NEW PLAYER IN THE CASPIAN REGION

The Central Asia tour of the new chairman of the People's Republic of China, Xi Jinping, showed the exceptional interest of the Middle Kingdom in the region. It is difficult to remember such an eventful visit to this region by a Chinese leader. From 3 to 13 September, Xi Jinping visited Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and even had time to participate in the G20 summit in St. Petersburg and in the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Bishkek. At the same time, the visit was not only eventful, but also very fruitful.

The Chinese leader had his first stop in Turkmenistan. During the two-day visit, he attended the launch of a complex for the extraction and processing of natural gas from the Galkinish field, whose reserves are second only to South Pars, the largest oil field in the Persian Gulf. It should be noted that China allocated about $ 8 billion for the development of the field. In addition, an agreement was signed to increase the export of Turkmen gas to China to 40 billion cubic metres in 2014 after the completion of the third branch of the Turkmenistan-China pipeline. The parties also signed an agreement to build a fourth branch, which may increase the export of Turkmen gas to 65 billion cubic metres by 2020.

After leaving Central Asia for a short time, the Chinese leader took part in the G20 summit in St. Petersburg. Xi Jinping only participated in the global forum, which discussed the global financial and economic problems in the crisis and post-crisis periods for two days. Here the activity of the Chinese was reflected in the definition of the further development of bilateral relations with Russia. Gazprom and China's CNPC signed an agreement on the basic conditions of natural gas supplies from Russia to China via the eastern route. They agreed upon the amount and timing of the start of exports, the period of the build-up of supplies, the level of guaranteed payments, the point of gas delivery on the border and other aspects of cooperation.

China's feverish activity continued in Kazakhstan. During Xi Jinping's visit to the country, China and Kazakhstan signed an agreement under which the company KazMunayGas sold the CNPC a stake of 8.3 % in the largest Kazakh oil deposit Kashagan. The price of the transaction ranges within $ 5 billion. In addition, the Chinese company is building a pipe factory and an industrial complex of oil equipment in Aktau.

In general, the parties agreed on more than 20 projects worth $ 18 billion until 2020.

During President Xi Jinping's visit to Uzbekistan, 31 documents were signed on projects worth a total of $ 15 billion. Both sides also attach great strategic importance to the construction and operation of the Uzbekistan-China gas pipeline. The protocol they signed involves the construction of its fourth thread with a design capacity of 30 billion cubic metres a year. They also reached an agreement on the construction of a partition tunnel on the Angren-Pap railway line, which will provide direct access from China to South Asia. This agreement is part of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan route. The subject of the construction of this railway was developed during the Chinese president's visit to Bishkek, where, like in St. Petersburg, in addition to participating in the summit, the two sides held talks on the development of bilateral relations.

The Chinese leader's visit to Kyrgyzstan was marked by the signing of contracts worth $ 3 billion, including an agreement on the construction of a Kyrgyzstan-China gas pipeline, which will be part of the pipeline from Turkmenistan to China.

In general, we can note the high level of the preparedness of the Chinese delegation to the countries of Central Asia and Russia. During their visits, important documents of a strategic nature were signed that will determine the course of China's foreign relations with Central Asian countries. And even the agreement signed with Russia can be seen in this context. We must say that the fifth generation of Chinese leaders is more actively building relationships with the countries of Central Asia. Relations between them began to form quickly and more decisively. Of course, the foundations of these relations were established earlier - differences over the delineation of the borders with these countries were resolved, trade relations developed and investments were made in the region.

However, the general trend in relations with the countries of the region is some restraint. The dominant position of influence here was recognized as the prerogative of Russia, which has declared Central Asia its backyard with all the consequences that ensue. China's main priority in the region is the establishment of trade relations with the countries in order to develop border areas and to prevent the possible penetration of separatist sentiment from Central Asia to the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region.

An important component of policy in relation to this area is to deter the possible increasing US presence in Central Asia. China absolutely does not want this country to be present near its northern borders. This fact brings it closer to Russia, which also strongly opposes the US presence in the region. It is for this reason that with joint efforts, these countries established the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes all the countries of Central Asia except for Turkmenistan. For China, membership in the SCO is also a union of efforts in combating the "three evil forces". This is what China calls terrorism, extremism and separatism. Now this struggle has become a topic in the expansion of bilateral relations with the countries of the region, acquiring a deeper interpretation.

As we can see, the intensification of China's relations is taking place on already embedded pillars. China is increasing its presence and expanding political ties through the development of economic and implementation of investment projects and through the expansion of trade ties. China particularly highlights the field of security, as if trying to let it be known to Russia that she rules here. It is interesting that active participation in energy projects in Central Asia allows China to feel more comfortable in the issue of trading with Russia for the import of natural gas and oil from that country and makes it possible to reduce the price. If China had not started the production and transportation of hydrocarbons from Central Asia, it would not be so firm in negotiations with Russia. Now China is steadily pursuing its demands.

China clearly feels that niche, which formed as a result of the determination of the direction of Russia's activity and the relative apathy of the US and the EU in the region, and fills it successfully. At the same, the tactics are based on the high degree of response to the reality, rapid implementation and pragmatism in identifying areas of contact. The picture of the country's interaction in Central Asia is also clearly defined: China sees it in the whole context, trying to develop inter-state projects and create transport infrastructure. This creates conditions for cooperation with the countries of the region in the future.

An important factor is that as China gets involved in the implementation of large projects, it begins to actively penetrate the region of the Caspian Sea, which has been oriented to the West since the appearance of new independent states here. This visit by the Chinese leader stressed that China is becoming an important player in the Caspian Sea and will try to strengthen its position in the littoral countries more and more.

It is possible that in the future, China could come to Azerbaijan, forming a sort of integration layer in the energy and transport sectors. In this way, China would manage what Russia and the West failed to achieve. However, this process is for the long-term. Meanwhile, President Xi Jinping's visit can be considered very successful. From now on the Central Asian countries are willing to perceive the active presence of the country at the psychological level. It is a phenomenon that seemed highly controversial a few years ago. Now the matter depends on the implementation of the agreements that were signed, and there should be no hitches here.