IS THERE TO BE A PRECEDENT?

In the middle of May the first round of unofficial talks was held at the UN Security Council regarding draft resolutions on Kosovo, the Serbian province which has been an international protectorate since 1999. Two documents were under examination - one drawn up with the support of the USA and the EU, and another prepared by Russia. The American-European plan rests on the so-called Ahtisaari plan which, as is well known, at the first stage effectively grants Kosovo independence under international supervision. The province is also permitted to have "lightly armed" military units and also symbols of state such as a crest, flag and anthem. In addition, Kosovo can pursue its own foreign policy and join various international organizations, including the UN. However, the province cannot be divided into Serbian and Albanian zones or merge with another state.

Clash of interests

The Ahtisaari plan was, of course, approved by the Kosovo parliament, although there were expressions of displeasure even there. Members of the organized Albanian nationalist movement are displeased that the document contains no explicit reference to the independence of the province. At the same time, members of the region's Serb population did not take part in the vote in Kosovo, even though they are to receive a definite quota in the parliament, government and local authorities. The document drawn up by the UN special envoy was also unanimously approved by the foreign ministers of the EU. As regards Belgrade, it naturally rejected Ahtisaari's proposals. The plan now needs to be approved by the UN Security Council before it can go into effect. And this is where the main difficulties start. In spite of assertions by the US envoy to the UN, Zalmay Khalilzad, that the majority of members of the UN Security Council support the document, experts take a different view. Thus, Ahtisaari's definition of Kosovo's status is supported unequivocally only by the USA, Great Britain, France, Belgium and Italy. Panama, Peru and Qatar constantly waver. Congo, South Africa, Ghana, Indonesia and China are more inclined towards rejection. Slovakia and Russia, for their part, have already indicated that they will vote against. And Moscow's position is of particular importance in this correlation of forces because as a permanent member of the Security Council it has the right of veto. Russia has already hinted following the first round of talks that it will use it. It gives as the main reason for such a decision the fact that Belgrade categorically opposes the document and the UN Security Council should examine all possible scenarios. For its part, Russia is putting its own draft document to the international community which speaks of the need for the immediate implementation of UN resolution No 1244, envisaging the creation of "multi-ethnic democracy accompanied by the observance of the rights of the individual and of ethnic minorities" in Kosovo. That the positions of the West and Russia are irreconcilable is borne out by the words of the Russian permanent representative at the UN, Vitaliy Churkin, who said that on a number of provisions the American-European and the Russian drafts cannot be brought together. He also stressed especially that independence for Kosovo "will have very broad international repercussions". "Never before has anyone proposed granting independence to an autonomous region which is part of a country. This is a turning point, and it needs to be very closely examined," he said. In response, Khalilzad assured the Russian side that he is ready to stiffen the document with Russian proposals for guaranteeing the rights of the Serbian minority. But it still remains highly likely that Moscow will refuse to accept this compromise.

It is noteworthy that the Russian position was effectively supported by Panama, which spoke of the need to extend the talks between the Serbs and the Albanians by six months and to ensure security standards for the ethnic minorities in Kosovo. Churkin believes this initiative has greatly "perplexed" the other members of the Security Council.

It can clearly be seen that a serious trial of strength is developing around Kosovo which is, of course, not confined to the UN. This issue was also discussed during the Russia-EU summit which was held in Samara on 17-18 May. At the concluding press conference Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov called on the world community not to force events. Shortly before, Kosovo had also been on the agenda during a visit by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Moscow.

It is obvious that the EU is one of the most interested parties in this debate. The politicians there clearly want to be done with the Kosovo problem as quickly as possible and are even prepared to place the main burden of the international presence in the province on the shoulders of the union. At the same time, Brussels is anxious to avoid a crisis in relations with Serbia and Russia. Germany, which currently holds the EU presidency, has declared the problem of Kosovo one of its top priorities - Berlin favours a so-called "softened resolution" under which the question of the future status of Kosovo remains open while at the same time the future deployment of KFOR units, police and the peacekeeping mission envisaged by the Ahtisaari plan is allowed to go ahead.

It is worth pointing out that Moscow's position was indirectly supported by the report which followed a visit by UN diplomats to Kosovo. They visited the Serb enclaves of Orahovac, Velika Hoca and Gracanica and reached the conclusion that, in spite of assurances given by the Kosovo authorities regarding their readiness to help create a multi-ethnic society in the province, they are still a very long way from actually implementing these promises. This was also stated by Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica in an interview with "Vesti 24" television. He said that the rights of the Serbs were being grossly violated in Kosovo, while UN representatives were deceiving the world community when they talked about the situation in the province. "Serb refugees are not returning to Kosovo. And most terrible of all, they are not only not returning to those areas where Albanians live, they are not returning to those areas where Serbs have always lived and continue to live. And that is a scandal. It is a scandal not only for the temporary administration and the international community, it is a scandal for the UN mission in Kosovo and for special envoy Martti Ahtisaari. The truth is that the Serbs cannot move freely. The truth is that the majority of them have not returned to Kosovo. The truth is that some 150 monasteries and churches have been destroyed," he said. Belgrade's position therefore remains unchanged - Serbia agrees only to grant the region broad autonomy.

Already decided?

Meanwhile, predictions are becoming ever more frequent that the Kosovo issue is going to be resolved in any case whether the Serbs like it or not. It's just that for the moment it appears they are trying to persuade them, as it were, with maximum advantage for the Serbs themselves. For example, they are promising in exchange to give them the green light into the EU. It is believed that if the UN Security Council fails to settle the status of Kosovo, the Kosovo Albanians will do it themselves and the USA and the majority of the EU countries will simply recognize it as a fait accompli. And this is not a groundless assertion since this scenario is borne out by a number of statements issued by high-ranking international mediators. For example, in an interview with the Austrian newspaper Der Standard in mid-April, Secretary-General of the OSCE Marc Perrin de Brichambaut said that "if Kosovo unilaterally declares itself an independent state then it could be recognized by a whole number of states". Ahtisaari's deputy Albert Rohan is convinced that "Kosovo will probably declare independence in any event". "The question is do we want the process to be controlled and orderly or chaotic?" he asked. He is echoed by US Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns, who believes that "it is very difficult to go against the tide of history". And finally, the most hardline approach was set out by Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried: "I hope the Russians understand that Kosovo will gain its independence in any case. This will happen either under observation and control, which will guarantee the welfare of the Serb people. Or in an uncontrolled way, and then it will be the Kosovo Serbs who suffer the most, which will be terrible." The USA and the EU are thus trying to persuade Russia that, by using its right of veto, it will be responsible for an escalation of violence in the province. Moscow's response to this is best illustrated by the words of Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Titov, who said that "the Kosovo Albanians are blackmailing the world community by threatening a bloodbath if they don't get their independence".

No alternative

As we can see, the situation appears to be deadlocked for the moment, while promises that 2007 will be a significant year for Kosovo appear downright ominous. For example, a number of experts are urging that the Serbs who live on the territory of Kosovo should not be forgotten. It may be recalled that one of the local leaders said that in the event of the province being granted independence the Kosovo Serbs could also declare that their enclaves are not subordinate to the authorities in Pristina. And then the situation could really get out of control. And this in turn is quite capable of destabilizing the situation not only on the Balkan peninsula but throughout Europe. 

It is also worth remembering that the talks on defining the status of Kosovo are making the situation much more complicated in Serbia itself. Observers in the region are warning that radicals could triumph in the coming parliamentary elections in the country. This is a view that is also held by the speaker of the Serbian parliament, Tomislav Nikolic. He is convinced that everything that is forcing President Boris Tadic and Prime Minister Kostunica (leaders of the Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of Serbia respectively) to agree to compromises with one another is "pressure and blackmail by the West". We would recall that the opposition Serbian Radical Party of Vojislav Sesel won a victory in the elections to parliament, taking more than 30 per cent of the vote. But the democratic parties overall also won a substantial number of votes. And if the pro-European Serbian politicians lean towards the EU, the ultra-radicals, on the contrary, believe that the West is bringing only grief to Serbia. Also, the Serbian Radical Party fiercely opposes granting any degree of independence at all to the rebel province. However, even the pro-European Serbian parties will hardly agree to the proposals of Ahtisaari, as this would mean political death for them. Such a step is also impossible because the new Constitution of Serbia, passed in a referendum last autumn, clearly defines Kosovo as an inalienable part of Serbia. It is doubtful whether any political force in the country would risk taking on the responsibility for initiating a review of the Constitution. But failure to resolve the status of Kosovo is also sapping the strength of the Serbian state. For example, US ambassador in Belgrade Michael Polt once said that until the status of the rebel province is finally resolved neither Belgrade nor Pristina can count on integration into the EU. At the same time it is quite possible that the Serbs will themselves turn their backs on the European Union.

Separatists' dream

Another reason many countries are following the events surrounding Kosovo with apprehension is that the example of the Kosovo Albanians could be followed by other ethnic minorities on the territory of Europe, and not only there. If some can do it, then why not others, and if the territorial integrity of one country can be sacrificed, then why should other states remain under the protection of international law? In particular, some media sources have been pointing out for some time now that similar alarming signals are emanating - albeit weakly for the time being - from such countries as Cyprus, France, Great Britain, Spain, Slovenia and Romania. As we all know, they are familiar with territorial and ethnic problems to some degree or other from their own experience. But most concerns are prompted by the frozen conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union. For example, the president of the Dniester region, Igor Smirnov, said during a meeting with President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Goran Lennmarker that "the Dniester region has more grounds for recognition than Kosovo". Something similar was said by the foreign minister of Abkhazia, Sergey Shamba, in whose opinion "the legal and historical grounds for Abkhaz claims to independence are stronger than in Kosovo". The "Kosovo model" is also of interest to the Armenian separatists who, unfortunately, find support on this issue in Russia. For example, the director of the Institute of CIS Countries, deputy of the State Duma and member of the general council of the United Russia party Konstantin Zatulin said at the opening ceremony for a branch of the institute in Armenia that "the discussion of the question of the status of Kosovo and other similar international conflicts has to be used in the issue of a Karabakh settlement, and Russia should play its role in this". But officials in Baku are relaxed on this account - there is no way a document like Ahtisaari's plan could be used in the process of settling the Karabakh conflict. After all, first and foremost, if the issue in Kosovo is inter-ethnic and internal, then in the case of Karabakh we are dealing with aggression by one sovereign state against another, which has been recognized as such by the international community. Also, if the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro was a federative state, then the Republic of Azerbaijan is a unitary state.

It should be said at this point that the possibility of trying to repeat the "Kosovo precedent" could have an effect on the position of Russia. After all, its determined support of Serbia is hardly dictated just by an ardent desire to provide support for "the fraternal Serbian people". In politics, as in business, there are no friends, only interests. Moscow has already hinted on several occasions that any declaration of independence for Kosovo will have a direct influence on Moscow's attitude to territorial conflicts in the CIS - this mainly concerns South Ossetia, Abkhazia and the Dniester region. There is thus every reason to suppose that the Kremlin could all of a sudden betray its principles on this issue. This is also borne out by statements from certain Serbian politicians that the "battles" in the UN Security Council are nothing but a sign of horse-trading between Russia and the West. At the same time we should not forget that apart from its interest in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia also has Chechnya, Dagestan and Tatarstan, which from time to time entertain "radiant" thoughts of greater independence from Moscow. And so it is clear that in the question of the status of Kosovo the Kremlin has a great many "pros" and "cons", and this is precisely the reason its representatives constantly issue calls "not to wield an axe" but to take a balanced approach to the problem.

Bad or worse still?

The entire question now lies in whether Serbia will agree to a division of its territory voluntarily or whether it will be forced. In the first case, there will be no precedent and the UN will chalk up a peacefully resolved conflict - according to a unique scenario, please note! And indeed, if we take an impartial and honest look at all this, Kosovo is currently bringing Serbia more woe than benefit. And even if the province accepts that very status of broad autonomy, Belgrade will have to pump huge financial resources into it, otherwise it will again be the target of angry accusations. And it is scarcely worth pointing out the difference in the birth rates of the Serbs and the Kosovars. But on the other hand the Serbs regard Kosovo as the cradle of their statehood, a sacred land abundantly washed with the blood of their ancestors. What will become of the Serbian national consciousness if they simply decide to turn their backs on this land? And then, where is the guarantee that the present situation, in which it's bad for Serbia without Kosovo and worse still with it, will not be subsequently recreated somewhere artificially? And where is the guarantee that Kosovo will not turn into the European equivalent of the Palestinian autonomy, "a stably unstable territory", existing on international aid? A number of experts have already pointed out the possibility of such a scenario. And the most galling and senseless in all this is that those who suffer most from the geopolitical squabbles and international impotence will be the ordinary people, both Serbs and Kosovars. In the opinion of Ahtisaari, if the UN Security Council does not decide the status of Kosovo in May the problem will become an irritant and spoil the mood of the G8 summit in June. So the struggle of interests around the rebel Serbian province has perhaps not even reached its climax yet.