ASTANA HAS TO CHOOSE: TO GO ACROSS THE CASPIAN OR BY A ROUNDABOUT ROUTE

Kazakhstan has recently started attracting more and more attention of the world's influential capital cities and leading political figures. The country was always in the focus of international attention, but its role is increasing in the circumstances when the struggle is going on for influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia and the rivalry between the USA, Russia and the European Union for energy supplies and energy transit routes has intensified. 

Suffice it to look at a chronicle of foreign visits to Astana to realize the important role that Kazakhstan plays among regional priorities of the EU and the USA. Andris Piebalgs, the EU Energy Commissioner, visited Kazakhstan in early December 2006; a delegation of the US Department of State led by Daniel S. Sullivan, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, arrived on a visit in early February 2007; then Robert Simmons, NATO's Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia, arrived on a visit; Richard A. Boucher, the US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, paid a visit in mid-February. Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov paid a visit in late February and Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili ended this array of high-ranking guests in early March.

Judging by reports of foreign and Kazakh news agencies, the main topic that the overseas guests were discussing with the Kazakh leadership was the country's joining to the projects of energy supplies, first of all across the Caspian Sea, to be precise the project of the creation of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline which the USA and the West regards as an alternative to gas supplies through Russia.

Some media outlets say that Simmons even spoke about the need to set up a navy in the Caspian Sea and said that NATO was ready to assist Kazakhstan in this issue. The interest that the USA and the EU is showing in Kazakhstan is quite understandable. First, the country has great demonstrated oil reserves (about 4bn t) and plans to produce about 150 t of oil a year by 2015. If part of these reserves is transported across the Caspian Sea to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, then the role and importance of routes that are not dependent on Russia will increase and consequently the position of the West in the region will strengthen (accordingly, the position of Moscow will weaken).

As to gas supplies, the implementation of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline project may change the geopolitical situation in Central Asia, because it can redirect Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan from Russia towards the West through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, thus depriving Moscow of a possibility to influence these countries and also pricing policy in the European and world gas markets. 

Second, Kazakhstan looks like an important geopolitical foothold, first of all for Washington, to expand its influence to Central and South Asia and to restrain China. And finally, this country has a rather liberal investment climate that creates prerequisites for investments and business in this country. 

However, there are at least two weak points in these calculations. First, Kazakhstan is too closely linked with and dependent on Russia due to traditional historical (Russian language and Russian community that comprises over 30 per cent of the population of Kazakhstan), geographical (the great length of the border), economic and strategic (the need to use Moscow as a counterbalance to China) reasons.

Second, apart from common interests, the USA and EU has considerable differences in their positions. The EU thinks it is possible to seek compatibility of long-term energy strategies of the EU and Russia and for this reason is not interested in the worsening of relations between Astana and Moscow. On the contrary, Washington is not looking for compromises with Moscow and is trying to pull Kazakhstan out of the sphere of Russian influence and sets as an objective the establishment of all-round strategic control over Central Asia in order to restrict the influence not only of Moscow but also of Beijing (and other regional players, such as Delhi) in the region.

In this situation, Kazakhstan is trying to implement its own interests by playing on contradictions between Russia, the USA and the EU and at the same time not go beyond its traditional priorities that were described in President Nazarbayev's state of the nation address on 28 February 2007. These priorities are Russia, China, the USA, the EU and then Central Asian counties, the Caspian and Black Sea regions.

Saying that in visible future the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) will be the main route to transport Kazakh oil and that there will not be radical changes concerning the creation of new routes (in one of his interviews Foreign Minister Marat Tazhin even described such projects as "fantasy, utopia and dreams"), the Kazakh leadership stresses at the same time that a multi-vector policy is an element of Kazakh diplomacy, the diversification of energy routes is an element of national security and the construction of new routes is a matter of efficiency, rationality and profitability. However, Astana does not say if the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is within the diversity of routes or they mean only Russia and China. (It makes no secret that Moscow supports a Chinese route because it has its interests there because Russian oil may be pumped via this pipeline as well). There is also an Iranian route, but judging by comments on Sullivan's visit to Astana, Washington's reaction concerning this issue will remain extremely tough and irreconcilable.

Baku's position looks interesting against the background of the struggle of world capital cities for Astana. 

Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov paid an official visit to Astana in later February (it was symbolic that the visit coincided with the 15th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries). Apparently the aim of Mammadyarov's visit was to enlist Kazakhstan's support in the issues concerning the implementation of strategic projects - Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC), Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) and Baku-Tbilisi-Kars. This topic is lately high on the agenda of Azerbaijani-Kazakh relations that is quite intelligible - if Kazakhstan supports the mentioned projects with its reserves, it will make them practically invulnerable to external influence.

During Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev's visit to Almaty in June 2006 for the summit of the Conference for Interaction and Confidence in Asia, the two countries signed the agreement "On support and assistance to the transportation of oil from Kazakhstan to international markets across the Caspian Sea and Azerbaijan via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline". 

At a briefing following the signing ceremony, President Nazarbayev said that "by joining the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) project, Kazakhstan gets the third route for oil transportation apart from the Russian and Chinese ones". The task of Azerbaijani diplomacy and the government is to make this route a reality. For the time being it is planed to transport 7.5m t of Kazakh oil via the BTC pipeline and to increase the amount to 20m t. However, these amounts have not yet materialized although commercial and tariff conditions of the BTC are more favourable than that of the CPC.

It would be very advantageous to both countries if Kazakhstan joins the BTE project and supports the construction of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline. However, it seems that being fearful of "friendly fire" from Moscow, Astana refrains from making any statements and deeds to back the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, pleading the unsettled status of the Caspian Sea.

And finally, the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway is the final element of the triad of strategic projects which could unite the two countries into a strong intercontinental union. The transport ministers of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Turkey and China signed a protocol in Astana on 27 July 2006 on the improvement and strengthening of transport ties between Europe and Asia. Taking into account that the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway will become operational in future, the creation of a transport infrastructure in Kazakhstan connecting the country's Caspian ports with points of destination on the Chinese border, it would be of unprecedented importance for Azerbaijan, Georgia and the entire Europe to get an access to China through Kazakhstan. Taking into account the scale of markets in China and neighbouring countries, railway communication between these countries would be an important factor for long-term and stable development and security of the Caucasus, Caspian and Asian regions.

In general, the involvement of Kazakhstan in the formation of the Trans-Caspian transport, oil and gas transit infrastructure in the Caspian Sea would be an important factor for strengthening energy security of the region as a whole and of separate countries in the region. It would be desirable that not only the USA, Europe and Azerbaijan, but Kazakhstan itself, which claims the role a Eurasian bridge, understands this strategic task.