CIRCUMSTANCES AGAINST STATE INTERESTS

The EU imposed yet another batch of sanctions on Turkey. However, the sanctions adopted on December 11 caused unambiguous attitude even within the EU. The initiators of sanctions – Greece and Cyprus – are unhappy with their soft nature. Other states believe that sanctions should not impede the dialogue between Brussels and Ankara.

Why sanctions?

On September 25, the heads of the 27 EU countries were supposed to gather in Brussels to vote for sanctions against Turkey. According to the initiators, Ankara is violating the sovereign rights of two EU members, Greece and Cyprus, by developing natural resources within their zone of responsibility. In particular, European politicians are concerned that Turkey has dispatched and continues to dispatch ships to explore the underwater energy resources in waters they consider to their sovereign territory. However, due to the worsening situation with the COVID-19 pandemic, it was decided to postpone the vote until the EU summit in December 2020.

According to European experts, for Ankara, the delay with the decision meant only postponing the inevitable – a potential break with Europe. In fact, Ankara and Brussels have practically frozen their active relations since 2018, when Ankara began its ‘gunboat diplomacy’ in the Eastern Mediterranean. Then the EU announced its intention to freeze the negotiations with Turkey on the accession of the country to the EU and suspended works on adapting the Customs Union Treaty concluded in 1995.

In the meantime, despite the aggressive attitude of Athens, Nicosia and Paris, the current position of the EU on the prospects of interaction with Ankara are not as obvious as it might seem at first glance.

European observers point out that a number of the EU states do not share the positions of France, Greece and Cyprus and in fact support the cooperation with Turkey. Many point to Italy's long-standing ambivalence on this issue. It is assumed that it is Italy's energy interests in war-torn Libya, and not its significant investments in the energy resources of the Eastern Mediterranean that determine the position of Rome.

To impose sanctions on Turkey, the European Council needs the unanimous approval of all the EU member states, which is not so easy to get. Earlier, French President E. Macron stated that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Turkey "is no longer a partner" in the Eastern Mediterranean and called on Europe to speak with "a more united and clear voice." The main target of Macron's appeals is believed to be Italy, France's traditional European rival in the Mediterranean and one of the strongest advocates of a closer EU-Turkey relationship.

Divided Mediterranean

Since Greece, Cyprus and France support more decisive actions against Turkey, and Italy, Malta and Spain have a different position, the Mediterranean is effectively divided equally. But if Italy for some reason changes its preferences and takes the side of France, this could lead to a coincidence of opinions between the two largest Mediterranean EU states. And then it is likely that the entire southern EU will support sanctions in one form or another. With this in mind, Macron called for the creation of Pax Mediterranea, driven by a partnership of the Mediterranean EU states. In addition, Macron is offering Italy a reboot of realpolitik in the great game for the Mediterranean - an all-encompassing Franco-Italian partnership to "protect the region".

It is no secret that the four largest countries of the Mediterranean (Egypt, Turkey, France and Italy) make up more than half of the region's population and determine the rules of the great game here. Despite the intervention of external actors, from Russia to the UAE, it is the struggle between this big four of the Mediterranean for dominance over the region's energy resources and commercial transit routes that determines the course and conditions of regional geopolitics.

The fierce geopolitical rivalry between these four countries, which also have the most powerful armed forces in the Mediterranean, was, by and large, caused after their involvement in the civil war in Libya, where the partnership between France and Egypt is against the interests of Turkey. France is one of the largest arms suppliers to Egypt. It covertly cooperates with Cairo to support the Libyan National Army in eastern Libya against the Government of National Accord (GNA), which is militarily aided by Turkey and Italy.

In doing so, Italy's decision to side with GNA and Turkey is part of a broader effort to protect its own energy interests in Libya and revitalize its presence in the Mediterranean Basin. This rebalancing resulted in Italy's exports to Mediterranean markets exceeding those to the US and China. However, despite Italy's trade successes and an increased presence in the Mediterranean, the development of links with the markets of North Africa is constrained due to France's excessive influence in the region.

On the contrary, the growth of the Italian-Turkish trade turnover by all means strengthens the influence of Rome in the Mediterranean. In principle, the same is true for many other European states in relation to Turkey.

Turkey-EU: a long road to interaction

The Cold War initiated a natural warming of relations between Turkey and the West, as Ankara sided with the Western bloc and ultimately joined NATO. Following the Association Agreement with Europe (1964) and accession to the Customs Union (1995), Turkey became a key strategic partner and was recognized as a candidate for EU membership in 1999. But the road turned out to be a difficult one.

Justice and Development Party (AKP) led by Prime Minister and then President Recep Tayyip Erdogan came to power under the slogan of ensuring Turkey's full membership in the EU. From 2002 to 2011, Turkey pursued a policy of strategic Europeanization with the aim of harmonizing legislation with the EU. As the EU accession negotiations dragged on, member states increasingly expressed opposition to human rights as well as democratic rights in Turkey, with the religious orientation of the Turkish government. This indicated that the EU had no desire to comply with its obligations to ensure Ankara's full membership in the union.

In response, after the AKP's second term in power, Turkey's commitment to Europe gave way to strategic de-Europeanization. One of the reasons why Turkey abandoned its clearly pro-European orientation was the conflict in Syria, which broke up in 2011. Millions of refugees flocked to Turkey with many of them illegally entering Europe.

Given the principle of free movement of people within the EU, the union had to strengthen its border security, which meant dealing with Turkey. This gave Ankara a chance to declare its advantages in relations with the EU through the 2016 deal. A statement by the EU and Turkey, which called for an end to the flow of migrants to the Greek islands in exchange for European funding for Syrian refugees, significantly eased tensions between Ankara and Brussels.

However, in 2019, relations between the parties seriuosly deteriorated again after Turkey sent the research vessel Oruc Reis accompanied by naval vessels for seismic exploration near the island of Kastelorizo. Greece considered this as a violation of its sovereignty.

Tensions between Ankara and Brussels have been further fuelled by the recent deterioration in relations between the presidents of Turkey and France. Turkey has accused France of spreading a wave of Islamophobia in the aftermath of the latest cartoons-driven attack in Charlie Hebdo. Paris then began to initiate Turkey's withdrawal from the Customs Union.

Although in theory EU sanctions could force Turkey to soften its behaviour, such EU threats to Ankara have long become ineffective. In addition, Turkey remains the EU's fifth largest trading partner and a key security and immigration partner. No matter how much the EU wants to take an emphatically tough stance towards Ankara, these circumstances strongly influence the decision-making of the 27 member states.

Sanctions are not as terrible as they are painted

The EU sanctions against a large number of Turkish individuals and companies responsible for drilling in the disputed waters of the Mediterranean can nevertheless be viewed as a compromise. Naturally, Greece and Cyprus were unhappy with extremely lenient language of the sanction documents.

Last year, the EU developed a special program concerning the unauthorized collection of intelligence in the Eastern Mediterranean. The assets of people and companies accused of planning or participating in activities in the exclusive economic zone of Cyprus or on its continental shelf were frozen. The current version is appended to the sanctions list, which has been in force since 2019.

So far, restrictive measures have been applied to only two divisions of the Turkish state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO). The sanctions’ list can be “expanded, if necessary,” including those involved in seismic surveys on the Oruc Reis in areas where Greece reserves the right to expand its jurisdiction. At the same time, the document does not stipulate who exactly will be subject to restrictions.

The resolution also calls on EU High Representative Josep Borrell and the European Commission to report on the state of economic and political relations between the EU and Turkey and to prepare "options for further action" for the next EU summit in March.

An interesting nuance is that the EU will seek to coordinate these issues with the US, which is interpreted as a reflection of hopes for closer foreign policy ties with Washington after the inauguration of the US President-elect Joseph Biden in January 2021.

This is a reference to the new geopolitical situation, which, most likely, will establish after the democratic administration comes to power in the US. Apparently, the EU currently led by Germany, which is also trying to avoid confrontation with Ankara, expects that Washington will pay close attention to this situation.

Thus, the current version of sanctions against Ankara looks more like a version of deferred pressure, rather than a step that can induce Turkey to change its line of behaviour.

President Erdogan has already stated that “EU sanctions against Turkey will not be a serious problem for the country. The EU has been imposing sanctions against Turkey for many years.” Thus, he made it clear that Ankara's interests in the region remain unchanged.

The Turks understand that the European and world conjuncture is changeable, and state interests are of a long-term nature. Relatively speaking, in a few years Macron may be re-elected, and Turkey will not leave the Mediterranean shores. And the valuable energy resources located in the immediate vicinity of its shores can be extracted and profited by others. It is better to wait until the end of the current unfavourable period than to cheat on your own interests. The latter can turn out to be much more expensive, both literally and figuratively.