UNCLEAR SUCCESS

Iran is a country with which Azerbaijan has the longest border. We are linked by common history, religion and culture. Together with the Persians, Azerbaijanis are the largest ethnic group in the Islamic Republic of Iran, playing an important role in the political and economic life of that country. For this reason, our state and public is not indifferent to all remarkable events in the domestic and foreign policy of Iran. In this regard, it is no surprise that the situation surrounding Iran's nuclear programme and the 14 March parliamentary elections to the Islamic Majlis (parliament) was in the centre of close attention in Azerbaijan.

It must be noted that information about the elections was contradictory and incomplete because international observers were not invited to monitor them and the activities of foreign journalists were limited. For example, if the Iranian authorities say that the turnout was 65 per cent, opposition circles maintain that the turnout was much lower. According to the website Iran-e Emruz, the turnout in the capital Tehran was 40 per cent and in Tabriz only 33 per cent. Moreover, numerous violations during the vote-counting were reported. The European Union issued a special statement describing the elections as "not free and unfair".

Seven thousand candidates contended for 290 seats in parliament. The Supervisory Council, which is authorized to filter contenders, earlier rejected 200 candidates who had been critical of the regime - independents or reformists. Some of the contenders (for example, Mohammad Reza Aref - vice-president in Mohammad Khatami's government, Reza Amrollahi - the former representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the IAEA and others) were forced to drop out of the race under pressure. Imam Khomeyni's grandson dropped out of the race under pressure from his family after the Supervisory Council confirmed his loyalty. As a result, the opposition camp nominated its candidates only in one third of all the country's constituencies, which reduced the interest in the elections, especially in major cities.

According to the preliminary results, 120 seats were gained by radical or moderate conservatives, 46 by reformists and 34 by independent candidates. A second round will be held in 30 constituencies where none of the contenders gained the minimum 25 per cent of the vote. In the remaining constituencies, votes will probably be recounted to identify the winner. As a result, the incumbent President Mahmud Ahmadinezhad and his circle may be celebrating their victory because the supporters of social and economic reforms who favour a dialogue with the West (the National Trust Party led by the former speaker of the Iranian parliament, Mehdi Karrubi, and the Reformist Coalition which supports the former Iranian president, Seyyed Mohammad Khatami) ended up in a clear minority.

The current victory of conservatives, just like the election of Ahmadinezhad himself in the previous presidential elections, was secured mainly by the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) which unofficially controls political and economic power in the country. The functionaries, supporters and veterans of the IRGC are ousting clerics, taking the reins of power in all government agencies. Although the IRGC often criticizes its henchman President Ahmadinezhad regarding various aspects of his economic and social policy, this force - the Basij, just like any other mass military-political organization, is the main supporter of the head of state. As a result, the IRGC and the Basij secured the conservatives' victory in the recent parliamentary elections. This was especially important after Ahmadinezhad's supporters lost the municipal elections and during the re-election of the influential Supervisory Council.

Meanwhile, the conservatives' success does not at all mean that the government will have an easy life and does not guarantee President Ahmadinezhad's re-election. A considerable number of conservative deputies are politicians who disagree with his views of the country's domestic development and with his style of relations with the world community. They are inclined to criticize the current government and may unleash serious political battles inside the ruling faction in parliament, which has not been the case in Iran for a long time.

Ahmadinezhad and his circle were also seriously disappointed in the resounding victory of one of the main political opponents of the regime - the former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Ali Larijani, who was dismissed from his post last autumn for his lenient position in the talks with the EU on Iran's nuclear programme. He headed the ticket in Qom - the country's religious centre where he enlisted support from influential mullahs. According to The Los Angeles Times, moderate conservatives and reformists may form a serious political force that will be able to put massive pressure on President Ahmadinezhad in all spheres.

Also, apart from the "conservatives" and "reformers", there is a new group which can be called "centrists" in Iran's political scene. Most of them represent pragmatic conservatives whose unofficial leader is the former Iranian president and the current chairman of the influential Supervisory Council, 74-year-old Hashemi Rafsanjani. If his difficult relations with Iran's spiritual leader Ali Khamene'i are kept secret, he has an open conflict with President Ahmadinezhad. He has been quite critical of the president, especially his foreign policy and nuclear programme. At the same time, the former president is certainly supported by major businesses and some of the top clerics.

The main issue which defines not only Iran's foreign policy and economy, but also its domestic policy is the country's nuclear programme. The world community is concerned not so much about the programme to develop nuclear energy and the implementation of the project to create Iran's own fuel base, to which Iran is entitled as a member of the NNPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), as the possible development of nuclear weapons on the basis of Iran's own fuel, especially as, in parallel, Iran is developing and testing ballistic missiles that are absolutely useless from a military point of view if there are no nuclear warheads. However, the Tehran government continues to insist on the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, and all attempts to prove the opposite have been futile so far.

Based on the IAEA report which notes Tehran's refusal to freeze its programmes, the UN Security Council adopted a third resolution with 14 votes in favour and one abstention (Indonesia) on 3 March 2008, toughening sanctions against Iran. This resolution imposes a ban on trade in double use products with Iran which can be used for both civilian and military purposes. The list of Iranian officials who cannot enter other countries was expanded (to 18). Also, a list was made of 12 companies and banks (including major state-owned banks such as Bank-e Melli and Bank-e Saderat), with which transactions are banned.

However, this resolution, judging by the first reaction, did not have the required effect. Ahmadinezhad's uncompromising government is continuing its confrontational behaviour in the international arena. Immediately after the elections the results of which were portrayed by the conservative circles as the population's clear support for the hard line, Tehran issued harshly-worded statements against the USA and the UN. "There will be no more negotiations with the 'six' (USA, Russia, Britain, France, Germany and China) or any other country on the nuclear problem," said the official government spokesman Gholam Hoseyn Elham.

However, Iran's economic realities will hardly help the government in its confrontation with the rest of the world. Even despite the soaring oil and gas prices, the Iranian economy is experiencing great difficulties. Living standards are increasing very slowly. Two-digit inflation, problems in petrol supplies, the shortage of many consumer goods, the high rate of unemployment among the youth and soaring housing prices are causing growing discontent among the population. As a result of the UN sanctions, the business climate in the country has deteriorated, the influx of foreign investments has fallen and foreign companies are leaving the Iranian market. The hopes of Ahmadinezhad's government for an influx of capital from Asian countries, especially China, Japan and Korea, have not been realized. Chinese capital, which has been increasing its presence in Iran over the last 10 years, now contains its activity, preferring to develop only trade relations.

The Azerbaijani authorities are continuing their careful policy with regard to Iran and are in no hurry to join the international campaign of pressure on Tehran. However, to all appearances, the Iranian leadership misinterpreted our carefulness and took a number of steps recently which were negatively perceived by public opinion and will certainly affect Azerbaijani-Iranian relations.

Tehran's exaggerated demands and non-constructive approach to the issue of Caspian status prevent progress on the settlement of this problem that is of great importance to all Caspian littoral states. To the accompaniment of lofty phrases about Islamic solidarity, Tehran is actively developing its relations with Armenia, a country that persists in its aggressive and annexation plans against Azerbaijan and illegally holds considerable parts of our territory bordering on Iran.

Relations between Tehran and Yerevan are not limited to simple trade, but have risen to a level of strategic partnership.

In addition, Iran has been taking unfriendly steps in the recent period. For example, the Iranian authorities, without bothering to invent a more or less genuine excuse, roughly disrupted an event to mark the anniversary of the tragic Xocali events, expelling its participants from a mosque. Even the presence of the Azerbaijani ambassador to Iran at this event did not stop them.

Iran declined to support Azerbaijan during the UN vote on the resolution on the situation in Azerbaijan's occupied territories. The Iranian representative was absent from the vote. The letter that Iran submitted in support of this resolution later was only an attempt to "put a brave face on a sorry business".

There are probably other cases of Tehran's unfriendly behaviour with regard to Azerbaijan and our interests. But what we know is enough to make certain conclusions and start reconsidering Azerbaijani-Iranian relations. Of course, we should remain good neighbours, but the Iranian leadership must feel that Azerbaijan, whose economic and geopolitical influence has significantly increased in recent years, has no intention of putting up with disrespect for its interests and will react to this appropriately.