LOST WAR, WON ELECTION

In the late 1980s-early 1990s, when the Soviet celebrities passed through numerous expert councils and commissions began to be replaced by the new generation of performers, who made some get excited, while the others found their performance flashy and bogus, many "knowledgeable people" would confidently say "Give me enough money and access to television, and I will make a star even from a singing stool!" To which the experienced producers would reply “Yes, you can produce an album for your singing stool for a million dollars, even get it invited to music shows, organise interviews, presentations, and so on. But your money will not help to make the fans wait in front of the ticket booths or hotels in the night. That’s what your star should take care of on its own."

The recent early parliamentary elections in Armenia confirmed this maxim once again. For Robert Kocharian and his political bloc Hayastan, Russian media moguls of Armenian descent, including Aram Gabrelyanov and Margarita Simonyan, staged an impressive promotion campaign. Kocharian’s face and interviews were flashing on the pages of Moscow-based media outlets, where his team and himself confidently stated that they did not even think of Hayastan losing the elections. The Armenian audience was diligently bombarded with videos, which allegedly showed ‘malicious’ Azerbaijani troopers patrolling the roads in Kafan, plundering the Armenian fishermen on the Sevan Lake, and singing adhan in Yerevan.

Yet the outcome of the election was quite expected for some and shocking for others. Thus, Nikol Pashinyan’s bloc Civil Contract received 53.92% of the votes, which is enough for Pashinyan and his team to form a one-party government. Kocharian’s bloc could only get 21.04% of the votes, despite his boastful statements made earlier. The third-comer with slightly more than 5% of the votes was I Have Honour Alliance of Artur Vanetsyan and former President Serzh Sargsyan.

Predicted failure

The outcome of the election was not a coincidence. We can, of course, remember the old truth that assumes a limited external influence on the election results. In any case, the results of elections are determined in Armenia itself, not in Russia or France. Moreover, it is the political power that de facto controls the government that wins the elections in Armenia.

However, it is impossible to assume that the success of Pashinyan and his supporters was solely based on administrative resources. Way before the elections, experts warned that Robert Kocharian had no electoral support in Armenia despite being an experienced political player, and being supported by influential circles in Moscow.

In Azerbaijan, Robert Kocharian and Serzh Sargsyan are openly called war criminals for their involvement in the genocide of civilians in Khojaly. Perhaps Gabrelyanov, Simonyan, Zatulin, and others were sure that these facts from Kocharian’s and Sargsyan’s biographies would not prevent them from getting the required votes from the Armenian society, just as they did not prevent each of them from holding the post of the president in the past. But they did not take into account that both Kocharian and Sargsyan used the same methods even in Armenia. For example, the shooting of civilians on the streets of Yerevan on March 1, 2008 protesting against the rigging of the presidential elections. Observers also recall the highly suspicious "parliamentary terrorist attack" on October 27, 1999, when the Speaker of the parliament Karen Demirchyan and Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsyan, Kocharian's most dangerous political rivals at the time, were killed. Finally, there is a series of political assassinations in 1997-1998, when Levon Ter-Petrosyan was ousted from power. Armenian people also remembers corruption, state banditry and many other realities of the rule of the Garabagh clan. Experts believe that it was these realities that led to Kocharian's failure in the last elections.

Remarkably, the revanchist sentiments and the portrayal of Azerbaijanis and Turks as eternal enemies did not work either. Moreover, they played this card against Pashinyan, who was accused of the defeat of Armenia in the 44-day war, calling him a capitulator, a traitor, etc. The forces that declared themselves as pro-Russian lost in Armenia. Now experts wonder what this might mean. Can we expect that now, after Pashinyan's victory, the post-conflict settlement process will get a new boost? Will Armenia under his leadership begin to distance itself from Russia and reorient to the West?

Western dreams and Russian reality

It is well known that Nikol Pashinyan came to power under pro-Western slogans and with the support of plenty of people in his team who collaborated with the Soros Foundation. After the 44-day war, when, contrary to Yerevan’s expectations, Russia did not punish Azerbaijan in response to the very first attempts to oust the Armenian occupants from Garabagh, there is a growing disappointment in the alliance with Russia and Armenia's membership in the integration associations such as CSTO and EAEU. But experts warn that Pashinyan will have to consider the existing realities, when Armenia has the strongest dependence on Russia. Yerevan simply does not have the strength and resources to cover its borders with Azerbaijan on new frontiers, not to mention independently controlling its own borders with Turkey and Iran. Armenia will not raise the issue of withdrawing the Russian base from Gyumri either. It also lacks the ability to rebuild its army on its own, with Yerevan asking for support from Russia again. Finally, there is also economic dependence: without oil and gas, which Armenia buys from Russia at local prices, and other economic gifts from Moscow, the country simply will not survive. Especially now, when it has lost income from the plunder of the occupied Garabagh. In a word, Pashinyan and his supporters may dream of Armenia's turn to the West, but so far this is nothing more than a dream.

Inevitable peacemaker

The situation is more difficult with the peacekeeping process. It was Pashinyan who signed the ceasefire agreement with Azerbaijan on November 10, 2020. Moreover, since the spring of 2018, when Nikol Pashinyan came to power as a result of a coup, he was already considered a representative of the ‘party of peace’. There were forecasts that it would be possible to make a breakthrough in the negotiations with Pashinyan. But the same Pashinyan set the course for a “new war for new territories”, as his Defense Minister David Tonoyan put it; he visited the then occupied Shusha, where he took part in the inauguration ceremony of Arayik Harutyunyan, the so-called President of Nagorno-Karabakh, and so on. It was also Pashinyan who served as Prime Minister of Armenia both during the outbreak of skirmish in Tovuz and in September 2020, when Yerevan's irresponsible behaviour led to the war now known as the Second Garabagh War. Whether such a track record makes Pashinyan a peacemaker is a big question. The fact that during the election campaign it was mainly his rivals who promoted the revanchist sentiments only partly fuels optimism. Nikol Pashinyan signed the agreement of November 10 reluctantly - the Armenian army had already been defeated by that moment. Moreover, Pashinyan refused to cease fire for too long, although the defeat of Armenia was already obvious to everyone.

Today Armenia also has little choice. It will be impossible to evade fulfilling the obligations under the signed agreement, regardless of who is the prime minister of Armenia. Playing the revenge card will end in nothing at best, and may strongly hit Armenia anew at worst, the consequences of which will be even more deplorable for the countrys.