WHO SUPPORTS WHOM AND AGAINST WHOM?

Ukraine held extraordinary elections in late September, scheduled after President Yushchenko dissolved the parliament in spring this year. This provoked a bitter standoff between the political forces, but some time later Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions agreed to hold extraordinary elections, although the Constitutional Court has yet to confirm that the dissolution of the parliament was legal. However, the elections showed that the country's split into the "orange" and "blue & white" camps has yet to be overcome.

According to the Ukrainian Central Electoral Commission, with a turnout of 62.4 per cent the Party of Regions gained 34.35 per cent of votes, the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc (YTB) - 30.73 per cent and the pro-presidential bloc Our Ukraine - People's Self-Defence (OU-PSD) - 14.16 per cent. The communists gained 5.38 per cent and Litvin's bloc - 3.96 per cent, while the Socialist Party came up short of three per cent and did not make it into the parliament. We might think that there is nothing strange about such a distribution of votes and that assertions about a split in the country are simply exaggerations by Ukraine's ill-wishers. The problem, however, is not with the numbers of votes, but rather the fact that the rival political forces gained voters' support mainly in their "own" regions. This time, as in all recent years, the "orange" camp gained almost all of the votes in the west and centre and the "blue & white" camp in the east and south.

Compared with previous parliamentary elections, there was a noticeable fall (by five per cent) in the general political activity of the population. However, both local and foreign observers point out that voters did not make the same mistakes as one and a half years ago: many votes attached to small parties went missing, and were switched to the political alliances that were likely to win. The absolute majority of this unstable electorate defected to Tymoshenko's party. As a result, the number of votes gained by the YTB increased by almost 50 per cent, and this bloc can be regarded as the true winner in the elections. The Party of Regions led by Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych came first, as in the previous elections, and even slightly increased its electorate. But the YTB's rapid advance, and the fact that the Socialist Party, an ally of the Party of Regions, did not cross the threshold, are likely to keep Yanukovych and his supporters in opposition.

Political analysts have yet to analyze the results of the elections. However, the YTB has clearly won. Tymoshenko made effective use of the fact that after the YTB leader was dismissed as prime minister, she was not responsible for the problems faced by Ukraine. Tymoshenko, equally happily and passionately, criticized both President Yushchenko and his supporters, and Prime Minister Yanukovych and the Party of Regions. On a wave of criticism, she made many gains, topped by her creativity and readiness to win over any, even a prejudiced, voter.

According to the results of the elections, the disposition of forces in the parliament has the following picture: Party of Regions - 176 seats, YTB - 156 seats and Our Ukraine - People's Self-Defence - 72 seats. The Communist Party of Ukraine gained only 27 seats and the Litvin Bloc - 20 seats. There are myriad predictions regarding the configuration of the future parliamentary majority. However, the restoration of the "orange" coalition of the YTB and OU-PSD looks more realistic and predictable. Together they have 228 of the 450 seats in parliament. As we can see, this majority is quite shaky. The Litvin Bloc with 20 seats could boost the strength of the ruling coalition. Both the "regional" and "orange" camps are negotiating with it.

Of course, Litvin, the former speaker of the third parliament, would like this prestigious and influential post again, but he is unlikely to get it this time. The "orange" majority will nominate the leader of the OU-PSD bloc, Lutsenko, or somebody else from the presidential team for this post. Litvin says he will join the "orange" coalition if his supporters are appointed heads of the tax and customs departments and governors in several regions. This is unlikely to suit Yuliya Tymoshenko, who intends to install her supporters in all economic ministries and departments, leaving only the "power-wielding" posts to the pro-presidential bloc. So the partners and potential allies in the "orange" coalition are expected to do a lot of bargaining.

However, an alliance between the Litvin Bloc, the Party of Regions and communists is even less likely. The point is that in the eyes of Yanukovych's supporters, it was Litvin who paved the way for the cancellation of the results of the second round of the presidential elections and allowed the "orange" camp to put Yushchenko, not their leader Yanukovych, in the presidential chair after rerun elections. What will the Litvin Bloc get out of an alliance with the Party of Regions? Sitting in opposition and waiting for Yushchenko to quarrel with Tymoshenko, in order to form a provisional government with the communists, the Party of Regions and some of the pro-presidential deputies? There is no doubt that in response, YTB deputies will resign and initiate extraordinary elections again. An election campaign is an expensive luxury and there is no guarantee that next time Litvin's bloc will be able to pass the threshold.

President Yushchenko is in quite a difficult situation. The goal which he had set his supporters, of gaining as many votes as the YTB, was not achieved. So he will have to take account of the growing influence of the YTB, his ally and rival, which has more parliamentary seats than the OU-PSD. According to the constitutional changes that took effect in 2005, the president can no longer appoint the prime minister. Now only a candidate supported by the parliamentary majority can become prime minister. The head of state participates in forming the government only by nominating the "presidential quota": three top officials - the foreign minister, the defence minister and the head of the National Security Council. The Constitutional Court is also beyond the president's jurisdiction.

Yuliya Tymoshenko is very close to heading the government again. But how long will it last? Many friends and business partners of the head of state openly dislike and fear Tymoshenko. Yanukovych is the lesser of two evils for them. Although he is alien, he is still predictable and keeps his word. Having become prime minister, Yanukovych did not unleash a war to wipe out his former rivals. For this reason, prompted by his circle, President Yushchenko is promoting the idea of a vast coalition involving the Party of Regions, the YTB and the OU-PSD. It is clear that in such a coalition, the prime minister is more a technical than a political figure, and anyone can become prime minister (for example, Azarov), not Yanukovych or Tymoshenko.

For Viktor Yushchenko, the issue of a parliamenary coalition and government combination is important not only in the context of current affairs and the interests of the financial-industrial groups he supports, but also in terms of the prospects for his own second presidential term. A broad coalition could ensure that the parliament passes a law to expand the president's powers and even allow him to be elected by parliament, not by a nationwide vote. This all sounds fine, but the YTB does not even want to think of setting up a coalition with the Party of Regions, threatening to take an uncompromisingly oppositional stance. Yuliya Tymoshenko is supported by more than half of the pro-presidential faction. Thus, regardless of how attractive the idea of a wide coalition is to Yushchenko and even to the interests of political stability in the country, it is almost unachievable in current conditions.

In the context of the future presidential campaign, Yushchenko would feel more comforable dealing with the Party of Regions than the YTB, led by the uncontrollable and ambitious Yuliya Tymoshenko. In return for long-term premiership, Yanukovych ,or anyone else from Rinat Akhmetov's team, could ensure, popular support for Viktor Yushchenko in the east and south of the country. But such a combination is too risky because most voters do not like political upheavals or betrayal and might fail Yushchenko in both western and eastern Ukraine, despite the politicians' agreement. The sad fate of Aleksandr Moroz who gave up his "orange credentials" in exchange for the post of speaker and, as a result, lost his electoral support, is a graphic precedent.

Thus, Yushchenko and his circle will hardly be able to evade an "orange" coalition that will probably involve Litvin as well. They just have to hope that, in taking the reins of power, Yuliya Tymoshenko will also have to keep the electoral promises which helped her get such tremendous support in the elections. It is one thing to tell the electorate how well everyone will be doing after the elections, and another thing to put this into practice. It must be remembered that the YTB and OU-PSD have promised the population all sorts of wealth worth 40 billion dollars. This is clearly not allowed for in the budget, which will hardly be able to bear such an extra burden.

The formation of the "orange" coalition also meets the interests of the West which expects Ukraine to turn towards NATO once and for all through Kiev's official request for a special programme and procedures on membership of the North Atlantic alliance. It is also expected that the Tymoshenko government will start implementing long-time plans to establish special relations between Ukraine and the European Union.

These aspects, especially those related to NATO, cause open alarm in Moscow. Although Tymoshenko says that she intends to strengthen cooperation with Moscow, no-one really trusts her. This is proved by the fact that Moscow is flexing its levers of pressure. It is difficult to interpret otherwise Gazprom's statement that Ukraine has some 1.3 billion dollars of debt for gas previously supplied to Ukraine. Boyko, the oil minister in Yanukovych's government, who visited Moscow, managed to settle this problem. But no-one is insured against new claims that could be used as an excuse to suspend gas supplies before winter and increase prices again. Today the price of gas is 130 dollars per 1,000 cubic metres. It is expected that next year the price will increase to 160 dollars. It is known that at 180 dollars or more, many sectors of Ukrainian industry consuming gas will become unprofitable and will grind to a standstill. If gas blackmail does not work, then Moscow might use other levers of economic pressure, introduce visa restrictions and provoke separatism and regionalism in southeastern Ukraine and Crimea. It is well known how Moscow dealt with Georgia in a similar situation. We can only hope that political disputes both in Kiev and Moscow will not overshadow the fate of the two closest Slavic people and that politicians will be wise enough to avoid an open confrontation in relations between Russia and Ukraine.

The elections in Ukraine are of interest to Moscow not only within the context of integration processes. Parliamentary elections are just around the corner in Russia itself and it will probably be impossible to avoid certain parallels. At first sight, the situation in Russia, where even before Putin's decision to head the United Russia list, its victory seemed predetermined, is quite different from Ukraine where everything is so fragile and unstable. But perhaps, it is only an apparent superiority. Despite all its chaotic nature, there is a live political process under way in Ukraine, and its economy is developing dynamically, even without the "oil doping" which drugs Russia and other post-Soviet states rich in energy reserves. After the establishment of a "vertical hierarchy of power and controllable democracy", politics in Russia was almost completely replaced by government. Externally, such a system seems steady and stable, but it is extremely fragile since it is almost wholly based on favourable oil prices and Vladimir Putin's personal rating.

The Ukrainian elections and the expected formation of an "orange" coalition are of interest to Azerbaijan as well. Ukraine is one of our important economic partners. We cooperate closely (politically) within GUAM and are developing military-technical cooperation, which is also important to us. Baku and Kiev are coordinating their efforts to establish relations with NATO and the European Union. They intend to implement major projects like the Odessa-Brody-Gdansk pipeline, which will help diversify sources of oil for Ukraine, Lithuania and Poland and grant Azerbaijan's SOCAR access to oil refineries and the retail network of oil products in these countries.

It must be noted as well that representatives of the Azerbaijani diaspora in Ukraine were quite active in these elections in Ukraine. Five of them were included on the election lists of various parties and political blocs, but only one of them, Oleg Meydanovich Babayev (in fact, he has never lived in Azerbaijan and is originally from Kursk) from the YTB, made it into the parliament. Another Azerbaijani, Eduard Zeynalov, occupies 76th place in the OU-PSD and has a chance to gain a seat in parliament if one of the candidates on the list gives up his seat. However, regardless of the configuration of the government in Kiev and the person who heads it, Azerbaijan and Ukraine will continue deepening their cooperation, because our relations are based on a firm foundation of common national interests.