SYRIA REVISITED

Tense situation around the Syrian province of Idlib led to a clash between Syrian and Turkish forces on the evening of February 20. Despite timely intervention of Russia that helped to calm the conflicting parties and prevented the escalation of the conflict, the risk of confrontation between Turkey and Syria (as well as Russia) remains high.

Current situation may take Turkey and Russia to the period of tense relations five years ago, hence creating new risks not only for Syria, but also for the region as a whole. That’s why the steps taken by Ankara and Moscow regarding the situation in Idlib remain in the focus of the world community. What will be next? After all, why did this small Syrian region once again push Ankara and Moscow to confrontation?

According to Turkish Minister of Defense Hulusi Akar, Turkey does not want a confrontation with Russia. Currently, the Turkish army is actually facing the Syrian and Russian military, which can turn into clashes at any time. Turkish government said that if the Syrian army did not return to the front line indicated in the Sochi Memorandum before the end of February, the Turkish army would force it to do so. Washington also considers the risk of war in Idlib high.

When both sides are “right”

Remarkably, both Moscow and Ankara refer to the Sochi Treaty in all their statements. In principle, both sides are right. For example, at the end of the Cabinet Meeting on February 18, spokesperson of President Recep T. Erdogan, Ibrahim Kalin, said: “Obviously, our priority in Idlib is the immediate return to the Sochi Memorandum. Our relevant officials held various talks and negotiations on taking necessary steps to protect especially our observation posts and civilians by once again sticking to the boundaries of the Idlib de-escalation zone, which we previously determined. They exchanged documents. The decision for the time being is to continue the negotiations..”

Moscow made a similar statement. So, the Russian ambassador to Ankara, Alexei Yerkhov, said that Ankara does not comply with the Sochi accords. During a telephone conversation on February 21 between presidents Putin and Erdogan, both parties expressed their commitment to the Sochi Memorandum.

Obviously, both parties have disagreements on specific points of the agreement. Therefore, reaching an agreement that suits both Ankara and Moscow, as well as developing a common position on Idlib is impossible even after numerous meetings of the Russian and Turkish delegations, as well as telephone discussions between the presidents of both countries.

What is the Sochi Memorandum?

The agreement on the document, which has recently become the subject of heated debate and discussion, was reached on September 17, 2018 after negotiations between the presidents of Russia and Turkey in Sochi. Under the terms of the agreement initiated by the Turkish president, the parties agreed to declare a ceasefire and create a demilitarised zone in Idlib, which is one of the provinces of Syria.

Armed forces of the Syrian opposition had to withdraw heavy weapons (tanks, multiple launch rocket systems, guns and mortars) from the frontline zone until October 10.  It was also planned to create a 15-20 km long demilitarised zone in Idlib between the armed opposition and government forces until October 15. Fighters of the An-Nusra group (also known as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) and other terrorist organisations were supposed to leave the area as well.

According to the plan, Russian and Turkish troops would jointly patrol the demilitarised zone to ensure a ceasefire. Groups recognised by both sides as terrorist would have to withdraw from the demilitarised zone, and their activities in the region outlawed. One of the principal points of the agreement was the transfer to the control of government forces of the M-5 highway, connecting Aleppo, Hama and Damascus with the southern borders of the country. Yet another term of the document assumed the establishment of Iranian, Russian and Turkish observation posts around Idlib to monitor the ceasefire.

The Sochi Memorandum entered into force immediately after signing. The first stage of the agreement was successfully completed after heavy weapons were withdrawn from the front line. Russian Foreign Ministry announced the withdrawal from the demilitarised zone of more than 1,000 armed persons and about 100 units of military equipment. The “heavy weapons” category mentioned in the document included rocket launchers, mortars, tanks, 23mm anti-aircraft mounts, 57mm anti-tank guns, as well as 12.7mm and 14.5mm machine guns.

However, the next stage of the agreement failed as the establishment of the demilitarised zone around Idlib scheduled for October 15 has slowed. After that, radical jihadist groups, including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and others, joined forces to attack the Turkish-backed armed groups of the Syrian opposition in the region. As a result, up to 70% of the province soon came under the control of jihadists.

Russia and, most importantly, the Syrian government could now use the situation in their own interests, as part of the obligations under the Sochi Memorandum were actually not fulfilled. Also, radical jihadists, who often organised drone attacks on the positions of the Syrian army south of Idlib and Tartus, as well as the Russian military base Khmeimim in Latakia, took advantage of the situation to prepare for a new military operation. Therefore, Moscow announced the failure of Ankara to comply with the Sochi agreement. Last spring, the Syrian army launched a military operation in the south of Idlib and liberated several areas claiming the provocation of radical groups. Another offensive by the Syrian army in August prevented the visit of President Erdogan to Moscow and his reaching of agreement on a ceasefire. Even then, it was clear that the ceasefire in Idlib would not last long.

Why Bashar al-Assad insists on Idlib

In fact, the Syrian authorities did not treat the Sochi Memorandum well since the very beginning of the process. But since the document was signed by Vladimir Putin himself, Damascus did not dare to object to the agreement. Subsequent events in Idlib and frequent ceasefire violations played into the hands of the Syrian authorities. So why does Bashar al-Assad insist on the Idlib issue?

Idlib is the only province (with the exception of the Kurdish cantons) currently controlled by the opposition. In recent years, the provincial population has grown, although back in 2015, when Idlib was completely controlled by the opposition, the population of the province was 1.4 million people. This happened after the opposition, defeated in Aleppo, Damascus and Daria in the south of the country, handed over heavy weapons and were taken by bus to Idlib, as agreed earlier. By the time the Sochi Memorandum was signed, about three million people were living in Idlib, and more than half of them were immigrants who opposed the central government. Finally, Idlib borders Turkey, and the main support for the Syrian opposition comes from Idlib. Another reason for President Assad’s insistence is that Idlib is located not far from the main port city of Syria—Latakia, and one of the most peaceful cities in the region—Tartus. At the same time, the presence of radical jihadists in Idlib was a real reason for the start of the military operation of the Syrian government forces.

Syrian military forces in Idlib

Given all these factors, the Syrian government concentrated its main forces around Idlib for almost a year to establish control over the last stronghold of the opposition. Before the war, about 220 thousand soldiers served in the Syrian army. Syrian military possessed about 500 aircraft, 4,700 tanks, 4,500 armored vehicles, 500 self-propelled artillery units and 1,500 cannons. As a result of attacks and desertion, the army suffered certain losses in the initial stages of the conflict. In recent years, the Syrian army was not involved in active military operations at all, and has lost about 2,600 units of tanks, armored vehicles and artillery in the past nine years.

However, after the active intervention of Iran and Russia in the Syrian conflict in 2015, the country's army partially restored its power thanks to modern tanks and missile systems received from these countries. At the same time, the Syrian army managed to bring the number of manpower to the prewar level through pardoning former troopers, provided that they would join the army in the liberated territories.

Interestingly, most of the Syrian army, as a rule, does not participate in military operations, being either in the rear or in the barracks. Active operations involve only special operations forces of the army (50,000-70,000 people).

The main driving force of the Syrian army is the 25th Special Forces Division, formerly known as the Tiger Forces, under the command of General Suheil al-Hassan. It is estimated that there are about 10,000 troops in the division. The main operations in Syria are carried out by the forces of this division.

The second major force of the Syrian army is the 4th Division under the command of the brother of President Bashar al-Assad, Mahir al-Assad. The division includes the operational units of Al-Ghavs ("Assistance") involved in operations around Aleppo, Idlib and Latakia.

Finally, the third main force of the Syrian army is the 104th elite division, or presidential guard, stationed in Damascus.

In addition, in the early years of the conflict, the armed forces of the ruling Ba'ath Party and youth groups of the Shabbiha were later included in the Syrian army, subsequently united under the 5th army as the National Defense Forces. They also participate in military operations.

Fighters of the Russian PMC Wagner and other mercenaries, including fighters of the Iranian brigade Abulfazl Abbas, consisting of Iraqi Shiites, Afghan and Pakistani fighters of the Fatimiyyun Brigades, Palestinians, and finally several thousand Lebanese fighters from Hezbollah also provide military support to the Syrian government forces. That’s why the regular army of Syria is not involved in large-scale operations, and is replaced by the above groups, which have many years of experience in military operations.

What Turkey wants

Last week, the command of the Turkish army sent an additional group of 5,000-7,000 troops to  monitor the ceasefire regime in Idlib. Turkish army also has highly qualified special forces. In addition, in Idlib and in northern Syria, the Turks also support the armed forces of the so-called Syrian National Army. In general, there are about 60,000 armed fighters loyal to the Turkish army in Syria.

According to various estimates, only in Idlib there are about 70,000 militants, including 30,000 radical jihadists. This means that military actions can have serious consequences.

Unlike the Syrian government, Turkey is interested in continuing the ceasefire in Idlib and maintaining the Sochi Memorandum, because as a result of a clash with the Syrian army in Idlib, 500,000-1,000,000 refugees can move to Turkey or the liberated regions of Syria. In addition, military operations in densely populated areas can lead to mass extermination of civilians.

Finally, a military operation could lead to the loss of the last province, which is under formal control of the Syrian opposition, and the fate of militants will be in danger. Al-Qaida-related groups like Al-Nusra and Khayyat Tahrir al-Sham have little chance of survival. The fact that militants from these groups are fleeing to Turkey to protect themselves from the Syrian army is an additional risk to Ankara.

The fate of about 15,000 ethnic Uyghurs in Idlib also remains in question. Islamic Party of Turkestan, which consists mainly of Uyghurs, has been recognised as terrorist in the U.S. and European countries. Therefore, Turkey cannot accept them on its territory. In addition, this move can provoke a negative reaction of China. In this context, a ceasefire and commitment to the Sochi Peace Agreement in Idlib are priorities for Turkey. Otherwise, the region may be drawn into an even deeper crisis.