NEITHER FRIEND NOR FOE…

In early December, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law, "On suspension by the Russian Federation of participation in the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe" (CFE Treaty). The appropriate document was passed by the Russian Federation State Duma of the preceding convocation and approved by the Federation Council in November 2007. Naturally, Russian and foreign politicians, military experts and analysts immediately focused on this extraordinary development. And although the commentaries boil down to statements that no radical changes in the balance of power should be expected and therefore the big-time confrontation of the past will not return to Europe, the consequences of Moscow's decision might turn out to be quite serious in the context of the South Caucasus. But let us first remind readers of the agreement itself.

The CFE Treaty (Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe) was signed in Paris in November 1990 and came into legal force on 17 July 1992. The signatories were member states of the two opposing military-political alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The treaty aimed to set a secure and stable balance of conventional weapons at the minimum possible level. With appropriate arms cuts, the inequalities between the sides in the number of weapons of different categories were to be eliminated, and they were to limit the types of armaments essential for conducting surprise attacks and initiating large-scale offensive operations. Upon the signing and implementation of the CFE Treaty, the total number of tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery systems (100-millimetre and greater calibre) was reduced by almost 50%, and the number of attack aircraft and helicopters in Europe was also reduced.

In addition, the CFE Treaty also included provisions on compliance with the arms quota. Each of the signatory states was to inform its partners on the quantity of weapons in the areas to which the treaty applied, and foreign military delegations were given the possibility of visiting military bases to confirm the consistency of reported data with the actual state of affairs. Measures of trust were also proposed, which required the signatories to inform one another on major movements of military units and to invite interested foreign observers to military exercises.

However, the Warsaw Pact was soon dissolved. The majority of its former members joined NATO, thereby dramatically changing the balance of armed forces in Europe. The dissolution of the Soviet Union ensued: the new independent states shared out the quotas of the former Soviet Union among themselves in summer 1992 in Tashkent. However, Azerbaijan, which is almost twice as large by territory and three times as large by population as Armenia, received - and, unfortunately, accepted - the same share as Georgia and Armenia. As well as ceilings on the total number of weapons, so-called flank restrictions were introduced for the parties, which effectively limited the possibility of the USSR, and later of the Russian Federation as its successor, deploying troops and heavy hardware in numbers which exceeded the limits set for the Baltic region in the north and for the Caucasus in the south. However, when Russia encountered problems in Chechnya and Dagestan, the number of troops permitted by the flank restrictions of the CFE Treaty proved insufficient for suppression of the separatist activities. Moscow explained its problems, and the signatory states agreed to meet it halfway.

The Istanbul Agreement was signed in 1999, which included appropriate decisions and split the earlier bloc quotas into per country quotas. The CFE became the "adapted CFE." It had to be ratified by all signatory countries in order to come into legal force. But, thus far, only Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus have ratified it. The remaining signatories are waiting, citing as the reason the fact that Russia did not fully honour its obligation to withdraw its troops from Moldova and Georgia.

Seeking to satisfy Tbilisi's demands and to deprive NATO of its arguments, Moscow withdrew its troops from Georgia in November 2007 - earlier than scheduled. The Russian heavy hardware was withdrawn from the Dniester Region (Moldova) even before that. Only 900 troops remain there: the Russian leadership claims that they are guarding depots with 20,000 tons of ammunition. The withdrawal of the ammunition is said to be hindered by the self-styled Dniester Region authorities who lay claim to the depots. Nonetheless, Brussels insists that Moscow did not honour its obligations in full and, therefore, NATO members cannot ratify the adapted CFE Treaty.

But the postponement of ratification of the new treaty by NATO is not Russia's only concern. The Baltic States, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, have still not signed the CFE. Although the armed forces of these countries are insignificant, their territories have become a "grey zone" of sorts, where, if need be, any numbers of heavy hardware can be deployed. Russia would not have any means of preventing this. In the mean time, after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR, the North Atlantic alliance outnumbers Russia three or four times in terms of heavy weapons.

On Moscow's initiative, an extraordinary meeting was held in Vienna on 12-15 June 2007 to find a way out of the critical situation which has taken shape regarding the issue of ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty. During the meeting, the Russian representative stipulated a number of fundamental conditions which the signatory states should meet: the bringing of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia into the treaty's jurisdiction; reduction of the ceilings for NATO's conventional weapons and military hardware, to make up for the build-up of the potential of the North Atlantic alliance resulting from its expansion; and the abolition of flank restrictions for Russia. When Moscow's proposals were turned down by other signatories of the CFE Treaty, the Kremlin announced that it intended to withdraw from the treaty, and did so upon the expiry of the deadline it had set. However, Moscow chose to leave a loophole for rejoining the CFE Treaty and declared not withdrawal, as set out in the text of the treaty, but suspension of its participation in the treaty.

But what does suspension of Russia's participation in the CFE Treaty mean? According to Lieutenant General Yevgeniy Buzhinskiy, deputy head of the Russian Defence Ministry's main directorate for international military cooperation, Russia will not inform NATO member countries about the movements of military units and hardware in the European part of the country and will no longer receive foreign military inspectors. Moscow intends to move troops and hardware on its territory as it wishes (this includes moving troops and hardware from the Urals, Far East and Siberia, whose numbers are not regulated by the CFE Treaty, to the European part of the country), including into and out of the area of flank restrictions. However, no dramatic build-up of troops is expected.

According to the agreements achieved at the Istanbul summit (1999), Russia's quota was set at 6,350 tanks, 11,280 armoured vehicles, 6,315 artillery systems, 3,416 airplanes and 855 helicopters. The flank restrictions for the Russian Federation were increased to 1,300 tanks, 2,140 armoured vehicles and 1,680 artillery systems. At the same time, the total quota for NATO at the time of signing of the document was 19,096 tanks, 31,787 armoured vehicles, 19,529 artillery systems, 7,273 airplanes and 2,282 helicopters. By mid-2007, with the arsenals of the new members of NATO, the quota stood at 22,424 tanks, 36,570 armoured vehicles, 23,137 artillery systems, 8,038 airplanes and 2,509 helicopters.

These numbers show that NATO has total military superiority over Russia and it does not make sense to widen the gap. But becoming embroiled in a new arms race does not make sense for Moscow either. After all, the NATO member countries are economically incomparably stronger than Russia. Another reason why exceeding the CFE Treaty ceilings is unlikely is that, in reality, neither NATO member countries nor Russia are anywhere near the set quota. This is why Moscow will probably choose to start upgrading its weapons and deploying them in a way that will enable it to put pressure on its neighbours.

It is obvious that the Kremlin intends to influence Ukraine and Georgia, and perhaps Austria and Finland too, to prevent them from joining NATO. Deployment of more divisions on their borders might, in the opinion of some Russian analysts, have a sobering effect on political circles which strive for their countries' accession to the North Atlantic alliance. But this opinion might prove to be wrong because every effect causes a counter effect and no one, including first and foremost Russia itself, needs a new Cold War. As for NATO, its position remains composed but firm. The alliance maintains that there is no need to dramatize the situation and says that NATO and Russia are no longer enemies. However, expressing hopes that Russia will re-join the CFE Treaty, Brussels nonetheless refuses to take Moscow's demands into account.

Russia's decision to suspend its participation in the treaty is unlikely to be backed up by any other signatories, including Russia's allies. Belarus already has a sizeable arms quota under the CFE Treaty, and President Lukashenka is unlikely to feel inclined to further worsen the already negative US and European attitude towards him against the backdrop of his tensions with Moscow over oil and natural gas supplies. Armenia depends too much on Western economic assistance to challenge the United States and NATO. It is easier for Yerevan to pursue its established policy of formally complying with its quota, part of which it even transferred to Russia, which set up a military base in Gyumri.  At the same time, Armenia illegally keeps its task force and hundreds of unregistered units of heavy hardware, including tanks, cannons and multiple rocket launching systems, in the occupied Azerbaijani territory of Karabakh. Yerevan has the effrontery, however, to accuse Azerbaijan of non-compliance with CFE Treaty quotas, although Baku is only compensating for the ratio of armaments from its side.

While disapproving of the arms race in the region, the Western countries nonetheless understand Azerbaijan's situation. This is why it does not make sense for Baku to line up with Russia and withdraw from the CFE Treaty. Furthermore, if the forecasts about the build-up of Russia's military strength in the immediate vicinity of Azerbaijan's border in the North Caucasus come true, the issue of additional security measures might arise. This could be accomplished both by strengthening Azerbaijan's own military potential and by establishing closer ties with fraternal Turkey, as well as with the United States and NATO. Of course, this is not the best scenario for Baku, so let us hope that Moscow will not force us into taking any steps that would bear extra risks and might complicate Russian-Azerbaijani relations in the military and political fields.