US RADAR STATIONS IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS

The nuclear and missile programs of North Korea and Iran have heightened concerns over a possible strike on the facilities of the USA and its allies. To neutralize this threat, Washington is considering plans to develop an appropriate missile defense system. On the face of it, this issue does not have direct connection with Azerbaijan. However, in a news conference in Brussels in early March, Lt-Gen Henry Obering stated that within the framework of the missile defense system being created, Pentagon would like to have a radar station in the Caucasus as well. It is expected that the mobile launching radar will be deployed for a more powerful radar station which is to be established in the Czech Republic (the antimissile rocket proper will be installed in Poland). The US general said that this was only an idea and that no specific negotiations had been held with countries of the Caucasus to that effect yet. However, government and military circles of some countries, Russia in particular, have reacted in a rather nervous fashion.

Russian experts believe that the Caucasus radar will be capable of tracking the activities of the Russian anti-aircraft troops in the Black Sea, in Armenia and in the Caspian. According to the former commander-in-chief of Russia's anti-aircraft troops, Anatoliy Kornukov, the US radar station in the Caucasus "directly concerns Russia's national security because it is likely to have all-around surveillance and will be responsible for monitoring southern parts of our country". His current colleague, Army General Vladimir Mikhaylov, warned certain countries against providing their territories for the US military infrastructure, and referred to the possible deployment of the latest anti-aircraft system C-400 as a retaliatory measure. It has been stated at the highest political level that other measures are being considered, including secession from the Agreement on the liquidation of medium-range missiles. This agreement, signed in the late 1980s by Mikhail Gorbachev, led to a considerable reduction in the level of the missile confrontation in the world. Former defense minister and currently first deputy prime minister of the Russian Federation, Sergey Ivanov, has said openly that the Agreement on conventional forces in Europe (CFE) in the light of the ongoing NATO enlargement is effectively fading away and Moscow may stop recognizing the commitments imposed by this agreement.

Probing the ground

Russia's possible deployment of medium-range missiles or the buildup of its weaponry in the Caucasus, which runs counter to the existing limits, does not directly depend on the position of Azerbaijan and Georgia on the stationing of the US radar and integration into NATO. Moscow may make such a decision even if we act in the most loyal and reserved way. We cannot rule out and ignore the negative scenarios resulting from the resumption of a stand-off on the East-West vector. It is no wonder that both Tbilisi and Baku are engaged in intense consultations with their strategic allies, high-ranking NATO officials and the US military and political administration.

Turkish Army Chief of Staff Gen Ergin Saygun visited Azerbaijan in late February. He was familiarized with the transition of the Azerbaijani armed forces to NATO standards. Touching upon Turkey's modernization of military airdromes in Azerbaijan following the example of Georgia, Saygun said Ankara would continue providing comprehensive assistance towards strengthening Azerbaijan's defense capacity. This was followed by a visit to Baku by a Turkish military delegation led by the commander of ground troops, Army General Ilker Basbug. Consultations with top brass were continued at a high political level. On 8-9 March, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan paid a working visit to Azerbaijan. It goes without saying that the objective of his visit went far beyond the mere participation in the opening of a new building of the Turkish embassy in Azerbaijan and the forum of Diaspora organizations of Turkey and Azerbaijan. The most important part of the visit, which stayed off camera, was the exchange of opinions over the deteriorating situation on Iran, the need for Azerbaijan to make up its mind over its NATO integration and Washington's military appeals to Baku.

According to a diplomatic source, a special representative of the UN Secretary General for the South Caucasus and Central Asia, Robert Simmons, is expected to visit Azerbaijan. The aim of the mission is to discuss prospects for developing cooperation between NATO and Azerbaijan. At the end of March, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov will leave for Washington to meet US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. It is obvious that along with the Karabakh settlement, the talks are likely to focus on Azerbaijan's stance on NATO enlargement, possible stationing of the US radar, as well as US assistance in the efforts to curb Iran's nuclear program.

Therefore, Baku, even after consultations with representatives of fraternal Turkey, is still facing a dilemma. Long-term security and national development interests are closely intertwined with integration into Western economic and defense areas and strengthening of a strategic partnership with the USA. But it would be precipitous to underestimate the risk of a hostile reaction from Tehran and especially Moscow. Washington's promises of protection are still hollow and have yet to be inked. The USA is a superpower, but it is two oceans away, while Russia and Iran are touching our northern and southern borders respectively. In a critical situation, real military assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan can be promptly provided only by Turkey. This is why it is with Ankara that it is necessary to agree our course of action, and this is being done now.

Western politicians and top brass prefer not to engage in terse rhetoric with the Kremlin. They state that neither the local anti-aircraft system unfolding in Europe nor the radar poses any threat to Russia. Even if it is pointed northwards, the power of this radar will not be sufficient to detect the launch of Russian missiles. This task is being successfully coped with by the early warning system existing on the territory of the USA and in space.

It is obvious that Iran is the subject of retaliation. This is seen in the statement by the speaker for the US Missile Defense Agency, Rick Lehner, that "specialists would like the radar station to be installed as close as possible to the territory of Iran". To convince Moscow of this, the Americans have engaged the mechanism of consultations. On 9 March, within the framework of the so-called "Mazurkevich-Edelman" high-level working group, consultations were held in Washington between Russian and US defense departments. The group is named after the people heading respective delegations - the head of the department for international military cooperation of the Russian Defense Ministry, Col Gen Anatoliy Mazurkevich, and under-secretary of defense for policy, Eric Edelman.

Without the right to make a mistake

Let us leave alone the US plans and turn to Russia's and Iran's attitude towards Azerbaijan. Can Moscow count on Azerbaijan's restraint in the issue of the US radar at a time when it has stationed not only a monitoring but also a destruction facility in Armenia pointed at Azerbaijan and Turkey (several C-300 facilities and soon C-400)? We cannot always turn a blind eye to the fact that Russia sees Armenia as a strategic ally and supports it in economic and military aspects. Armenia has occupied a fifth of our territory and has no intention of vacating it. Officials in Moscow making threatening statements should also remember that a sharp deterioration in Azerbaijani-Russian relations will make it impossible for Russia to continue using the highly important Qabala radar station.

As far as Iran is concerned, President Ilham Aliyev has repeatedly stated that Baku supports a resolution of Iran's nuclear problem only through negotiations. It has also been publicly stated that Azerbaijan does not intend to provide its territory or participate in any other way in the operation against Iran. However, the following question is legitimately asked in Azerbaijan: how can we be affected by the developments if military action does start? Without the opportunity to deal a blow to the USA directly, Tehran threatens to deal strikes against US interests throughout the world. Can Azerbaijan feel safe under such circumstances? 

Even if the Iranians refrain from any action on the territory of Azerbaijan, there is no guarantee that Armenia, patronized by Moscow, will not be tempted to inflict a rocket or bomb strike on our oil pipelines and terminals by taking advantage of the US-Iranian stand-off and then put the blame at the feet of Tehran. In other words, the US radar, capable of detecting facilities in our airspace (it would be na?ve to trust the conscientiousness of the Russian-controlled Gabala radar station, especially since this installation is designed to detect rocket activity at long distances), can prove very useful in strengthening our security. It is worth mentioning that we already have certain experience of such interaction with the USA, which has proved quite positive. There are two radar stations which have been installed in Azerbaijan with US assistance. Being a practical outcome of the US project Caucasus Martlet, they have significantly boosted Azerbaijan's capacity to track targets at sea and in air, though officially they are not part of the anti-aircraft troops but of the border troops.

As we can see, there is a difficult choice to make. Both Baku and Tbilisi are in no hurry to clarify their positions. Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bazhuashvili has shied away from answering a question by telling the media that Washington had not yet asked Tbilisi about that. The head of the international relations department of the Azerbaijani Presidential Administration, Novruz Mammadov, has said that the USA is not in talks with Azerbaijan over the issue. The Azerbaijani Defense Ministry has denied the possibility of stationing US anti-aircraft radar stations in Azerbaijan and pointed to a constitutional ban on stationing foreign military bases in Azerbaijan.

It remains to be added that facilities of the missile defense system can be stationed only on the territories of US allies in NATO. Therefore, the process of entry by a country providing its territory for the deployment of the missile defense system will be automatically accelerated. In this case Georgia and Azerbaijan will have to deal with a complicated and dangerous knot of problematic issues related to integration into NATO, stationing of components of the US missile defense system on their territories and relations in the context of the Iranian problem. 

It is quite possible that the need to urgently make up one's mind on all issues has been slightly exaggerated by the media which have a natural inclination to sensations. The process of bringing the Azerbaijani armed forces into line with NATO standards is to be completed only in 2008. At issue are structural changes in the Azerbaijani armed forces, namely, bringing personnel into conformity with NATO requirements. The introduction of the missile defense system in Europe is not expected until 2011, when Poland will deploy the first three out of 10 antimissile rockets. And contrary to a widespread opinion, military strikes on facilities in Iran are not a matter of the next weeks or months. Anyhow, the questions asked will have to be answered, which will predetermine Azerbaijan's strategic choice. And there is no right to make a mistake here.