THE FIRST REPUBLIC AND KEMALIST TURKEY

During the gala events which took place in our country to celebrate the 90th anniversary of the foundation of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic, some historians and analysts actively propounded a premise that Turkey played a special role in that event. Indeed, the Turkish military did play an extremely important role in the physical survival of the Azerbaijani nation, which in the spring and summer of 1918 was defenceless against armed Armenian gangs and military units of the Bolshevik Baku Soviet. Turkish military and political support for the birth of the independent ADR should not be underestimated.

At the same time, it has to be recognised that the Turkish factor played a role which was far from straightforward in the history of the First Republic. Documents in the archives show that the fall of the ADR and the occupation of Azerbaijan were made possible by the coincidence of the interests of Kemalist Turkey and Soviet Russia in this region and the need of both anti-imperialist regimes for mutual support.

After the defeat of Ottoman Turkey in WWI and the signing, on 30 October 1918, of the Armistice of Mudros, which not only marked the end of the Ottoman Empire, but also paved the way for the division of Turkey, the national movement in the country gathered steam. Its leaders, first and foremost Mustafa Kemal, knew that without union with Russia they would not be able to continue their struggle. This was when Mustafa Kemal established relations with the Bolshevik underground movement in Baku via his emissary to the Transcaucasus, Fuad Sabit. By December 1919, another channel of communication between Turkey and the Bolsheviks was established by Halil Pasa, former commander of the Eastern Group of Turkish Troops. Both men maintained relations with the ADR government at the same time.

The main aim of these contacts was to organise Russian military assistance to the Kemalists in Turkey and set up a strategic corridor of communications between Anatolia and Russia, via Azerbaijan. On 28 January 1920 the chamber of deputies, in which the majority were supporters of the liberation movement, adopted the National Pact, which proclaimed Turkey's right to independence and integrity within the borders that existed at the time of the signing of the Armistice of Mudros. In reply the allied forces imposed martial law in Istanbul on 16 March 1920 and dissolved the chamber of deputies. As a result the Committee, which assumed the functions of a provisional government, convoked in Ankara a new maclis with extraordinary powers. The new maclis, which was named the Great National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT), opened on 23 April 1920. It declared Turkey's independence and pronounced itself the only legitimate authority; a new government was formed by M. Kemal. From the moment of creation of the GNAT its leadership pursued a consistent course towards cooperation with Soviet Russia, which became the only source of military, technical, financial, material and political support for the Kemalists. Soviet Russia, too, was interested in GNAT's support. Having failed to "export" world revolution to the West, the Bolsheviks began to concentrate on spreading their influence to the East, principally to Turkey and Iran.

The coincidence of the goals of consolidating their regional positions and their interest in mutual support resulted in both Moscow and Ankara adopting the same "political language" on Azerbaijan. American scientist Tadeusz Swietochowski cites convincing arguments about the true role of the Turkey factor in the organisation of the Bolshevik coup in Azerbaijan in March-April 1920. "In those turbulent spring days the Kemalist Turks in Baku had taken part in the developments, aspiring to swing the outcome in favour of the Ankara government. They convened in early April to coordinate the actions of their groups. Some of the participants in the convention had worked with the Azerbaijani Communists before that and were among the founders of the Turkish Communist Party in Baku in March. The coordinating centre, which included Halil Pasa and Fuad Sabit, passed a resolution defining Turkey's policy in the Azerbaijani crisis. Its three main postulates were:

1. The toppling of the incumbent pro-British Azerbaijani Government and its replacement by a government that would be able to cooperate with the Bolsheviks

2. The creation of a committee to carry out changes in the government, which would include Bolsheviks and organisations in charge of propaganda, the press, publishing activities and military operations

3. The occupation of Baku by the Red Army only at the request of the Turkish Communist Party - in the opinion of the committee, which is shared by the Turkish and Azerbaijani Communist parties, an invasion of Azerbaijan had to be avoided."

The resolution was handed to Kazim Karabekir, commander of the Turkish troops on the Eastern Anatolia front, whose recommendations, for their part, laid the foundation for the famous letter of Mustafa Kemal to Lenin, dated 26 April.

Thus, the establishment of total control over the Transcaucasus region, and especially Azerbaijan, was in both regional powers' interests as it enabled the establishment of a channel of military-technical support to the Mustafa Kemal government from the Russian Bolsheviks.  In this context, Azerbaijan's role was growing in the eyes of Moscow from that of a mere corridor connecting Turkey and Russia to that of a source of raw materials for the process of the prospective Bolshevisation of Turkey, especially as Bolshevik propaganda was gaining influence there at that time, the Turkish Communist Party was legalised (Mustafa Kemal was forced to condone these developments which were counter to the ideology and practice of the Kemalists and which later proved to be provisional, only to win the sympathy of the Bolsheviks).

The fact that the first foreign political document of the GNAT, passed at its first session, five days before the occupation of Baku (on 23 April 1920), was an appeal to Azerbaijan to "let Soviet troops pass to the Turkish border to defend them against British attacks," testifies to the significance of the Azerbaijan factor in Russo-Turkish relations. At the same time Halil Pasa, a prominent Kemalist and Mustafa Kemal's emissary to Baku, was trying to persuade the ADR leadership that there was no need to be concerned about the arrival of Red Army forces which, he claimed, "were only passing through the territory of Azerbaijan on their way to Anatolia, where they would join the liberation war in Turkey." Swietochowski writes that Halil Pasa "even said that he would soon take command of the 11th Army, as evidence of the Russians' good intentions."

A few days later, on 26 April, M. Kemal sent a message to the Soviet Government, in which he conveyed the strategic course of the young Turkish government regarding Russia and the three Transcaucasus republics. Undertaking to "combine all of my work and all military operations with the Russian Bolsheviks, who pursue the goal of combat against the imperialist governments," he clearly and unambiguously outlined in that message the main thrust of Ankara's regional strategy: a refusal to expand its zone of influence to the South Caucasus and recognition of Russia's dominion there in return for political, military, technical and material support from Moscow. "If Soviet forces intend to begin combat operations against Georgia, or use their influence to force Georgia, resorting to diplomatic methods, to join the union and expel the British from the Caucasus, the Turkish Government undertakes to carry out military operations against imperialist Armenia and commits itself to forcing the Azerbaijani Republic to join the group of Soviet states," the Turkish leader promised, continuing his message by discussing the "price" for the "services" offered. "In order, first, to expel the imperialist forces which occupy our territory, populated by our people, and second, to strengthen our internal forces to continue our common fight against imperialism, we ask Soviet Russia to give us, as emergency assistance, 5 million Turkish liras in gold, weapons and ammunition in amounts which need to be agreed during talks and, in addition, some military-technical support and health care supplies, as well as food for our troops which will have to operate in the East according to the requirements of Soviet authorities ."

As a result, it was Turkey which provided the most active support to Soviet Russia for the occupation of Baku in such a short time, which was confirmed later by the Turkish leaders themselves. "With our influential assistance and support, these armies (the 10th and 11th Soviet Armies - author) easily crossed the Northern Caucasus and entered Azerbaijan," Mustafa Kemal noted at a GNAT session on 14 August 1920. "The Azerbaijanis reacted calmly to the arrival of the armies. The Soviet armies took all the necessary military strategic measures on the borders with Armenia and Georgia and, at the same time, began to establish direct communications with us."

Soviet Azerbaijani officials also testified later to the pro-Russian position of Turkey in that period. In his 20 September 1920 letter to Deputy People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs Lev Karakhan, the first Plenipotentiary Representative of Soviet Azerbaijan to the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, Behbud Sahtaxtinskiy, admitted that "before the coup, the Turks in Azerbaijan insisted in every way on a union with Russia and they helped the coup a great deal."

It is important to note that the dual nature of the Turkish presence in Azerbaijan, which eventually became a factor in the success of the coup in the republic, was observed from the very first day of independence. On 23 August, the head of the ADR Government Fatali-Xan Xoyski noted in his instruction to M.E. Rasulzada, head of the Azerbaijani delegation in Istanbul (who from June to September 1918 effectively acted as ADR diplomatic representative in Turkey) when he described the role of the Turks in Baku, that "Nuri Pasa's policy is increasingly leaning toward interference in our internal affairs" and asked, in view of this, to "cautiously find out what Istanbul's policy is and take appropriate measure to safeguard our independence." Xoyski's letter dated 31 August included a similar request. "The most important thing is to clarify, once and for all, our relations with Turkey; otherwise we are going to have a diarchy or polyarchy which will be absolutely detrimental to any activity or governance effort. I would suggest that all governance should be concentrated in the hands of the Azerbaijani government and the Turkish military units should submit all their wishes and requests to the government, instead of interfering directly in the process of governance, which is the case now."

The ADR Prime Minister touched on the issue of Turkish interference again in his 7 December 1918 speech at the opening of the Azerbaijani Parliament, where he said that the "Turkish command, which entered our territory on our invitation to protect our borders and to suppress domestic anarchy, through force of circumstances interfered in our domestic affairs." The prime minister added that "we, desiring to preserve the sovereignty of our rights on the one hand, but being in dire need of the services of the Turkish command on the other, were to skilfully manoeuvre in a manner that would defend us from external interference and, at the same time, avoid an insult to the people who, at great cost, saved our very physical existence."

The controversial nature of the Azerbaijani-Turkish union is also discussed by T. Swietochowski, who stresses that "Panturkism as an ideology considerably strengthened the national identity and Azerbaijanis were increasingly aware of their affiliation with the Turkic peoples, but the pro-Turkish orientation did not go down very well with (the ADR leadership's - author) desire to control the affairs of their country independently." It is expedient to cite in this context Rasulzada, the leader of the Musavat parliamentary faction, whose sympathy towards Turkey was widely known and who, in his speech to Parliament on 5 February 1919, clearly outlined the limits of tolerance of the ADR authorities for the "Turkey factor": "We knew that our people have their habits and their own way of life, and Turkish people have theirs. And if Constantinople wanted to govern Baku, Baku would go against Constantinople."

As the date (17 November 1918) for the departure of Turkish troops from Azerbaijan drew near, the desire of the ADR leaders for independence, for their own pro-Azerbaijani orientation, became increasingly apparent. The adoption by the republic's Government, on 9 November 1918, of a decree on the replacement of the earlier national flag (On 21 June, the national flag of Azerbaijan was almost identical to the Turkish national flag - a white crescent and white eight-pointed star on a red background) with a new one, which had green, red and blue stripes with a white crescent and eight-pointed star, was symbolic in this respect.

The desire to be free from the "Turkish heritage" was manifested in every sphere of the republic's life and especially in its military policy. On 25 December 1918, Samad bey Mehmandarov openly criticized the policy of the Turkish envoys who oversaw military development in the ADR in his address to the people after his appointment as Defence Minister. "Now it has transpired that, unfortunately, the Turkish authorities made many mistakes and allowed many irregularities," he said. "For example, they recruited only the poor, whereas the children of rich noblemen and merchants were exempt from drafts. And those whom the Turkish authorities did recruit were badly dressed and badly fed and the Azerbaijani soldiers who served with the Turkish military often had much smaller and much poorer quality allowances than their comrades, the Turkish soldiers."

On 5 February 1919 Mehmandarov issued an order revoking the Turkish-imposed law on military conscription as "imperfect and not corresponding to the spirit of the local population." Instead, the appropriate law from the Tsarist period was re-enacted until the development by the ADR Government of a new law on universal conscription. On 25 February, during a discussion in Parliament on the organizational structure and staff list of the Defence Ministry, Mehmandarov gave a negative assessment of the activities of Turkish representatives in the Azerbaijani Army, noting that "no one, of course, questions the Turks' achievements in saving the lives of our people, but this cannot hinder us from being critical towards their other actions."  Rasulzada's statement was roughly in the same vein. During the discussion in Parliament on the role of the Turkish Army in the founding of the independent ADR, he noted that the "memory of Turks in our hearts will be like those memories in Bulgaria about the Russian heroes who came there to free the country" and that "to commemorate them, we must erect tall monuments everywhere," but he added that "this does not mean we cannot criticize them."

Overall, in the context of Azerbaijan's independence, the Turkey factor played an equivocal role. Neither the Young Turks, headed by Nuri Pasa, nor the Kemalists in the persons of Mustafa Kemal's emissaries to Azerbaijan, not to mention the Turkish Communists, who were more comfortable in Baku than in their native Turkey, were interested in Azerbaijan's development as a truly independent state. The independent position and pro-Western orientation of the ADR was viewed by all political forces in Turkey as a potential threat to their country's interests. At the same time, to the Kemalists the independent ADR was an "obstacle" to their vital struggle to bring about closer ties and a rapprochement with Moscow and to the Young Turks it was an obstacle to the spread in the future of Turkish influence towards the Caucasus and Central Asia.

As a result, although their mission of military and political support for the young Azerbaijani state and the safeguarding of its borders were objectively progressive, the Turks pursued their own strategic goals in Azerbaijan from the very beginning of the First Republic. This was manifested, in particular, in the Turkish emissaries' support in Baku for pan-Turkist and even pan-Islamic forces in the leadership of the ADR, which they viewed as a counterbalance to the Azerbaijani national democratic forces and supporters of the independent (as far as this was possible in the conditions of the period) domestic and foreign political orientation of the government of the First Republic.

And in the first few months of 1920 they openly supported the Bolshevik elements in the ADR Government because Ankara pinned its hopes on transforming Azerbaijan into a "corridor country" for them. The logical finale to the development of this trend ensued in spring 1920, when the Turkish nationalists and communists combined their efforts and started to openly support the implementation of plans by Moscow and Bakuvian Bolsheviks to seize power in Baku and other regions of the ADR. The pendulum of the pragmatic foreign policy of Turkey, which in mid-1918 saved the Azerbaijani nation from genocide by the Armenian Dashnak-Bolshevik alliance and supported the Azerbaijani patriotic forces in their aspiration to found an independent republic, swung, in spring 1920, in the opposite direction. As a result, the Turkey factor became the most important auxiliary contributor to the process of occupation and subsequent sovietisation of Azerbaijan.