NON-STRATEGIC FRIENDSHIP

The Iranian president's third visit to Azerbaijan was his first official one - on 21-22 August Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Baku at the head of a small Iranian delegation. In principle, relations between the two countries are distinguished by the regular nature of contacts between their heads of state. In 2002 the Azerbaijani national leader Heydar Aliyev visited Iran, in 2004 President Khatami visited our country, and the following year Ilham Aliyev paid a return visit to Tehran. In December 2005 the current Iranian president visited Naxcivan, and in May 2006 he visited Baku to take part in the 9th summit meeting of the Economic Cooperation Organization, during which he had an opportunity to hold a bilateral meeting with the president of our country. In other words, Azerbaijani-Iranian relations have to their credit quite a high frequency of contacts at summit level, which is a stabilizing factor for the robust development of those relations.

Nevertheless, the background to the latest visit was fraught with difficulty. To use sporting terminology, it could be said that the two leaders approached the Baku summit with different foreign-policy "ratings". Thus, Ilham Aliyev is in excellent "diplomatic form". He enjoys high ratings both inside the country and abroad because he heads a country which, lying at the intersection of world powers' interests, is pursuing a balanced and effective foreign policy. Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, has been fairly "battered" by external criticism and pressure because of his nuclear programme. It is becoming ever more obvious that the Iranian leader by his uncompromising policies is burning all his bridges and dragging his country into the abyss of international isolation, losing partners and allies.

In this context it may be noted that the USA is already openly talking about possible scenarios for military action against Iran. Experts in Washington's conservative and pro-Republican Heritage Foundation, which includes members of the State Department, the Pentagon and the National Security Council, have drawn up a report (the full version of the report was published on 25 July), the main conclusion of which is that a military solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis is in principle possible. But however attractive the prospect of inflicting missile strikes on Iranian territory might look in the eyes of a certain part of the American establishment and society, the experts point out that a final decision has not yet been taken. The US Congress has also had its say in efforts to find a solution to the Iranian problem. The congressmen recently voted on two bills, the co-authors of which were chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs democrat Tom Lantos and his deputy, the republican Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. The authors of the bill are proposing a ban on investments in the Iranian economy exceeding 20m dollars and creating an international nuclear fuel bank for supplies to Iran. At the same time, the sanctions will apply not only to companies in the USA but also to companies in other countries that exceed the investment limit of 20m dollars. Such companies will be denied the right to operate on the American market. Lantos said that the aim of these two bills was "to step up economic sanctions against Iran and to expose Tehran's intention to obtain atomic weapons while working on its so-called peaceful nuclear programme".

However, the chances of the bill on limiting investments being passed by the Senate and President Bush are extremely slim. Most likely, the White House will do everything possible to prevent its passage as, if it were to enter into force, it would have the effect of souring relations between the administration and the governments of many European countries and also India, China and Russia. Also, major investment funds and financial companies with interests in Iran would be forced out of the American market. But the very fact that the anti-Iranian campaign has already gone far beyond a discussion of peaceful scenarios for a solution to the problem of the Iranian nuclear programme is revealing.

The former US envoy to the UN and now leading expert at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, John Bolton, believes that Iran has got too close to creating a nuclear weapon and that the abortive diplomatic efforts of the Europeans have narrowed the available options. The main ones of these are regime change or a limited military operation with the aim of preventing Tehran from obtaining nuclear weapons. He does not believe that these options are particularly attractive, but that they are better than an Iran in possession of atomic weapons. It is interesting that the position of Moscow - Tehran's  main ally - is also changing. We would remind you that Russia has already refused to supply nuclear fuel to Bushehr and has radically altered its stance on "the Iranian issue" at the UN and other international organizations.

As a result of this, the latest visit by the president of Iran to Azerbaijan took on a special significance. At its heart lay not so much a drive to solve specific issues relating to bilateral cooperation (it is well known how difficult it is to persuade Tehran to take part in one project or another with Azerbaijan) as a desire on the part of the Iranian leadership to enlist the support of Baku in its confrontation with the USA and the West, or at least to ensure Baku's neutrality on the Iranian issue.

Meanwhile, Baku is interested in both the bilateral and the foreign policy aspects of Azerbaijani-Iranian relations. There is the fact, for example, that Iran is the fourth leading trade and economic partner of our country (after Russia, Italy and Turkey). Over the first six months of this year trade with Iran totalled 304m dollars (for the whole of 2006 it was 381m dollars). Iran does not invest that much in the Azerbaijani economy (12.2m dollars in the first half of 2007), and yet it is ahead of such "investors" as Italy, Russia, Austria and the World Bank. It is interesting that Ahmadinejad stressed several times during his visit to Baku that both countries have the potential to reach a higher level of cooperation. "We would like our relations with neighbouring Azerbaijan to develop at a faster pace, we have a great interest in this," the Iranian leader said at a concluding press conference. Behind these words lies an approach by Tehran to its northern neighbour that has undergone fundamental change in recent years in the direction of greater constructivism and pragmatism, and a desire on its part to ensure Baku maintains a good-neighbourly attitude to Iran against a background of growing confrontation between Tehran and the West. The Azerbaijani president responded with mutual cordiality, saying that "there is complete mutual understanding between us on all issues, we support one another and defend one another's positions".

It should be pointed out that bilateral cooperation could indeed be on a wider scale, but a restraining factor for Iranian trade and investment in the Azerbaijan market is the critical state of the Iranian economy. The country has an extremely inefficient state sector which is closely tied to the oil industry (oil accounts for 80 per cent of all export revenues), and high levels of unemployment (15 per cent) and inflation (16 per cent). In spite of substantial gold and hard currency reserves (58bn dollars) and huge budget revenues (over 100bn dollars in 2006), 40 per cent of the country's population lives below the poverty line. In other words, our partner is an "oil giant with feet of clay".

But in spite of this, and also the fundamental incompatibility of Baku's and Tehran's strategic points of departure - ideological and foreign policy - cooperation with Tehran is a very important factor for Azerbaijan's stable national development and for the reinforcement of its regional positions. In this context, it is sufficient to recall various projects to supply Naxcivan with electricity and gas and for providing transport links between the exclave and the rest of Azerbaijan via Iranian territory and in general lifting it out of the isolation brought about by Armenian aggression. It should also be stressed that cooperation with Iran is of great importance to Azerbaijan from the point of view of settling a number of issues relating to the Caspian, the fight against trafficking in drugs and weapons of mass destruction in the occupied Azerbaijani territories, and implementation of the North-South and TRASECA projects.

As regards the outcome of the visit by the Iranian head of state to Baku, we should note its high level of productivity - four memoranda were signed for the implementation of such important infrastructure projects as the construction of a road bridge between Culfa in Azerbaijan and Julfa in Iran, the granting of international status to the Saxtaxti-Poldasht checkpoint, the opening of a permanent Baku-Naxcivan-Tehran bus route, and the construction of a hydropower station in the border area of Ordubad-Maraza. We would also point out that all of these projects are of exceptional importance in terms of lifting the blockade around Naxcivan and the full integration of this region into the rest of Azerbaijan. It is revealing that for a long time these projects were blocked by the Iranian side and have been signed only now, when it has become absolutely obvious to Tehran that constructive and mutually advantageous relations with Baku are of critical importance to Iran's regional security.

Of particular importance in this context is the joint declaration signed following the talks in Baku, which reflected the identity of positions of the two heads of state on issues of sensitivity for each side. Azerbaijan again won the maximum number of provisions favourable to itself on the Nagornyy Karabakh problem, while Iran obtained favourable wordings on the nuclear issue in which it has such an extreme interest. The declaration stressed that "the parties, guided by the commonly accepted standards and principles of international law, support the right of all countries, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to the peaceful use of nuclear energy within the framework of cooperation with the IAEA and commitments arising from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty".

Overall, the summit meeting between the leaders of the two neighbouring states can be boldly chalked up as a success for the Azerbaijani president and his diplomacy. Baku made effective use of the current crisis surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme, "squeezing" the necessary projects and wordings out of the traditionally intransigent Tehran. At the same time, the Azerbaijani side effectively left its hands free for future manoeuvre should tension flare up around Iran. And indeed, what is the value of assurances that the territory of our country will not be used for any hypothetical strike against Iran if such a strike, as predicted by the American generals themselves, will be inflicted from the air and aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf, and with speed and precision? It is also important that, having achieved its goals along the Iranian axis, Baku has also reinforced its reputation in the eyes of its main partners - Moscow and Washington. Moscow, as is well known, is urging all countries to normalize relations and engage in dialogue with Iran, in the belief that this will help solve the problem of preserving the non-proliferation regime. For this reason, the Baku summit must have prompted positive feelings in the Kremlin. And Washington, which takes a cautious attitude towards any contacts between its partners and the Iranian regime, has nothing to complain about in this case. Baku, deservedly enjoying a reputation as a balanced regional player, has played its "Iranian match" carefully and skilfully, without giving away anything unnecessary to Tehran and at the same time reinforcing its positions. The latter point is of special relevance to the USA - any strengthening in the regional positions of our country, which is a strategic ally of Washington in the region, is of no small importance to American diplomacy.