IF A FRIEND IS IN TROUBLE...

Following the permission to install a monument to an Armenian military and an occupant of Azerbaijani territories, Georgia is going to make another present to Armenia. Tbilisi agreed to open customs checkpoints at the borders with Abkhazia and South Ossetia as part of a bilateral agreement with Russia. This will actually help Armenia, which continues its aggression against Azerbaijan, overcome the transport isolation.

Neutral status

On February 6, respective delegations of Russia and Georgia held the first meeting on the final implementation of the bilateral agreement on trade and transit of goods concluded back in 2011. This agreement involves the opening of three trade corridors, two of which pass through the Georgian autonomies of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, recognised by Russia as independent states following the August 2008 war.

The agreement was part of the documents concluded during Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2012 and was possible after Georgia lifted a veto on Russia's participation in the WTO, provided that the parties invite international mediators to control the labelling and flow of goods through Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Ultimately, Moscow and Tbilisi opted for the Swiss company Societe Genérale de Surveillance SA (SGS). In general, the preparation of the agreement took almost eight years partly due to the differences between Moscow and Tbilisi regarding the political status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, on whose territories the opening of corresponding checkpoints is expected.

During the talks in Geneva, Georgians have insisted that the customs posts be located on the former administrative border of Georgia, as of 1991. Russia categorically rejected the proposal, since this would contradict the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. Apparently, Moscow and Tbilisi have found a common language. The only question is which of the parties showed a great deal of flexibility.

Russian government circles declare that "the contractual obligations force Georgia to recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent customs territories." Moscow is seemingly happy that "the agreement does not include a clause on Russian-Georgian trade. Even in the title of the agreement, we have omitted any mentioning of the trading parties. Russia recognises three types of trade: firstly, between the Russian Federation and Georgia; secondly, between the Russian Federation and Abkhazia and the Russian Federation and South Ossetia; and thirdly, between Abkhazia and Georgia and South Ossetia and Georgia." In other words, according to the Kremlin, the main point of the agreement is the fact that "new customs borders of Georgia have been identified" for the first time since 2008.

Meanwhile, Tbilisi does not view the opening of customs corridors from the same angle. "We do not enter into political debates and try our best to avoid sharp corners, understanding that the value of the agreement is its neutral status," said Zurab Abashidze, the special envoy of the Georgian Prime Minister for relations with Russia. Apparently, Mr. Abashidze means that the Swiss company SGS will monitor the labelling and flow of goods through the transport corridors, and therefore the Georgian side focuses on the following aspect: "It is not about the customs officers, but about the experts of a private company. Locations of monitoring terminals have been specifically defined in the agreement."

However, a recent information leakage stifles all the assurances of the Georgian side about the "neutral status of the agreement". It is reported that Tbilisi has tried to enter into the contract with SGS the wording, which assumes that the company would conduct its operations in accordance with the Georgian law on the occupied territories, which recognises Abkhazia as the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic, and South Ossetia as the Tskhinvali Region. However, Russia insisted that the final contracts of Moscow and Tbilisi with the Swiss company did not contain any references to the aforementioned legal approaches of the parties.

As a result, Russia seems happy to make Georgia "reconcile with the existing reality." No matter how Tbilisi tries to smooth out sharp corners, the course of the Geneva talks suggests that the Georgian side agreed to establish customs posts on the borders with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moscow views the decision as a significant shift in the Georgian position.

Apparently, this is what the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin meant last autumn expressing his hope that the results of the presidential elections in Georgia would help normalise relations between the two countries. In his interview with BBC, the new president of Georgia, Salome Zurabishvili, said that "it is not the right time to cooperate with Russia." But, apparently, this statement has already been adjusted by post-electoral realities.

It is not surprising that such a compromise from the government of the Georgian Dream has caused a sharp reaction of the majority of Georgian political elite. In particular, ex-President Mikhail Saakashvili recalled that in 2012 he reached an agreement to place customs posts at internationally recognised borders only. He described the completion of the preparation of the agreement on the opening of new checkpoints through the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a surrender. According to Saakashvili, "this will have long-term disastrous consequences for Georgian statehood."

Vice-President of the Atlantic Council of Georgia Batu Kutelia also pointed out the inadmissibility of opening transport corridors through Abkhazia and South Ossetia. "As always, Russia is trying to use international mechanisms to confirm the independence of the territories it has occupied," Kutelia said.

In fact, by agreeing to open customs checkpoints in the autonomous territories that she had controlled in the past, Georgia has made a second mistake, which obviously contradicts the interests of its closest ally and partner—Azerbaijan.

Armenian requests

The most important aspect of opening customs posts in the territories of Georgian autonomies is that this will give Armenia a hope to overcome the existing transport blockade. Yerevan obviously hopes for the possibility of a speedy resumption of direct communication between Armenia and Russia through the territory of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in order to have uninterrupted access to the communications of the Russian Federation and the EU countries. In particular, Armenia views the South Ossetian corridor as an alternative to the Georgian Military Road, which in winter is often blocked due to snowfalls and avalanches, hence making cargo from Russia to Armenia and from Armenia to Russia stand idle for weeks in the Upper Lars region.

It is, of course, no accident that Moscow disclosed information about the "numerous requests of Armenians regarding the transit to Russia." During his recent visit to Yerevan, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin stated that Armenia has indeed made such a request, which Russia will consider to ensure the opening of the transit corridor.

Does the opening of a transit corridor for Armenia through the separatist formations recognised by Russia meet the interests of Georgia? According to Batu Kutelia, "the opening of the transit corridor through Tskhinvali is completely unacceptable for Armenia. Moreover, this issue should not be a topic of discussion at all within the framework of the Geneva Tripartite Commission".

Some Georgian experts consider it unlikely and even completely exclude the possibility of a deal between Moscow and Tbilisi on the issue of opening borders with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. They believe that such a scenario could trigger a wave of protest in the country, which could put an end to the existing government of Georgia once and for all. However, the very fact that the Georgian Dream government can agree (or has already agreed) to play an instrumental role in fulfilling the "Armenian requests" mentioned by Karasin gives food for thoughts. Especially in the context of Azerbaijani-Georgian relations, which until now have been unequivocally based on the principles of strategic partnership and alliance.

Apparently, the relations between our countries are going through a very difficult period. Installation in the Akhalkalaki region of Georgia of a monument to one of the Armenian executioners of the peaceful Azerbaijani population of Karabakh, Mikhail Avaghian, has indeed opened a can of worms. Azerbaijan has officially condemned the provocation and expressed hope that the Georgian authorities would eliminate the problem for the sake of keeping friendly and good-neighbourly relations between our countries. Azerbaijani citizens of Georgia have also protested against the installation of the monument. On February 8, Azerbaijanis protested in Tbilisi in front of the Georgian Parliament. The protesters held in their hands the flags of Azerbaijan and Georgia, as well as the posters condemning separatism. They said that the protests would continue until the monument to the Armenian terrorist was dismantled.

By the way, Tbilisi City Hall sanctioned the rally only after the second request of the protest organisers. Many Georgians, who view the monument in Akhalkalaki as a provocation worsening Azerbaijani-Georgian relations, also supported the rally.

Protesters reminded that the Armenian militant has been notoriously known for crimes against not only peaceful Azerbaijanis, but also the Georgian population of Abkhazia. In particular, the veteran of the Abkhaz war, Vakhtang Jorjikia, said: "Mikhail Avaghian fought in Abkhazia against the Georgians. He was a war criminal. The monument installed in Georgia must be dismantled." The war veteran believes that the monument would be dismantled, "since the authorities cannot turn a blind eye to this issue. This is a call against the state. Georgian population considers the installation of the monument a provocation. The ultimate goal is to worsen relations between Georgia and Azerbaijan, to create a confrontation between people of different nationalities living in Georgia and to cause instability."

Shortly after the monument was erected in Akhalkalaki, Azerbaijanis suggested the installation of a monument to the national hero of Azerbaijan Mubariz Ibrahimov in Georgia. Meanwhile, a group of Georgian activists demanded the authorities to dismantle the monument to Nariman Narimanov in Marneuli. Then Armenian provocateurs demanded the demolition of a tombstone to the National Hero of Azerbaijan, Jalil Safarov, in his native village of Marneuli.

It is not difficult to imagine the implications of such irresponsible attitude towards Armenian provocations, as well as other steps that contradict the interests of the country and its closest strategic partner, Azerbaijan. Does it mean that Tbilisi sacrifices the strategic cooperation with Baku to strengthening the dialogue with Yerevan? Or maybe this is just a trap into which the Georgian authorities inadvertently fell by the hands of Armenians?

We still remember the pre-election statements of the incumbent president Salome Zurabishvili, which have caused discontent not only in Georgia, but also in Turkey and Azerbaijan, when she had a scandalous pre-election meeting with Armenian voters and opposed the Turks (rather, ethnic Georgians from Turkey) and the Armenians, promising the latter the advantage in issuing Georgian citizenship. In other words, she has boldly touched one of the most painful issues in the region, which, by the way, cost her the support of Georgian Azerbaijanis. We also remember the earlier years, the initial stage of the Georgian Dream government, when Tbilisi began sending Yerevan signals of readiness to "balance relations" with Azerbaijan and Armenia. However, the reality had quickly cooled the pro-Armenian attitude of the Georgian government, for 'balancing' of Azerbaijani-Armenian relations is impossible simply because Azerbaijan and Armenia are states of different weight categories and their significance for Georgian politics and economy cannot be compared. Therefore, we strongly hope that the recent steps of the Georgian authorities will not become a tendency. Baku makes it clear that friendly, allied and partnership relations do not tolerate any steps that run counter to the spirit of confident strategic partnership between the two states.