KIEV - MOSCOW:NEW YEAR - OLD PROBLEMS

Russian-Ukrainian relations have drastically changed in recent years, and not for the better. Kiev staged an "orange" revolution and made a bid to join NATO and the European Union, which could not but affect its friendship with Moscow. A "gas war" broke out between the two countries in late 2005 and early 2006. The reason is that the Kremlin refused to supply cheap natural gas to the "pro-Western" Ukrainian government. As a result, the prices soared significantly. But the most important thing for Moscow is that Ukraine still depends on it. Relations between the two countries slightly stabilized in 2006 after the government of the main "perpetrator" of the "orange" revolution, Yuliya Tymoshenko, resigned. The "technical" prime minister, Yuriy Yekharunov, was appointed instead of Tymoshenko, and then this post was taken over by Viktor Yanukovich - the leader of the Party of Regions which is in opposition to the "orange" camp and believes that Ukraine does not need to rush into NATO. However, last year the confrontation between Ukrainian politicians reached such a dangerous point that after lengthy talks and even statements about a possible civil war, new parliamentary elections were scheduled, which resulted in the "orange" coalition taking the reins of power again.

Whom does Ukraine want to love?

On 16 January 2008, President Viktor Yushchenko, Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko and Speaker Arseniy Yatsenyuk sent a letter to NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, asking him to include Ukraine in the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) - not in the long-term, but at the Bucharest summit (Romania) in April. Such an initiative caused a stormy reaction in the Kremlin. The Rus-sian ambassador to Ukraine, Viktor Chernomyrdin, said that his country "will be forced to reconsider" its relations with Kiev if Ukraine wants to join NATO. According to the diplomat, "where Ukraine wants to join, who it wants to make friends with and whom it wants to love - all this is its internal affair". Russia is simply "explaining" - "if you join NATO, we will be forced to reconsider our relations". Indeed, if Ukraine wants to join the alliance, this will be a huge headache for Moscow. It is enough to remember that it is much more convenient to deploy the same American missile defence system in Ukraine rather than in Poland and the Czech Republic. This is just one of the possible consequences for Russia if Kiev joins NATO.

The Ukrainian opposition led by the Party of Regions also negatively reacted to the letter to the NATO secretary general. In its opinion, "the current government of Ukraine does not observe the provisions of the constitution" which says that Ukraine is a neutral country, does not join any military blocs and does not allow foreign troops and bases to be deployed in its territory (the only exception is the Black Sea fleet base the presence of which is allowed until 2017).

It must be noted that before joining the North Atlantic alliance, the Ukrainian leadership promised Jaap de Hoop Scheffer "to consult the Ukranian people". It is clear that this can happen only through a nationwide referendum. However, independent opinion polls show that most Ukrainians (60 per cent) are against the country's entry into NATO. These are mainly residents of southern and eastern regions of the country. Something tells us that their anti-NATO sentiments will only increase in the near future.

Meanwhile, experts say that Russia also has another deterrent factor up its sleeve. This is the Black Sea fleet which, as we said above, is a foreign military base in Ukraine. If Russian sailors leave Ukraine only in 2017, Kiev will be able to join the North Atlantic alliance only in 2017.

For this reason, the strengthening of Russian-Ukrainian frictions in this direction is quite a natural process. On 21 January, the Ukrainians tried to seize (on the basis of a ruling issued by the Kherson regional court) the radio-navigation system Mars-75, rented by the Russian Black Sea fleet in Genichensk in Kherson Region, in favour of the Ukrainian Ministry of Transport. Earlier, the Ukrainian courts (including the High Economic Court) recognized that the Black Sea fleet was illegally renting navigational-hydrographic facilities in Ukrainian territory (for example, light houses in Feodosiya, Yalta, Saki, Yevpatoriya and other parts of Crimea). However, neither officials who tried to implement the court ruling, nor activists of the Ukrainian organization Students' Brotherhood who offered to help "deport the Russian marines who guard the station" were allowed near it. The Russians still maintain that the status of the hydrographic facilities of the Black Sea fleet should be decided only at the state level. It is notable that at the same time as Students' Brotherhood set up tents, pro-Russian organizations such as the Slavic Party, the Russian Bloc party and the Russian community of Sevastopol staged a picket at the entrance to the facility. Thus, now we can expect more heated discussions on the presence of both navigational facilities and the whole Black Sea fleet in Ukrainian territory.

The straits as "a bone of contention"

In the first days of 2008, Ukraine also remembered about another problem in Russian-Ukrainian relations. Specifically, Kiev spoke about the possibility of unilaterally delineating the border in the Straits of Kerch. According to Ukrainian Foreign Minister Volodymyr Ohryzko, the Ukrainian-Russian commission on the demarcation of the Straits of Kerch will soon start working. The Ukrainian minister also stressed that his country will not allow any delays in solving the issue of the border in the Straits of Kerch, especially after the disaster in November 2007 when sulphur and fuel oil left by the Russians in the sea during a hurricane spilt into the straits. "Our state sustained serious economic damage as a result of the tragedy. For this reason, as a state that takes care of its national interests, we are forced to speed up this process," Ohryzko said. He also said that he thinks it possible to use the experience of the commission on the Sea of Azov to solve the problem of the Straits of Kerch. It must be remembered that negotiations on the demarcation of the Sea of Azov, the Black Sea and the Straits of Kerch were held in Kiev at the end of November 2007. Ukraine and Russia agreed on the median line in the Sea of Azov.

"If we have agreed to use the generally-recognized principle of demarcating the border in line with international law in the Sea of Azov, what prevents us from using the same principles to demarcate the Straits of Kerch?" Ohryzko asked. However, Russia is clearly not ready to answer this question and asserts that in this situation, the navigable channel of the straits will fall into the hands of Ukraine. All this will allow Kiev not just to charge Russian ship owners for entering the straits, but also to bring NATO ships into the Sea of Azov. For this reason, Moscow suggests drawing the border in the straits along the navigable channel, while the Sea of Azov will keep its status as an internal sea where ships belonging to third countries will be able to enter only with the mutual consent of the Russian Federation and Ukraine. But Kiev is not accepting this proposal, and the negotiations have been unsuccessfully continuing for more than 10 years.

The gas "war" continues

Meanwhile, the gas talks between the two countries still have the biggest potential in terms of fomenting tensions and promoting the crisis. As is known, the new prime minister, Yuliya Tymoshenko, is in favour of totally reconsidering the scheme of gas supplies to Ukraine. First, there is a proposal to give up the services of the mediator RUE and reduce Gazprom's share on the domestic market of gas supplies. Tymoshenko also intends to take control of Ukraine's domestic gas market, reducing the share of the Ukrgazenergo company on it (Gazprom owns 25 per cent of its shares through Rosukrenergo) from 70 to 7 per cent. Second, prices for the transit of Russian gas have increased significantly. This was reported in connection with the visit to Moscow by Naftohaz chief Oleg Dubina: Ukraine wants to increase the price for pumping 1,000 cubic metres of Russian gas to Europe through its territory from 1.7 to 9.32 dollars for 100 km. However, a short while later Viktor Yushchenko denied Dubina's statement about the hike in prices for gas transit from Russia. The president explained his position by the fact that if Ukraine increases the price of gas transit through it territory, then the Russian Federation will increase the price of gas transit through its own territory. As long as we are tied to Turkmen gas, Ukraine's transit policy will be specific. For this reason, the transit of 55 billion cubic metres of gas from Turkmenistan to Ukraine at a distance of 2,500 km costs approximately the same as the transit of 127 billion cubic metres of Russian gas through Ukrainian territory at a distance of 1,100 km," Yushchenko said. Thus, although Yushchenko made a concession, tensions in the gas issue are still mounting. Kiev will probably continue to insist on the liquidation of the mediator and perhaps, even on increasing the transit prices. Moscow will at least indirectly insist on its monopoly on gas supplies.

But the confrontation between the two countries does not end here. For example, in connection with their confrontation with the Kremlin, the Ukrainian authorities secured the signing of an agreement on reducing export duties on some types of raw materials. The agreement was signed by EU Commissioner for Trade Peter Mandelson and Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Hryhoriy Nemyria in London on 16 January.

Experts say that this was the last problem in the negotiations between Ukraine and the EU on Ukraine's entry into the WTO, which Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko said may happen in February (though in reality this process will take several months). Thus, if Ukraine joins this organization earlier than Russia, the latter will have to negotiate the conditions of its entry into the WTO with Kiev as well. Word was going round earlier that Ukraine and Russia may join the WTO at the same time, but it looks unlikely now.

As for retaliatory measures from Russia, some media say that Moscow may announce its plans to reconsider some provisions of the Great Russian-Ukrainian Treaty of 1997 which recognizes the state border between the two countries. This is what may raise numerous problems in the Crimean peninsula where there are three forces at the moment (Tatars, Ukrainians and Russians), who confront each other or form fragile "alliances based on their interests". Some experts predict the Kosovo scenario in Crimea. But this is another subject of discussion.

We can only add that contradictions in relations between Ukraine and Russia are taking place at the same time as contradictions within the Ukrainian government itself, even though you cannot always see them at first sight. According to the media, the date for Viktor Yushchenko's visit to Russia has already been agreed. It is also possible that a Ukraine-Russia action plan will be signed in Moscow on 12 February, i.e. during the second session of the Ukrainian-Russian interstate commission. This meeting gives the two neighbours a good chance to have an eye-to-eye conversation. Meanwhile, quite interesting rumours are going round against the background of this event. Specifically, according to UNIAN, while commenting on the working visit to Moscow on 28-30 January by the secretary of the National Security and Defence Council, Bogatyreva, to prepare Yushchenko's visit, political expert Mikhail Pogrebinskiy said that this testifies to attempts to restrict Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko's international contacts. According to Pogrebinskiy, Yushchenko's decision may be seen as "jealosy or unwillingness to allow Tymoshenko to hold any talks with the Kremlin".