the regional (Transcaucasian) situation and on the process of ADR state building, amidst chaos, devastation, civil war, foreign invasion and economic blockade.

Azerbaijan was a much more significant "target" for Soviet Russia than Georgia and Armenia, being rich in the natural resources which were especially valuable for a Russian economy weakened by world and civil wars. Azerbaijan held a unique position in the centre of the Russia-Persia-Turkey geo-strategic "triangle" which was extremely important in terms of the effective implementation of the geopolitical interests of Bolshevik Moscow along the entire length of the southern borders of tsarist Russia; it also held the Caspian "key", giving access to Central Asia. It was inevitable that, having emerged from the ruins of the Russian Empire and the surrounding chaos, the "First Republic" ended its historical path at the moment this anarchy ended and the Bolshevik centre consolidated its independent power in the country. In other words, the ADR lived as long as the leadership of Soviet Russia needed to mobilize its military and political resources to overthrow the bourgeois-democratic Azerbaijani government.

During the life of the ADR, the above-mentioned factors applied military-political pressure and ensured diplomatic isolation, "encouraging" internal instability, frequent changes of government (five governments emerged in that short period), the effectively subversive role of Azerbaijani Bolsheviks, as well as the Turkish communists and nationalists who forged a tactical alliance with them in the last months of the ADR. These factors were so strong that, even after the Sovietization of the whole of Transcaucasia, Azerbaijan retained a special status in the regional and eastern policy of Soviet Russia.

It should also be recalled that, as we said above, the idea of an independent Azerbaijan was unacceptable not just to the Bolsheviks, but also to a wide range of the Russian opposition - Denikin, who said "Azerbaijan, which is hostile to us", the Cadets, Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries. For example, Denikin was in favour of a "united, great and indivisible Russia" and would allow "autonomy for the periphery" only within the constraints of this formula. This autonomy was even lower in status than the "broad autonomy for Cossack troops justified by their historical services". Responding in his memoirs to accusations of intolerance towards the independence of "the periphery", he said that "this is not intolerance, but observance of the high interests of the Russian state, and this does not at all rule out the establishment of neighbourly relations". The actual denial to the Azerbaijanis of Transcaucasia of the right to self-determination and to establish their own independent state, brought all these forces closer to regional (in Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey) and international Armenian movements, regardless of their political orientation. It is also necessary to highlight the aggressive aspirations of the Armenian Republic and the Armenian separatism in the Karabakh, Zangazur and Naxcivan regions which it supported. All these factors together accelerated the fall of the ADR.