SERZH'S SURVIVAL SCHOOL

There was nothing memorable about the 9 April inauguration of Armenia's new president, Serzh Sargsyan - neither high-ranking guests nor popular celebration. The only significance was that the "Karabakh hawk", who came to power on the blood of his countrymen (although "Armenian Armenians" pretty much do not consider Karabakhi Serzh Sargsyan to be "theirs"), had the wisdom to hold his inauguration on the 40th day after the death of protestors in the violent dispersal of the opposition protests on 1 March. Common sense and basic human decency (and especially presidential) should have made the new Armenian leader move his inauguration by one day.

But it looks as though Sargsyan's thirst for power is so great that even a delay of just one day in assuming the presidential post is unacceptable. Perhaps Serzhik, as he's known in Armenia and Karabakh, deliberately chose this way to show his disregard for mourning rituals and even the feelings of relatives and supporters of the dead whom the authorities describe as provocateurs and subversives.

It was difficult to believe the sincerity of the new leader of "all Armenians'" remarks at his inauguration that he intends to hold dialogue with all forces in the country and to be president of all Armenians, even of those who opposed him.

At the very least opposition supporters did not believe in Sargsyan's sincerity and cast a cloud over Sargsyan's big day by "inappropriate" protests in different parts of the Armenian capital. 

Serzh Sargsyan has taken over the country at a tricky time. The new president must tackle problems left in the presidential portfolio by his predecessor Robert Kocharyan, although the new Armenian leader has only himself to blame for this too. 

The presidential race has once and for all divided Armenian society both at home and abroad into two irreconcilable camps. Under Robert Kocharyan Armenians at least managed to over up the crisis in relations from outside eyes. However, during the period when Kocharyan remained the de jure head of state, while de facto Prime Minister Sargsyan was already in charge, the ugliness and bitterness of the systemic crisis in Armenian society was so obvious that it was undeniable. 

The initial impression is of a confrontation in Armenia between the Karabakh Armenian clan and the "real" Armenian clan. This simmering process began long ago. The current systemic crisis in Armenian society, including the diaspora, has already gone beyond an internal clan conflict and acquired an international character. The influential Armenian diaspora has never before been so divided. Armenians in the West and Armenians in Russia take diametrically opposing positions. The conflict between Serzh Sargsyan and Levon Ter-Petrosyan has turned into a conflict between supporters of a pro-Western, democratically orientated Armenia and conservative, pro-Russian forces which are receiving help from forces inside the Kremlin.

A broad opposition has already matured in Armenia and is gaining strength. It is remarkable that before the latest presidential race it was much more difficult to get information about the real state of affairs within Armenian society than it is now. The Armenian media used to follow a closed policy, preferring to wash their dirty linen in private. Now, however, despite the censorship introduced by the current authorities, the world is inundated with information and comment from opposition politicians and observers. This reveals a trend towards greater openness in some Armenian circles, which was completely absent before.

Even the problem of resolving the Karabakh conflict which used to consolidate society is now a factor of public discord. Azerbaijan's latest diplomatic achievement - the resolution on "The situation in the occupied territories" passed by the UN General Assembly on 14 March - prompted a storm of criticism of the authorities. 

Understanding is growing in Armenia that the clear political and economic tie to Russia, which used to be reasonably effective and maintained relative stability, has recently broken down badly. An opposition structure, led by Levon Ter-Petrosyan, has now taken shape in Armenia, something the opponents of the ruling clan could only dream about before. 

On the other hand, Serzh Sargsyan has come up against a lack of total support within the authorities, even though he is Robert Kocharyan's successor. This became clear during the opposition's post-election activity, when prominent resignations and critical statements came from many senior officials and representatives of all the power-wielding structures, even though Serzh Sargsyan had been their leader before he became prime minister. It looks as though these officials had made an accurate assessment of their former boss who was interior minister, national security minister, defence minister and then prime minister.

It was already known that there was no unity within the Karabakh clan ruling Armenia. Rumours of a backstage struggle between Kocharyan and Sargsyan were constantly emerging. Therefore, observers were surprised at the news that Kocharyan would do a swap with Sargsyan - i.e. take the post of prime minister - that emerged before the 19 February presidential elections. For a long time Kocharyan himself did not deny these reports. Realizing that it was not worth expecting special support from the old team, the day before his inauguration Serzh Sargsyan announced the name of the new prime minister (it looks as though he had earlier been afraid of the consequences). The decree on his appointment had been signed straight after he took office. It was the chairman of the Armenian Central Bank, Tigran Sargsyan, 48. 

The same day Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanyan, a significant and quite popular figure in the Armenian establishment, said that he would not be part of the new team either. True, he said that 10 years as a minister was too long and that "renewal" was needed. "The new president should appoint the new minister," the former foreign minister said. Meanwhile, most observers think that the resignation of Oskanyan, who enjoyed respect amongst Armenians in the West, was probably prompted by the fact that he does not share the views and methods of the Karabakh hawk, Serzh Sargsyan.

This will clearly not be the end of the matter and the "renewal" in the corridors of power will be quite wide-ranging. Sargsyan will have to give portfolios to the representatives of three parties which supported him in the elections and with which his Republican Party has created the ruling coalition. These are the authoritative Dashnaktsutyun, the second largest parliamentary party, Prosperous Armenia, and yesterday's opposition party Orinats Yerkir, led by Artur Bagdasaryan who broke away from Levon Ter-Petrosyan for substantial promises.

Forming the new government when the situation in the corridors of power is so complex will be a serious test for Serzh Sargsyan.

He must rebuild Armenia's foreign policy system, especially against the backdrop of the complete loss of authority in the eyes of the West. The reasons are well-known: the totally falsified elections; the violent dispersal of the opposition with many fatalities; the introduction of a state of emergency; the ban on political activity and demonstrations; strict media censorship; numerous arrests of opposition activists, not to mention the rejection of the policy of complementarity in favour of a clear, unambiguous orientation towards Russia which has openly taken on the mission of guaranteeing Sargsyan's authority. 

The, to put it mildly, unusual congratulations of Serzh Sargsyan on his inauguration day from the European Union's high representative for foreign policy and security, Javier Solana, were indicative: "We continue the independent investigation into post-election events, we are watching the process of setting free the arrested political figures, the open dialogue with opposition, as well as emphasize restoration of full freedom as a means of raising the people's trust." The "letter of congratulation" needs no further comment. Serzh Sargsyan was not expecting any official congratulations from the US president. Moreover, Armenia has lost millions in annual aid from the American government as part of the Millennium Challenge programme, which is an immense loss for a country whose people are becoming totally impoverished and which is led by the corrupt Karabakhi regime. It will probably take the new Yerevan regime a long time to restore the not very high level of cooperation with the West that existed during Kocharyan's presidency. It is also not clear to what extent the Kremlin wishes to untie Yerevan's hands in this regard. 

The recently aggravated conflict between Moscow and NATO must also be taken into account. NATO will move right up to Armenia's border and come between it and Russia when it accepts Georgia, no friend of Russia. Tbilisi joining the North Atlantic Alliance will be a clear signal to the Kremlin that it is completely losing influence in the South Caucasus. Russia set itself the task of reviving Armenia's economy by buying it up root and branch but it has not managed to achieve any major results. The fiasco that Russia will suffer if NATO comes into the region could well lead to it "betraying" its current strategic partner in favour of the West. 

NATO's entry into the region would probably also open new prospects and formulae for the effective and rapid resolution of the regional conflicts that have arisen as the result of separatism in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagornyy Karabakh. Armenia understands full well that a great deal depends on who will be supporting them at that moment. The opposition representatives who are preaching the idea of a foreign policy change can feel these winds of political change. And they are winds that will most likely only grow stronger, and not without help from outside, mainly from Western diaspora organizations which have long wanted to see Armenia facing Europe and America.  

Therefore, we can probably expect that in the near future Yerevan will toughen its far from constructive position on the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Karabakh. Serzh Sargsyan simply has no other choice. On the one hand, he does not enjoy the mass support at home which he would require if he were to make the compromises necessary for a resolution. On the other hand, it is clear that the Russian "curators" will not allow Armenia to resolve the conflict under any formula at all, even if Azerbaijan were to do the unthinkable and give up its occupied territories. Settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict would erase the question in Armenian society of the need for a pro-Russia orientation. It is the only thread keeping Yerevan in Moscow's clutches.

One thing is clear: Serzh Sargsyan has stepped onto the slippery path of the presidency and there is no guarantee whatsoever, either at home or abroad, that he will be able to hang on to his post for the two terms available to him. 

It is difficult to balance on bayonets, especially when your feet are slippery with blood…