16 March 2025

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COUNTING ON INVULNERABILITY

The Bucharest meeting may become an important milestone in establishing a new world order

Author:

01.04.2008

The 2-4 April NATO summit in Bucharest was the focus of international attention long before its scheduled date. And this was no accident. As luck would have it, many international political problems have become particularly pressing at this point (naturally or deliberately), so the discussion at a meeting to be attended by effectively all the main "players" sparks huge interest. It is quite possible that future histories will identify the Bucharest meeting as an important milestone in the building of a new world order for the 21st century.

 

There is no such thing as a free lunch

One of the main issues on the summit agenda arises from the fact that the Ukrainian leadership - President Viktor Yushchenko, Prime Minister Yuliya Timoshenko and Speaker of the Supreme Rada, Arseniy Yatsenyuk - sent a letter to the North Atlantic alliance headquarters in January, asking for the assignment of a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to the country. Later, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili sent a similar letter to Brussels. Naturally, this immediately prompted strong statements from Russia, including a threat to re-aim Russian missiles at Ukraine. Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said, for example, that the policy of NATO enlargement is an instance of regression to the Cold War era.

In the mean time, Georgia's and Ukraine's chances of joining the alliance remained unclear for the entire period. The point is that there is no consensus at all on this issue among NATO member states themselves. For example, Robert Simmons, special representative of the General Secretary of the Alliance for the South Caucasus and Central Asia, said at a news conference in Moscow that Ukraine and Georgia will not receive their MAP's at the upcoming summit of the alliance in Bucharest. He, too, cited discord among the members of the alliance as the reason. For her part, German Chancellor Angela Merkel spoke against Georgia's and Ukraine's accession to NATO.  It is known that none of France, Italy, Spain and Greece is particularly well-disposed to this development.

However, Georgia and Ukraine still hope that the answer may be affirmative. In particular, Mikheil Saakashvili urged the countries of the alliance "not to connive" with Russia, and US President George Bush was quick to assure the Georgian leader that he would support Georgia's aspiration to establish closer ties with NATO.  In his turn, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Volodymyr Ogryzko stressed once again that Kiev will insist on getting their MAP at the Bucharest summit.

In the mean time, in discussing the issue of NATO expansion to the east (that is to say, effectively the issue of confrontation between the West and Russia) we should not forget that there are quite enough controversies already within the alliance, mainly along the Europe-USA divide.

Figuratively speaking, NATO is Washington's pass into the circle of EU member states, which, protected by US military might, are free of many headaches. But nothing is free, so the United States expects - and this is fair too - that its allies will support White House plans for which the territory of Europe is an indispensable launch pad or arena. That Washington finds this situation advantageous and that it is not at all delighted with the possibility of the growing military might of the EU is evident from its attitude towards the idea of the creation of a so-called "Euroarmy." For instance, the United States once dubbed it a "dangerous trend within NATO which sows discord."  Apparently, the emergence of the "Eurodollar" is more than enough for the United States.

So, it is perfectly clear - alongside acceptance of the fact that successful implementation of US initiatives helps strengthen EU and US positions in the international arena - that this also serves the purpose of further consolidating of Washington's position within NATO. And perhaps this is where the reasons for the mutually contradictory statements by George Bush and Angela Merkel on Georgia's and Ukraine's accession to NATO should be sought.

In the mean time, differences between the United States and other member states of the alliance manifest themselves in a number of other issues, too: for example, the United States is displeased with its allies' role in the counterterrorist operation in Afghanistan. The allies hesitate to send their troops to the most dangerous southern provinces of the country. It is curious in this respect that, in mid-March, unconfirmed reports began to appear in the media saying that Vladimir Putin had offered military assistance in Afghanistan in return for NATO's denial of a MAP to Ukraine and Georgia.

It has to be taken into account that any further steps taken by Russia in respect of the self-declared "republics" of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the sharpness of the "natural gas war" between Russia and Ukraine, which is far from over, hinge on NATO's decisions on Georgia and Ukraine.  Moscow makes no secret of this.

 

Offspring of the Star Wars programme

A whole range of issues in bilateral Russian-US relations is directly related to the NATO summit: the US plans to set up a third anti-missile missile deployment area in Eastern Europe, the future of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, START I and the Treaty on Medium and Short-Range Missiles and so on. However, the debate over the merits of missile defence deserves special attention because its pressing nature has given rise to suggestions that a new Cold War might break out.

As we know, Washington intends to set up a radar system in the Czech Republic and deploy 10 air defence interceptor missiles in Poland, citing as the reason the need for protection from a potential threat from Iran. Russia, however, is worried that these systems might be used to undermine its security. As Russian Defence Minister Sergey Lavrov noted, this is not a matter of a third deployment area, one radar and 10 interceptor missiles; rather, this is a system which is actively expanding and which will spread not only over the whole of Eastern Europe, but also into South-East Asia, including Japan, Britain and, according to some in the media, even Turkey, although there is no official confirmation yet."  According to a number of media outlets, the official talks on deployment of a mobile radar system in Turkey might also begin during the Bucharest summit. In return, Ankara could get material assistance with the modernization of its army and investments totalling more than $1 billion into the country's military sector. In addition, Washington will probably also continue its policy of tacit acquiescence to Turkish counterterrorist operations in Northern Iraq. The Austrian Die Presse writes that the US Missile Defense Administration (MDA) would like to install a high-sensitivity mobile radar system in Turkey. Thus far, the United States has only used one radar system of that type - in California.

In the mean time, it is worth noting that the ABM Treaty, which envisaged mutual restrictions on deployment of missile defence systems, was in the past signed upon the initiative of the US. The gist of the treaty was that no signatory would be able feel so invulnerable to a missile attack as to dare to strike first, certain of its capability to evade a devastating counter strike. This is why Russia said in response to the dissolution of the treaty and the White House decision to begin development of the national ABM system that, "this will lead to the demolition of the entire system of international agreements which maintained strategic stability."  It has to be said, however, that the idea of withdrawal from the treaty did not belong to Bush jr.'s administration. Former US President Ronald Reagan said that the doctrine of "mutual assured destruction" was "mad" because it effectively meant admission by Washington of its vulnerability. And this is where a logical question arises, vindicating the White House's resolve to deploy the components of the national ABM system in Eastern Europe. Assuming that the United States kept to the strategy of "mutual vulnerability" in its relations with Russia and even China, what should it do about Iran, which the West accuses of harbouring plans to create nuclear weapons?

Going back to the Reagan era, let us remind readers that back then he approved the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative, which was later dubbed the "Star Wars programme."  The plan was to intercept all missiles before they reached US airspace. Having survived the end of the Cold War, the programme did not die out and became instead what the Americans now call the national missile defence system. To create it, the United States withdrew from the ABM treaty and are now engaged in lengthy talks with Russia.

However, even within NATO there are problems. For example, in Britain - the main ally of the United States in Europe - not everyone is pleased with US plans to develop its national missile defence system. Neither should we forget that, according to media reports, the majority of citizens of the Czech Republic and Poland are also against the idea of deploying the US ABM system.

It is clear that the components of the US ABM system in Eastern Europe and Georgia's and Ukraine's accession to NATO are parts of a geopolitical game. It is clear, after all, that the US national ABM system does not pose any direct threat to Russia, but it does revamp the entire system of nuclear parity. And Moscow will, will-nilly, have to take measures to respond to the changing situation. What comes to mind here is that seven years ago, when Washington announced its decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, Moscow did not cause much stir and did not issue threats to "re-aim" its missiles. However, the different reaction to the same development is also quite understandable. In terms of foreign policy, the present-day Russia and the Russia of seven years ago are effectively two different countries.

There has been a lot of talk of late about a major overhaul of the world order which took shape right after World War II. But if this is true, the question is where the changing of the established rules of international relations will lead us - towards a streng-thening of global security or to-wards growing mistrust and the undermining of peace?


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