ALTHOUGH THERE IS CHOICE...

Armenia is getting ready for a parliamentary election which is supposed to serve as a rehearsal for the presidential poll. First observers from the OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights are already arriving in the country, while political parties are revealing their manifestos. Nevertheless, local experts are saying through their teeth: the election campaign is very slow and flat. Even scandals are not in abundance.

Many analysts believe that the reason is that Armenian parliament does not enjoy huge popularity. Besides, voters seem to be tired of the "inter-party bickering" and reshuffling of the same people who pronounce the same ardent speeches. This is taking place against the backdrop of the "ruling team" showing no sign of letting go of power, as it appears to have made up its mind as to Kocharyan's successor. Presidency is contended by Serzh Sarkisyan, a former "sitter" in Stepan Zatikyan's cell, then a "field commander" and war criminal, and currently defense minister and secretary of the Armenian Security Council.

However, Armenia is also experiencing another intrigue, the outcome of which can have a much greater impact on the political balance of forces in the region, because given the forthcoming "transfer of power" Yerevan's ruling team is still balancing between the role of "Russia's outpost" and the European orientation.

"Armenia is geared towards developing cooperation with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)," the secretary general of the organization, Nikolay Bordyuzha, said confidently in a lecture at the Yerevan State University. According to the secretary general, Armenia is a state which links its security with the CSTO, while the Organization aims to meet the interests of the republic. "Armenia is an active ally of the CSTO in developing cooperation between member countries, and we think the republic has been very active in this context," Bordyuzha said but apparently forgot to explain that the Organization had turned into a "power structure" of the Armenian government. The secretary general then dwelt on Armenia's preferential treatment in arms supplies. This is a system used within the CSTO. It provides member countries with the opportunity to buy Russian arms at Russia's domestic prices, while prices on Russian military hardware and weaponry exported to the West and other CIS countries are considerably higher. "This is only one of the advantages of cooperation between Armenia and the Organization. Also, a large number of Armenian servicemen are receiving education at Russian military schools and academies," Bordyuzha said.

It is worth mentioning that a NATO week was held in Armenia at the same time. Within the framework of the week, the visiting head of the defense cooperation section of the NATO department for defense policy and planning, George Katsirdakis, was giving assessment to Armenia's cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance. According to him, NATO has an extensive program of cooperation with Armenia, which is in the interests of both parties. Cooperation will also be maintained in the fight against terror and exchange of information. At the same time, Katsirdakis said that according to the information available to him, Armenia has no intention of entering NATO. "As repeatedly stated on behalf of the Alliance, participation in the IPAP (Individual Partnership Action Plan) has nothing to do with entering the organization. Countries interested in joining the Alliance, such as Ukraine and Georgia, will work on a different schedule. As for Georgia, it first has to normalize its relations with neighboring countries and Russia, and then seek admission to NATO. We do not want to participate in confrontation, NATO has different objectives. In any case, in 2008 Georgia will not become a member of the Alliance, this is a long process," Katsirdakis said.

In any other country such state of affairs could be described as a "balanced" or even "complimentary" foreign policy, though with a slight and traditional slant towards Russia. And everyone has the right to choose their friends themselves. In Armenia, however, the situation is completely different. The main "motive" of the union with Russia has always been the "territorial issue". Back at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, politicians of the Tsarist Russia started making advances to Armenian nationalists: in Petrograd Armenian tycoons were openly promised that "Russian bayonets" will "free from Turks" the so-called "Western Armenia", i.e. six eastern Turkish districts. At that time, the parties were looking at including this "Western Armenia" into Russia, not of the establishment of an independent Armenian state, but no-one was paying attention to such trifle things at the time. As is known, the victory of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in the Turkish war for independence, cancellation of the Sevr Treaty and signing of the Lozano agreement thwarted this geopolitical transformation. Nevertheless, Moscow has always made attempts to materialize its previous strategy: in the 1930s, shortly after World War II and in the 1970s, when oil super-profits were channeled into the military and industrial sector against the backdrop of an "energy crisis". In other words, Armenia does not expect preferential treatment in arms supplies from its friendship with Russia, but the six Turkish districts presented to it on a plate - nothing less than that. Armenia is seriously frustrated because Moscow, despite the "loyalty" on the part of Armenia, does not bother to denounce the Kars and Moscow agreements signed with Turkey. When Russia raised the gas price for Armenia, while the enterprises handed over to it in lieu of previous arrears have not started operating, Armenian politicians started understanding that stakes on Russia are not justifying themselves. Finally, it is no secret that after providing Armenia with military and diplomatic support, Moscow has been unable to create an effective alternative to the West in the economic sector. Therefore, there seems to be a great contrast between Armenia on the one hand and Georgia and Azerbaijan on the other.

At the same time, Armenia is unable to establish normal relations with the West either. This is largely due to the "zero" political and economic contacts with neighboring Turkey - the main "gateway to the West" for Eurasia. As a result of the ongoing occupation of Azerbaijani lands and active lobbying in "third country" parliaments for anti-Turkish "Armenian revolutions", the border with Turkey remains closed. Many politicians in Armenia seriously believe that it would be acceptable to establish diplomatic relations with Ankara only after the latter "apologizes for genocide". The statement by Suleyman Demirel that 5-million Armenia should not dictate anything to 60-million Turkey seems to have fallen on deaf ears in the Armenian establishment. And although Yerevan still hopes that European politicians "will express solidarity with Christian Armenia" and urge Turkey to accept Armenian conditions, in reality this cannot be seen as a serious political stake. In other words, Armenia views its current marriage with Russia as an enforced measure. 

The Armenian people have lived without their own state for too long, and in exchange for promises to establish it, Armenian leaders have served as fractional money in such games and intrigue so many times that they are now simply unable to make a distinction between serving someone else's interests and protecting their own. As a result, they cannot build normal relations with Russia and the West.