ARMENIA FAILED AGAIN

Armenia has hit the headlines of both the Soviet and post-Soviet media outlets several times with very dubious "accomplishments". Back in 1972 the first case of kidnapping took place in the USSR, when the bandits asked for ransom for the twin sons of a local tradesman, but the boys were killed immediately before the bargaining was over. On August 5, 1977, the “robbery of the century” happened in Yerevan, when local thieves stole a huge amount (in those times) of money – one and a half million Soviet rubles – from the State Bank of the Armenian SSR.

Again, in 1977, KGB uncovered a real terrorist conspiracy. Local nationalists led by certain Stepan Zatikyan blew up several cars in Moscow, including in the metro. The resounding terrorist attack in the USSR also took place in Yerevan. On October 27, 1999, five terrorists led by Nairi Hunanyan broke into the Armenian parliament and killed, among others, the speaker of the parliament and the prime minister of the country. In July 2016, another group of terrorists seized a police office in down-town Yerevan in the best, or rather the worst traditions of the 1970s – with the gates rammed by a truck, hostage-taking, etc. In February-March 2021, Armenia could go down the history of the post-Soviet space as the first country with a classic military coup. But they failed again.

Coup minus... the army?

Yerevan continues to provide the world media outlets with hot news about resignations, rallies, demonstrations, scandalous revelations, etc. Perhaps, we could present a detailed analysis of the latest hot news and forecasts concerning Armenia, guesstimating the groups or clans with chances to win, or the potential losers and their perspectives, etc.

But no matter how the current round of internal political confrontation in Armenia ends, one thing is certain. It is not just about an internal political crisis in the country. The ongoing events are part of the process that can be described as the destruction of the very model of Armenian statehood. Most importantly, the current crisis has revealed a very unpleasant aspect of life in today's Armenia – the country simply does not have an army.

There are slightly more than twenty states in the world with no official army. Japan has self-defense forces instead of the army. There is a military force in Iceland but it can hardly be called an army in classical context. In Costa Rica, the army was replaced by a civilian guard service in 1948. In Haiti, the army was officially disbanded after US troops entered the country. Panama, as well as the islands of Vanuatu, Palau and Nauru have no army simply because it is too expensive to maintain one. Formally, Armenia cannot be classified as one of such countries. The presence of an army is officially confirmed in all the required laws, while the politicians of all ranks do not miss an opportunity to pay their tribute to people in military uniform. But the latest dramatic events left no doubts: even though formally Armenia has an army, a defense minister, General Staff, generals and other high-ranking officials, there is de facto no Armenian army.

Consequences of the coup

Referring to the very negative outcome of the 44-day war in Garabagh for Armenia, it was not just a defeat. Armenia has practically lost all its military potential. In his public address after the liberation of Lachin, President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev provided a complete list of the destroyed Armenian military equipment.

The numbers are impressive. In October 2020, at the climax of the war, the number of destroyed and captured Armenian tanks exceeded 280. President Aliyev then asked frankly: “Where did they get so many tanks? This is contrary to international conventions concerning this issue. Why do not the bodies that are supposed to monitor the implementation of these conventions pay attention to this?”. Experts then recalled that the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe signed in 1990 stipulated the number of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery guns with a calibre of 100 mm and more, combat aircraft and attack helicopters each member state was allowed to have. With the collapse of the USSR, the quotas were divided between the republics. Thus, Armenia and Azerbaijan were allowed to have 220 tanks, the same number of armoured combat vehicles, 285 artillery systems, 100 combat aircraft and 50 attack helicopters only. Armenia officially stated that it had 110 tanks.

But now it turns out that more than 300 tanks were destroyed and taken as a trophy in the Second Garabagh War. This clearly shows that for many years Armenia has systematically violated the OSCE quotas, pulling a solid number of armoured equipment to the occupied Azerbaijani lands. Yerevan concentrated all its military forces in Garabagh and was confident that the CSTO allies and the Russian base in Gyumri would defend the internationally recognized territory of Armenia. Meaning that they could safely expose the rear and transfer everything to Garabagh. But now all they had is broken, destroyed and taken as a trophy. Moreover, the results of the war confirmed that the Armenian army failed to cope with its combat mission - to retain control over the occupied lands. And not because the high-ranking military officials of the country suddenly remembered international laws governing the military and sovereign borders. The Armenian military simply did not have enough power and training.

Armenian mess

Military defeat, horrible demoralization, 10,000 deserters after the war seriously downgrade the military rating of Armenia. Old problems of the Armenian army remain the same though - from monstrous corruption to everyday disorder of soldiers. Despite the rhetoric of Armenian officials about some far-fetched strategic plans, everything in a real war affects combat effectiveness, including soldiers' rations and underwear.

With a considerable loss of its combat potential in Garabagh, the Armenian army remains, nevertheless, a power tool in the domestic politics. In other words, Armenia does not have a combat-ready army, but there are “people with guns”. And local political bosses are trying all their best to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of these people with guns in the internal political showdown.

Given that in Armenia political declarations are made not only by the chief of the general staff, but also by the corps commanders, then such moves are quite expected. Indeed, back in the 2000s, it was reported about the prison mores that reigned in the armed forces. Armenian commanders competed with each other in the length of cavalcades of jeeps with personal guards they owned, etc. In 2008, generals supporting the then president Levon Ter-Petrosyan resigned from the army. As soon as he came to power, Nikol Pashinyan began purging the army trying to squeeze out the supporters of the Garabagh clan but failed. Finally, at the height of the war, oligarchs, political parties, and so on, formed their own detachments. That’s one step to civil war. That’s how an imperialist war may well turn into a civil one.