DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGES AND NATIONAL PRIORITIES

A serious demographic crisis awaits most countries of the former USSR and Eastern Europe in 2025. An explosive mixture of ageing population, low subsistence level and incomplete socio-economic and political reforms has formed in this region, says a recent World Bank report with the eloquent title From Red to Grey. Its authors assert that by 2025 Russia will lose 17.3m people (12 per cent of its population), Ukraine - 11.8m (-24 per cent), Belarus - 1.4m (-14 per cent), Georgia - 0.8m (-17 per cent), Lithuania - 0.4m (-11 per cent), Latvia, Moldova and Kazakhstan - 0.3m each (respectively - 13 per cent, 7 per cent and 2 per cent), Armenia - 0.2m (-6 per cent), and Estonia - 0.1m (-9 per cent). At the same time, populations will increase in Uzbekistan (by 9.3m), Tajikistan (2.6m), and Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan (respectively, by 1.6m, 1.5m and 1.3m). What is more, the reduced population will grow considerably older - almost every fifth resident in the region will be over 65.

Experts note that, on the whole, the same processes are under way on the territory of the former USSR as in Western Europe in the early 1970s: the birth rate is falling and life expectancy is rising. However, there is a cardinal difference, too, in the states' potential. Thus, in terms of its demographic characteristics, Ukraine is currently close to the UK, while in terms of subsistence level - to Algeria and Venezuela. If Georgia's "demographic portrait" resembles the FRG, then in terms of subsistence level this country is closer to Rwanda and Mozambique. An ageing population exerts powerful pressure on the state budget which especially affects pensions and the care of elderly people. These kinds of demographic trends, which have been called a third transitional period, will lead to a decrease in the volume of the work force and eventually to a slowdown in economic growth. Socio-economic reforms and the active attraction of migrants are the only ways capable of preventing the imminent collapse of the economies of the ageing states of the former USSR, the authors of the report assert.

World Bank Vice-President Shigeo Katsu believes that the developments will inevitably impact upon Western European countries, too. As the population of Eastern Europe and the former USSR ages and the growth in the subsistence level in migrants' home countries impels them to return home, such states as the UK, France and Germany will lose some of the "Polish plumbers" - natives of Eastern Europe who uninterruptedly supply the EU with the work force that is so needed. So, in the future these countries will most probably have to recruit their work force from other regions: from Turkey, Central Asia and North Africa, where the birth rate is still high and people aspire to go to the West to earn money.

In the meantime, the disappointing forecasts contained in the World Bank report were no surprise to experts: the negative trends in the development of the population have been developing in Europe for at least the past 200 years and are gradually affecting new territories. According to data from the UN Statistics Division, the pace of demographic development in the world is falling. And although the population of the Earth will increase to 8bn by 2025, its number will noticeably decrease in regions that have traditionally been considered trouble-free in this respect - Africa, America, Nepal, Turkey and Indonesia. According to UN estimates, by 2025 China will still remain the most populous state (1.4bn), followed by India and the USA (1.2bn and 330m). Next on the list are Indonesia, Pakistan and Brazil (respectively, 250m, 204m and 202m), followed by Bangladesh and Nigeria (181.4m and 161.7m).

As for the CIS, a pessimistic situation is developing there: the numbers of Russians, Kazakhs, Moldovans, Belarusians, Georgians and Ukrainians are steadily declining. At the same time, Central Asian countries will, by 2050, descend to a simple reproduction of population (the birth rate per woman in her lifetime will be 2.1 children). In the other former Soviet republics this indicator will end up even lower and populations will decrease. But things are worst in Russia. According to the most probable scenario computed by UN analysts, by 2050 Russia's population will "shrink" to 90.6m. The main causes of this collapse are the low birth rate against the backdrop of a high death rate and the poor ecological situation. Already there is a shortage of conscripts for the army, and the economically active section of the population is decreasing. Moscow is taking emergency measures to avoid the crisis but, for the time being, the attraction of migrants helps it to "stay afloat" (nearly a million guest workers enter the Russian Federation annually, and in 2005 their number was 12m, or 6.4 per cent of the world volume). But this extremely necessary measure is not popular with Russian society, and it will only "ease" but not stop the unfavourable demographic trends.

And what prospect awaits Azerbaijan? UN experts have two pieces of news for us: the good and the bad. The optimistic scenario promises a slow growth in the population (by 1.3m). But there is also a pessimistic forecast which, incidentally, is most probable: there will be the potential for demographic growth by 2035 and then the number of Azerbaijanis will start to decrease. In other words, a "demographic bomb" has been planted under our country, and depopulation awaits us. And, if you agree, the fact that the population of neighbouring Armenia will start to decline 20 years earlier - from 2015 - is an unlikely consolation.

However, the UN Statistics Division's calculations are by no means always impeccable. Its experts, for example, have repeatedly reviewed their forecasts for 2025, each time decreasing the pace of demographic growth. But does this mean that we have no grounds for concern? We'll try to clarify.

As specialists reasonably assert, the 20th century was a period of grandiose demographic change, and modern trends in the development of population manifest themselves to a greater or lesser extent everywhere, even in the demographically "model" China. The so-called transition from the centuries-long high death rate and high birth rate to low death rate and low birth rate was completed almost throughout the world. In some European countries it started back in the late 18th century when the death rate began to fall and the birth rate followed suit, and this process gradually became global. Now people are already talking about a new phase in the transition, which is characterized by change in mating and reproductive behaviour.

As a result, we have what we have. Polls conducted between 1999 and 2003 in 14 European countries, as part of the Population Policy Acceptance Study project, showed that almost 40 per cent of children are born to unmarried mothers, and this figure is steadily growing. The number of divorces is increasing too. An extremely low birth rate is characteristic of most countries which participated in the project - 1.4 children per woman throughout her childbearing period (remember that just the simple reproduction of population requires a different figure - 2.1). As for Catholic Spain, where the institution of the family was believed to be strong and abortions were banned up until last year, there the birth rate is even lower - 1.3 children. In the Netherlands and FRG, only 53 per cent choose to live in an officially registered marriage and to have children. Almost every fifth Finnish, German, Italian and Dutch woman remains childless until 40. In other words, the impression arises that EU countries are dooming themselves to depopulation. 

Life without children becomes almost a norm, and a considerable part of Europeans views unregistered cohabitation as a test of compatibility and a necessary stage towards marriage. However, Europeans do not "refuse" to have children; they simply give birth to very few of them. And this has to do, not with the difficulties, but with the achievements of the civilization. For centuries mothers tried to bring into the world as many children as possible, so that at least some of them had a chance of survival. Besides, there were no reliable contraceptives in the past. Nowadays, spouses, having given birth to even one child, can be sure that they will have grandchildren. Teenagers used to benefit their family by working in the household, so having many children was advantageous in this way, too. A monthly allowance of 150 euros is currently paid for each of the first three children in the FRG. If a fourth baby arrives, the allowance increases to 180 euros. But, as statistics assert, if an educated German woman decides to leave work to bring up her child, she loses up to 40,000 euros annually. So, should there be any wonder that people in the FRG prefer to have one to two children?!

On the other hand, material welfare by no means always "automatically" leads to a growth in the birth rate. In many EU countries the minimum salary is 1,500 euros [translator's note: per month] but, as we see, this does not lead to a high birth rate. Nowadays emancipated European women have lots of development opportunities. They can make a career, continue to study and not to get married at all - and many prefer these alternatives. And if men and women associate their lives with fewer children, then the incentives that the state offers to increase the birth rate may not actually work. Well, as a rule, they do not work in Western Europe, as the talk is already of a steady decline in the demand for children - it is satisfied at the expense of fewer numbers. The new demographic behaviour is dictated by a radical transformation of the institution of family and life priorities, and this situation, as specialists admit, is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to improve (please recall, e.g. that same-sex marriages were legalized in the UK not long ago and spouses in those marriages can adopt children, in other words, reproduce a same-sex behaviour model. This means that they turn an anomaly into a norm.)

As sceptics reasonably recall, measures to stimulate the birth rate help only where there is still a potential demand for children. Thus, a system of privileges was once created in Romania for parents who decided to have a second and a third child but, as a result, only Roma people increased their birth rate. And the quite large social allowances in other European countries mainly stimulate the birth rate of migrants, not the indigenous population, which may lead to the most unexpected consequences. For example, it is expected that already this year more than half of Berliners under 20 will be Muslims. And the tremendous growth in immigrants and the fall in the birth rate of the indigenous population, as demographers assert, effectively threaten the foundations of the very distinctiveness of French civilization.

Understandably, world trends have not bypassed Azerbaijan either. Experts believe that our country, together with Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, are seven countries with a "European" birth rate. Before the 1980s, there were great differences between them which started to gradually blend on account of a fall in birth rates in Moldova, Armenia and, finally, in Azerbaijan. The similarity of these countries clearly manifested itself after 1990 when a new stage in the fall in the birth rate was experienced and, even in Azerbaijan, which preserved some distinctions, it fell considerably below the threshold of the simple replacement of generations.

Certainly, these processes occurred under the powerful impact of socio-cultural, political and economic changes. But on the whole these countries only followed the path that Western Europe had trodden earlier. What is more, they did it at almost the same speed. The portal "Demoscope" notes that in Europe these processes occurred not only without social shock (like the collapse of the USSR and the difficult transition to a market economy) but also in a period of prosperity. It is enough to have a look at the table to see for oneself: there is nothing particularly specific in the trends in the birth rate in the "European" countries of the CIS in the 1990s.

In the meantime, the situation has begun to change from bad to good, as our country has adopted almost all the European patterns of demographic behaviour. The time when Azerbaijani women were awarded the honorary medal, "Mother Heroine" has passed into oblivion. A family with several children now arouses sympathy rather than approval. Besides, nowadays a woman with three or four children is regarded as a woman with many children. According to statistical data, in the past few years the proportions of births of a third and fourth child have dropped respectively from 16 and 6 per cent in 1992 to 12.4 and 3.2 per cent in 2004. As for the birth of a fifth child, this has decreased from 3.7 to 1.1 per cent. Besides, the number of children born outside marriage is steadily increasing. If in 1970 they accounted for just 3.1 per cent of the newborn, then by 2004 this figure had jumped to 20.3 per cent. In other words, one in five of our "babies" was born outside registered marriage. What is more, the difference between urban and rural "behaviour" is barely noticeable: the share of children born outside official marriage in rural areas is 21.9 per cent, and it is 18.3 per cent in towns.

But that is not all. As sociologists put it, in the past few decades, the institution of marriage has undergone a radical transformation, and these changes seem to be irreversible. Traditional family values (and corresponding behaviour) are no longer a priority. A sexual revolution has taken place in Azerbaijan, but public opinion seems to have paid no attention to it. However, liberty in this area has become the norm. Marital infidelity is no longer amoral, sex between high-school students is unlikely to be the exception, an Azerbaijan woman no longer views divorce as something "shameful" and negative, and few condemn so-called "civil marriages". Sexual minorities have started "ranting and raving" too. Behind these trends one can see emancipation, a greater extent of personal freedom allowed by public morals, and a refusal of the old clich?s of sexual and marital-family behaviour. But we, as it has turned out, "have thrown out the baby with the water". The wave of Western civilization, which has 'submerged' Azerbaijan, has fundamentally eroded the national particularities of the tacit marital code, too. In this regard we have become more liberal and, as we see, almost entirely oriented to new priorities, which inevitably impacts upon family-marital behaviour. And this is happening against the backdrop of a large number of refugees and a major labour migration of men, which strongly catalyses negative demographic trends. In other words, the "demographic bomb" is about to explode. The experience of many Western countries testifies - while our demographic behaviour gets increasingly close to that of the European - that birth rate tends to fall to a level which does not provide for even "zero growth". This is, actually, the essence of the ominous demographic crisis as, for centuries, social intentions were aimed at continuing the human race. It seems that now the situation may become dramatic, as other trends are typical of many countries, including Azerbaijan. But let us reiterate that radical changes in the institution of the family, and such transformations of life values that are almost irreversible in nature, always hide behind demographic indicators.

There is no point in missing the past, those times when public opinion viewed divorce as savagery, when career didn't mean much in the life of an Azerbaijani woman and marital infidelity was almost always men's privilege. A present-day xanim will not tolerate a husband who does not suit her, and if having children proves to be an insuperable barrier to her professional advancement, or a heavy financial burden, then she will most probably refuse to have a second child, let along a third or a fourth one. These are not trends but realities that we are not quite ready for; to be exact, are not ready for at all. And although the state demonstrates an interest in demographic problems, it seems that our society is not seriously concerned about their acuteness. We should recall that, among the challenges to our security, Azerbaijan's national security blueprint, adopted in late May this year, notes a shortage of professional human resources, i.e. it singles out the main problem. But for the time being few talk about the threat of depopulation and the need to stimulate the birth rate - these are the tasks of a demographic blueprint and policy which are yet to be created. What is more, they must be based not only and not so much on material incentives (allowances for parents, improvement in housing conditions, protection of reproductive health, etc) as social ones. There is a need to re-orientate the very system of life priorities and form the appropriate public opinion. Motherhood, fatherhood and family values should become the real and not just the declared priorities of Azerbaijani society. In other words, the demographic situation cannot be improved using "purely" demographic means. It needs to be improved, and as fast as possible, because it seems that the genie has already been released from the bottle. So the resolution of the issue of whether the "demographic bomb" in Azerbaijan will explode or not depends upon all of us and primarily upon the state.