A NEW COURSE?

The results of the 14 March vote at the UN General Assembly on the draft resolution "The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan" remains the focus of attention of Azerbaijani and foreign political analysts. But the most important point is that the tough position which Baku has taken towards the trio of co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group and countries who voted against our draft is beginning to yield results. They all spoke about their support for the principle of the territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of Azerbaijan. The question remains, however, and first and foremost for the countries on which Baku pinned great hopes in helping to achieve a just regulation of the Nagornyy-Karabakh conflict.

In this context, I would like to touch upon the position of our immediate neighbour and partner, Russia.  By charting a course towards strategic partnership with Moscow and complementing it with a balanced course of foreign policy, both in the region and in the international arena, Baku certainly counted on understanding and the adoption of a reciprocal approach by the Kremlin. However, the reverse is taking place: Moscow's positions on the fundamental issues of regulation are increasingly converging with those of Yerevan. Russia is building up its political, diplomatic and military support for Armenia, which, for its part, "re-exports" this support to the occupation authorities in Nagornyy-Karabakh. This is why a considerable section of Azerbaijani society and its political elite have formed the firm opinion that Moscow's policy remains under the influence of traditional Russian stereotypes and is aimed at the containment of Azerbaijan by support for Armenia. It is no accident, therefore, that, according to studies by the Ray Monitoring Centre, the number of respondents who consider Russia "a country which is unfriendly or even hostile toward Azerbaijan" has been increasing of late.

Of course, this is a direct outcome of the near-sighted policy and unfriendly moves by the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry or individual members of its establishment.

In the meantime, Moscow itself does not like the fact that the same type of containment policy is employed, according to its politicians, by the United States and the West. In his concluding news briefing on the results of the Russia-NATO Council meeting on 4 April in Bucharest, the Russian President stressed that the effectiveness of cooperation with the alliance will depend on the extent of consideration of Russia's interests by its individual members. "The appearance of a powerful military bloc right on our borders....  will be considered by Russia to be a direct threat to the security of our country. And statements that this process is not aimed against Russia cannot satisfy us. National security cannot be built on promises," said Mr. Putin.

It would be appropriate to note here that a powerful military-political bloc is also taking shape on the borders of Azerbaijan, constructed by Moscow and Yerevan; the bloc has military, political and economic components, frequently holding joint military exercises, actively engaging in military-technical cooperation and implies support for Armenia's positions within international organizations, including the UN, by Russian diplomats. But Armenia is an aggressor country, whereas NATO has no territorial claim against Russia. So the question arises: does Baku have reason to view this bloc as a threat to its national security? Of course it does, if we use standard logic. Is Iron Chancellor Bismarck's maxim (which Putin often quotes) that potential, not intention, is what matters in military policy, applicable in our case? Of course it is. After all, no matter how many times Moscow says that the movement of weaponry from Russian military bases in Georgia to Armenia is not intended for use against Azerbaijan, it is obvious that these bases can be used in Yerevan's interests at any time. Azerbaijan has more than once encountered such developments during the Karabakh war. So, the military presence in the neighbouring country has been enhanced, to which we should react accordingly, because our country's security, too, cannot and must not depend on statements and promises.

"Many people say that Russia is cross-grained," said Mr. Putin in Bucharest, commenting on the rationale behind his country's withdrawal from the ABM treaty, and he posed himself a question: "But why should we not be when talking about threats to our national security?"  It is hard to argue against the unassailable logic of this argument. Baku is also often criticized - and by Moscow, too - for its unwillingness to compromise on issues of regulation.  But one cannot help asking why we should be flexible on issues concerning our country's security, its sovereignty, the inviolability of its borders and territorial integrity?

This policy towards Azerbaijan, which is increasingly swerving away from one of strategic partnership, is not only apparent in the regulation of the Nagornyy-Karabakh conflict. It is being implemented in other areas too, including that of the economic security of Azerbaijan, in which Baku has always been as open as possible to Russia and Russian business. In his recent interview with Izvestiya (31 March), Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov complained that Washington is increasingly active in its attempts to enter post-Soviet areas - Ukraine and Georgia. He said that if Ukraine and Georgia are absorbed by NATO, this will lead to a considerable geopolitical shift. "We can see," he noted, "how they work with the Central Asian states and Azerbaijan to persuade them to export their energy resources without transiting them through Russia, and using routes, to boot, which are controlled by regimes which are closest to the United States. What can we do? Put counter-pressure on the former Soviet republics? This would be disrespectful, because they are sovereign states and have the right to choose their foreign political and economic partners."

Why has Mr Lavrov decided that we (or someone on our behalf) transport our energy resources along routes to avoid Russia?  Does Baku criticize Moscow for the fact that a "regime which is close to Yerevan" is building "North Stream" and "South Stream" to export its energy resources without transiting them through Azerbaijan? It did not occur to anyone here to do that because our foreign policy is not based solely on the promotion of our interests, but also on understanding and respecting others' legitimate interests and on benefits for our partners. Although some of the Russia's neighbouring countries really do consider sending their energy around Russia, this happens because Moscow puts primary, not counter, pressure on these countries, using energy pricing mechanisms and other means.

"Now they want to build the Nabucco gas pipeline," the Russian Foreign Minister continues, "which is clearly an artificial project. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan is of the same kind: it is not just that it is downright unprofitable, but there aren't the resources to fill it to capacity, so its pay-off period is very lengthy and requires long-term investment. It was built nonetheless, despite the fact that there were options to send the same amount of energy resources to Europe for shorter-term investment."

The logic of Russia's chief diplomat becomes incomprehensible at this point. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project is considered by the vast majority of Western, and even Russian specialists, as one of the most successful in the region. It incorporates an advanced model of Production Sharing Agreement, which Russia has not yet been able to adopt. All of the project's shareholders, without exception, make hundreds of millions of dollars of profit from it and the energy resources necessary are guaranteed by the Azeri-Ciraq-Gunasli deposit, whose reserve estimates have recently been revised upwards. They were revised not by us, but by the Western companies - the same ones, incidentally, which work in the Russian market, too. But the Russian minister claims later in the same interview that, "we (Russia - author's note) should take advantage of our natural resources, geography and transit capacities." But our country has similar advantages and, just like Russia, Azerbaijan has the right to use these advantages when it formulates its strategy in the energy sector.

Incidentally, a Russian corporation, LUKoil, also had an option to become a shareholder in the project, but it withdrew and sold its share for some reason. It refused to participate in a profitable project in Azerbaijan and to guarantee long-term profits for itself (everyone knows how high oil prices are now). Where else can you find a company in the modern world which would voluntarily refuse multi-million dollar profits? And the most ridiculous thing is that, at the same time, other Russian companies are transferring huge amounts of money to the accounts of defunct Armenian factories, whose future is quite uncertain.

This, apparently, is the formula for Russian geopolitics: to withdraw from a profitable project, then to subject it to scathing criticism; to refuse hundreds of millions of dollar and, later, to waste roughly as much in the sands of Armenia; to establish close relations with a regime whose aggressive foreign and domestic policy endangers not only its own people's interests, but also Russia's interests in the region, to support a country which, only after Mr. Putin's harsh reaction, suspended a large-scale campaign to close Russian-language schools in Yerevan - and to do all this to the detriment of mutually beneficial cooperation with our country where, by the way, not a single Russian school has ever been closed.

In this context, Sergey Lavrov's statement that Russia's main argument must be its "attractiveness in every sense, be it political, economic or cultural" and that Russia is a country which can "add value to anyone's security" does not sound credible. In the light of the above, it makes sense to ask the question: what "added value" can the present-day Moscow give to our security?

Overall, Azerbaijan is ready to develop further mutually beneficial cooperation with Russia in areas where our interests coincide - and there is a wide range of such areas. Baku views Moscow as a major and important international player which has been, is, and will be present in the region with its legitimate interests. We are interested in returning to the strategic decisions of the leaders of our countries, made to develop mutually beneficial and constructive relations, which will open the road to promising projects in the economic, investment, political and humanitarian sectors and which will realise our countries' huge potentials. But when we say that, we expect that Russia, too, will travel its part of the distance by recognizing our legitimate interests, the most important of which, at this stage, is the right to peaceful and safe development and a just regulation of the Nagornyy-Karabakh conflict, with respect for our sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of our borders.

A passage from the Russian President's Munich speech would be an appropriate conclusion to this article. For some reason it caused consternation in the Western world despite containing many important and pressing statements, including a statement of the threat arising from a "disregard for the fundamental principles of international law."

Concluding his speech in Bavaria, Mr. Putin emphasised that Russia would like to deal with "responsible partners" with whom it would be able to "work together on building a just and democratic world order, safeguarding security and prosperity, not just for the chosen few, but for everyone."  Azerbaijan would also like to deal with a responsible Russia and, with it, to build a just order in the South Caucasus region, which would be based on security and prosperity, not for just a chosen few regimes, but for all the countries and peoples who reside here. This would be the greatest "added value" which Moscow could possibly offer for the security of its neighbours and itself.