RUSSIA TRYING TO STIR UP GEORGIA OVER NATO

"When kings fight, it is the people who suffer" says the well-known proverb. This can be applied to the conflict between the West and Russia, which draws in weaker states whether they like it or not. 

Russian President Vladimir Putin has signed a decree giving the government the right to cooperate in economic, trade and other areas with what are practically (as they are described in the document) the authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and also to recognize some of the documents issued by these authorities. The decree also says that the Foreign Ministry should study the question of providing consular services to the residents of these regions. 

The Russian Foreign Ministry describes Putin's instruction as a logical step. The ministry said that further steps would be taken to cooperate in the interests of the social and economic development of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and of protecting the rights of the people living there, including Russian citizens. 

Earlier, in response to Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia in February, Russia had hinted at the possible recognition of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali. However, Russia has not yet decided to take this step, although it did lift the sanctions on Abkhazia that had been agreed in 1996 by the CIS partners. 

Russia cannot be understood with reason…

Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili's angry response to Moscow's actions on Abkhazia and South Ossetia was not long in coming. Likewise the reaction of the Western countries.

Although the Georgian question remained unanswered at the UN Security Council session in New York, this did not stop the USA, Great Britain, France and Germany (which along with Russia are members of the UN secretary general's Group of Friends of Georgia) announcing a communique on the situation in the conflict zone. The Russian delegation was not informed about the adoption of the document. The communique decisively condemns any actions (in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone) which could increase the risk of heightening tension. The four states also "expressed deep concern at Russia's establishment of official links" with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. "We call on the Russian Federation to revoke or not implement this decision," the document says. 

The controversy started in the UN Security Council several days earlier, when Georgia twice sent letters to the Security Council chairman expressing concern at Vladimir Putin's instructions to the Russian Federation government to work out ways to help the people of the unrecognized republics - Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Tbilisi also expressed its certainty that it was a Russian fighter aircraft that brought down an unmanned Georgian reconnaissance plane on 20 April this year.

Straight after this, Robert Simmons, the NATO secretary general's representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia, went to Georgia to deal with the situation on the spot, including the downed drone. His statement in Tbilisi was couched in even tougher language. NATO "doubts Russia's role as a mediator in the settlement of the Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts", Robert Simmons said in Tbilisi. This was the response of the NATO secretary general's representative to President Saakashvili's statement about the expediency of the presence of Russian peacekeepers in the Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflict zones. "NATO shares and supports the communique on Russia, adopted on 23 April by the USA, Great Britain, France and Germany - five members of the UN secretary general's Group of Friends of Georgia. This is a very serious document and we share the statements made in the communique," Simmons said.  

But will these moves stop Russia? Hardly. Or to be more exact, will the "creative thinking" of Russian politicians go as far as the practical recognition of the independence of the separatist entities? For, as Fedor Tyutchev wrote in the mid 19th century, "Russian cannot be understood by reason, or measured by the common yard". Not much seems to have changed in the Russian way of life since then, so the "war of nerves" and "mind games" will go on for quite some time. 

"Reflective" tactics 

By lifting sanctions on the separatist regimes of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and intending to establish direct, practically "inter-state", relations with these two unrecognized regions of Georgia, the Kremlin wants to kill two birds with one stone. 

First, Moscow politicians calculate that this step, bordering on recognition of the separatist entities, is a good lesson for the Western states that supported Kosovo's separation from Serbia. Second, it is a response to NATO's decision (at the Bucharest summit) to accept Georgia and Ukraine as members some time in the future. Third, it is an attempt to punish what the Russian establishment sees as disobedient Georgia for daring to confront Moscow openly. Fourth, it is a kind of warning to other republics of the former USSR which will make them think very carefully before taking Tbilisi's path. 

Apologists for Kosovo's separation from Serbia must take some of the blame for the situation that has developed over Georgia. However much they say that recognition of Pristina's independence does not set a precedent, the behaviour of Russia and its separatist allies is obvious proof of the temptation to follow Kosovo's example. This carries the threat of a chain reaction which will be very difficult to control, especially if such a country as Russia is involved. 

The main responsibility for what is going on, however, lies with Russia. The politics of divide and rule (for the want of other effective mechanisms) in its former colonies began a long time ago and continue today with no end in sight. 

This behaviour is more reminiscent of the reaction of a spoilt child who is having its favourite toy taken away than of a civilized, democratic country. All this will go against Russia at the end of the day. Pressure and blackmail lead to the opposite reaction, which is what we can basically see today in Georgia and Ukraine. Through its actions Russia is showing the international community that it does not have a clear, long-term foreign policy strategy. On the contrary, strategy has been sacrificed on the altar of impetuousness, which smacks more of animal reflexes described in zoology textbooks than of considered strategy. This is what leads to the process of the former satellites tearing themselves away in favour of integration with the more civilized and predictable West. 

By declaring war on "stroppy" little Georgia, "Great Rassia", as Peter the Great called it, is showing only its weakness, choosing to beat small countries instead of suffering defeat against the stronger countries of the West. But does recognition of this simple truth make anyone feel better? 

Certainly not Georgia, whom Moscow is trying to push to the limit by dismembering it "pour encourager les autres" and to get revenge on the West. These are the "plans of our own" which Vladimir Putin made veiled hints about in February when Kosovo's separation was formalized. Can the Kremlin's subsequent actions be considered an unpredictable and cunning strategic combination? Of course not: Moscow does not have that many options for its appropriate response and this "knight's move" was as clear as the fog which Russian politicians, threatening their Western opponents, tried to cover themselves with. 

This final factor can also be considered the fault of the four "great states" who signed the communique in support of Georgia. They were also obliged to act in good time to protect as far as possible their partners from these easily predictable moves by Moscow. But double standards would seem to have come into play, which have from the beginning been at the heart of their policy of a "Kosovo settlement" - strategic partners can and must be sacrificed in Realpolitik. 

I think this is the real lesson that Georgia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine should learn from this. Moscow is openly threatening Ukraine with the separation of Crimea. For Tbilisi, Baku and Kiev this is what the "Kosovo precedent" is all about.

If this idea is pursued further, then one realizes that there is something worse. Unlike the Russians, it is difficult to accuse British, German, French and, strange though it may sound, American politicians of a lack of a thought-out, long-term strategy. This can be seen in Germany and France's pragmatic voting (in exchange for Russian gas) against giving Georgia and Ukraine candidate membership status in NATO at the Bucharest summit. It can also be seen in the statement that Tbilisi and Kiev will definitely become part of the alliance, without any mention of dates.

This creates the clear impression that the "Western partners", as Vladimir Putin likes to call them, are deliberately provoking Russia into taking inappropriate action, being aware of its psychology and modus operandi. Any chess gambit sacrifices pieces for the sake of future victory. It would be good if Georgia (and possibly other countries) is being seen in the West as a piece that under the rules of chess can be returned to the board towards the end of the game and not as a pawn, the loss of which will not greatly grieve anyone.

It's quite a gloomy picture. 

What will be the end game? 

One thing is clear: the latest actions by the West are aimed at weakening Russia and several other powers. We have written about this many times so we will not dwell on this subject. However, all countries that have willingly or unwillingly been involved in major conflict (that is the whole of Europe, as a minimum, and most of Asia in the future) should already today be reading through the possible scenarios for events, including the current example in Georgia. Britain's Guardian newspaper says that Abkhazia and South Ossetia could "be the venue of a new cold war between a resurgent Russia and expansionist West".  

This prompts several important questions. 

First, how far might Moscow go? Second, is the West capable of proving that the Kosovo case really is unique, as they say, and cannot be applied to any other conflict situations? Third, how far could the West go to prove the cynical proverb "Gods may do what cattle may not"?  This has been the idea at the basis of the West's relations with Moscow. Fourth, what sacrifices are the Americans & Co. ready to make in this gambit and what kind of sacrifices will they be - pieces that will be returned to the board in future or expendable pieces such as pawns? 

There may be various answers to these questions and the two competing camps may quite naturally have very different answers.

However much they try to confuse us with statements that there can be no talk of a new cold war and however much the sides call one another "partners", the heart of the matter is perfectly clear. Call it what you like - it won't change. Only the consequences are unclear, especially for the "suffering people". 

The year 2008 promises to be packed to the very end with events affecting the "fate of peoples". We have to wait for the end of at least two processes upon which the further progress of history largely depends. These are the elections in the USA and the outcome of the disturbances in the upper echelons of power in Russia, where the situation after the demarcation of authority between Vladimir Putin and the new president, Dmitriy Medvedev, is not as predictable as it may have first appeared. In the case of the Americans it's a choice between the more moderate Democrats and McCain who is a bigger hawk than George Bush. In the case of Moscow it's a question of whether Dmitriy Medvedev wants to play second fiddle, a role which Russian political commentators are assigning to him, or whether there will be some changes…

…While Russia tries to profit from NATO's Kosovo policy and show that it is a great power at the expense of Georgia, other countries with similar problems could be the future target. 

It is another matter that Kremlin circles do not fully understand one important detail: Kosovo is a time bomb which has been placed under Russia itself. Its current actions in Georgia are simply hurrying up the clock which has been wound up by the "Western partners". Moscow still has to find out from its own experience whose flames they are fanning with their current behaviour. By trying to annoy the West, it looks as though Russia is simply carrying out the West's long-term strategy.