BALKANS' POLICY

In early September and early October Azerbaijan's foreign policy will focus on Croatia. First of all, Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov will set off for Zagreb in early September on his first official visit to that country and President of Croatia Stjepan Mesic will pay an official visit to our country in early October (following a visit by the president of our country, Ilham Aliyev, to Croatia in June 2005).

Croatia is in all respects an interesting country and a promising one from the point of view of strengthening the position of Azerbaijan both in the Balkans and on the European continent.  Developing our relations with it may hold a great deal of promise in the realm of politics and economics, culture and tourism and in implementing transcontinental transport and energy projects.

Interestingly, Croatia is in many ways a "Balkan copy" of Azerbaijan. The territory of this state lying in the south-eastern part of Europe is almost the same as ours. It covers 87,600 sq. km and is divided into a continental part (56,542 sq. km) and territorial waters with islands (31,067 sq. km). The latest census (2001) puts the population at 4.4 million). The population is distributed unequally due to the country's geographical features - it is predominantly mountainous. The central area is the most densely populated - Zagreb and its suburbs - while the mountainous regions (Lika and others) are sparsely populated. 

The population is predominantly Croat, the nation which forms the state (90 per cent). Serbs are the biggest of the national minority groups. Bosniaks, Italians, Hungarians, Albanians, Slovenes, Czechs, Montenegrins, Slovaks and others also live here. As in our country, too, the ethnic makeup of the population in Croatia was radically changed following the armed conflict on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. According to the 2001 census, Serbs made up just 4.5 per cent of the population in Croatia, while in 1991, they accounted for 12 per cent of the population. The majority of the population are Catholics (87.8 per cent). Orthodox believers account for 4.42 per cent of the population, Muslims - 1.2 per cent, and Protestants - 0.19 per cent. 

There is also some historical similarity between Croatia and Azerbaijan. Like Azerbaijan, Croatia was for a long time part of another imperial state and seceding from it was accompanied by painful processes. From the late 18th century, Croatia belonged to the Hungarian part of Austria-Hungary. On 29 November 1918, its parliament declared its secession from the Austro-Hungarian empire and that it was joining the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (from 1929 the Kingdom of Yugoslavia). It is true that there is a crucial difference here - after secession from the Russian empire and before it became part of the USSR, Azerbaijan enjoyed a short, 23-month period of independent development which Croatia did not have.  

The Republic of Croatia (RC) gained its independence almost at the same time as Azerbaijan. The Croatian Democratic Union (CDU), lead by Franjo Tudman, won the first multi-party elections in May 1990. A referendum on Croatia's independence was held in May 1991 which resulted in the Declaration on Independence and Sovereignty being adopted on 25 June 1991. However, legislative acts on the state independence of the RC and its secession from the SFRY came into force only on 8 October 1991. F. Tudman was the country's first president and he remained in this post until he died in December 1999. Symbolically, the Vatican was among the first to recognise the independence of Croatia on 13 January 1992. The EU also recognised its independence on 15 January 1992.  

Certain comparisons may also be drawn with regard to the causes and consequences of the separatist movements in Croatia and Azerbaijan. Resistance by the Serbian population (primarily in areas densely populated by Serbs) to Croatia's secession from Yugoslavia lead to a protracted armed conflict. Armed formations of the self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina with the support of the Yugoslav National Army (almost complete symmetry with the "Karabakh separatist - Armenian army" connection) put up fierce resistance to the Croats attempts to affirm their sovereignty on the territory of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, Western Syrmia, Western Slavonia, Eastern Lika, Kordun and Northern Dalmatia.  The UN played an active part in settling the conflict from November 1991. A UN peacekeeping contingent was sent to the RC within the framework of an operation to uphold the peace. After the Croats carried out two paramilitary operations in May-August 1995, Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Syrmia remained the only areas under Serb control. The Erdut agreement on the reintegration of these areas into the RC was signed between Zagreb and the Serb authorities on 12 November 1995. A temporary UN administration was set up in the region in the transitional period. The process of the peaceful reintegration of this region into the constitutional and legislative systems of the RC was completed on 15 January 1998. 

Over the 10 years which the CDU ruled, Croatia was able to strengthen its position as an independent state but the nationalistic sentiments of the then ruling regime led to its substantial international isolation. After a democratic six-party coalition came to power in January 2000 (the Social Democratic Party, the Croatian Social Liberal Party, the Croatian Peasant Party, the Croatian People's Party, the Liberal Party and the Istrian Democratic Assembly), the West actively supported Zagreb's policy of joining Euro-Atlantic structures as soon as possible.    

A strategic goal in Zagreb's foreign policy is to fulfil a trilateral task - to achieve full membership of the EU and NATO and to develop regional cooperation. Incidentally, Zagreb is giving particular attention to the latter since it rightly thinks that only a country which strives to develop good relations and mutually beneficial cooperation with its neighbours can count on the support of the EU members. It is not by accident therefore that Croatia is the leader among the countries of South Eastern Europe in implementing the tasks connected with integrating into Euro-Atlantic structures.

The development of Azerbaijani-Croatian relations was given a substantial boost by the visit by President of Azerbaijan I. Aliyev to Croatia in June 2005 which culminated in the signing of a joint declaration. This most important political document reflected the common approaches of our countries in crucial issues of world and regional politics. In particular, Zagreb stated its clear position on the issue of a Karabakh settlement stressing its adherence to the principles of the UN Charter, the main OSCE documents, in particular, the Helsinki Act, a peaceful settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict on the basis of respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of internationally recognised frontiers. The commonality of the interests of our countries, our mutual interest in strengthening political dialogue, in developing commercial, economic, investment and humanitarian relations create the prerequisites for the further development of bilateral relations.

Another factor bringing us closer is the need to act together and to cooperate in guaranteeing the energy security of South Eastern Europe and of the European continent as a whole. Therefore, it seems to us that energy will be one of the foremost topics on the agenda of the forthcoming talks to be held by the foreign minister in Croatia. It would be extremely important for Baku to turn Zagreb - a key capital in the Balkans - into its ally in the fierce energy politics confrontation with Moscow. It goes without saying that in this context, Croatia's political support for the Nabucco project and for other projects being carried out with the participation on Azerbaijan, Turkey, Greece and Italy is important. The last two countries are neighbours of Croatia's. 

Competition in this issue is very fierce. Southern Europe, which is preparing to become the European Union's new energy gateway, receives a large part of its oil and gas from Russia which is stepping up its presence in the region. Suffice it to say that 73 bn cu.m. of Russian gas was supplied to countries of South Eastern and Southern Europe in 2006 - almost half the entire volume of gas Russia supplies to the countries of the European Union. Macedonia, Bulgaria and Albania agreed in January to create a pipeline of the Albania-Macedonia-Bulgaria (AMBO) oil corporation. It will be almost 1,000 km long and it will deliver Russian oil through the Balkans from the Black Sea shores to the Mediterranean Sea. Russian and Greek companies are expected to start to build a Burgas - Alexsandroupoli pipeline next year. When it is completed in 2011 it will be able to deliver 20 m tonnes of oil annually from the Bulgarian Black Sea port of Burgas to Greece. In early April, Croatia, Italy, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia signed an agreement on building a so-called pan-European oil pipeline. It should be 1,400 km long and run from the Black Sea to the port of Trieste in Italy. It is planned to pipe through it 40 m tonnes of oil annually to the existing pipeline network of Austria, the Czech Republic and Germany.  Now the question is whose oil that will be.

The commercial and economic aspects of relations with Zagreb are extremely important for Baku. The trade turnover between the two countries has dropped below the million-dollar mark and is now a ridiculous 858,000 dollars (for the first six months of 2007, 5.1 m dollars in 2006). It is clear that Azerbaijan cannot be happy with such a situation for its partner is the most dynamic and strongest economy in the region. It's enough to take a look at the macro economic indices of Croatia's development to be convinced of the huge potential of bilateral relations. The GDP of this Balkan country has reached 60 bn dollars (per capita - 13,400 dollars, a rise of 4.6 per cent on 2006), its budget is 18 bn dollars, exports 11 bn dollars. Industry is developing rapidly - the processing sector accounts for 80 per cent of all production. The leading industries are: shipbuilding, machine engineering, oil refining, chemicals, food, timber manufacturing, electronics, and pharmaceuticals. Azerbaijan could cooperate actively with Croatia in all the above-mentioned spheres - if the government and the private sector were so-minded. 

Politically, Baku is interested in Zagreb's experience of Euro-Atlantic integration and cooperation with the European Union and with NATO.   Croatia began its movement into the EU in 1999. On 29 October 2001, representatives of Zagreb and the EU signed an Agreement on Association and Stabilisation and on 21 February 2003 the EU leadership was presented with Croatia's official application to join this organisation. It received the status of candidate country in June 2004 and on 3 October 2005, during a meeting of EU member countries' foreign ministers, the formal procedure for beginning talks on Croatia joining the EU was begun. And there is now every reason to think that this will be the next new member of the European Union. Its leadership has worked out a very effective scheme of dialogue and cooperation with Brussels which Azerbaijan could make very good use of. 

Croatia became a participant in the Partnership for Peace programme on 25 May 2000. The decision to allow Croatia access to the operational plan of action to prepare for membership of the Alliance was taken at a meeting of NATO foreign ministers (May 2002 in Reykjavik). Croatia thereby received the status of official NATO candidate member. It became a member of the WTO in November 2000 which creates prerequisites for mutually beneficial dialogue on this topic, too, especially taking account of Baku's desire to join this organisation. Croatian diplomacy has gained considerable experience with regard to the OSCE, too. The OSCE mandate in Croatia is drawing to an end now. Over 11 years the OSCE worked actively for the post-conflict rehabilitation of the region, including the defence of the basic rights of ethnic minorities, and as a whole to "pull up" Croatian society, bled dry by the war, to European standards. 

In other words, cooperation between our countries on issues of the EU, NATO, the WTO and the OSCE has very promising prospects and it would be very short-sighted not to take advantage of the experience and potential offered by Croatia.

As already mentioned above, Croatia devotes a lot of attention to regional cooperation, regarding this as one of the main priorities of its foreign policy. It recently ended its chairmanship of the organisation Process of Cooperation in South Eastern Europe, initiated an Agreement on Free Trade in Central Europe and other regional projects to strengthen stability and develop cooperation in the Balkans. All these facts make Croatian diplomacy extremely open to initiatives on interregional cooperation, which creates favourable prerequisites for possibly involving Zagreb in initiatives from Baku. 

Our countries also have huge potential in the humanitarian sphere, especially in the sphere of tourism. Its geographical location and the combination of various types of leisure make Croatia attractive to European tourists. Over 10 million foreign tourists visited the country in 2006.  Many of its tourist sites - Dubrovnik (the old city), cultural and historical monuments of the town of Split (the palace of Diocletian), Trogir, Porec, Sibenik, the Plitvice Lakes national park are under UNESCO patronage.

On the whole, Croatia is of interest for our country both with regard to developing mutually beneficial bilateral relations in the spheres of politics and commerce, energy and humanitarian cooperation, and with regard to forming a "Balkan bridgehead" for more actively promoting Azerbaijan's interests in South Eastern Europe and for strengthening its position in this strategic region.