TWO IN ONE DISCUSS MAIN ISSUES

Two important political events took place at once in Dushanbe, creating a significant political media resonance. These were the summits of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

Location of the summits was not chosen by chance. In fact, Tajikistan has been chairing both organisation since last year. Thus, according to the established rules, Dushanbe was supposed to be the host country of both summits. Since a significant number of the CSTO member states are also members of the SCO, it was decided to hold both summits together, one after the other.

In addition, CSTO and SCO are bodies aiming at resolving the urgent issues of regional security. And since the issue of risks associated with the change of power in Afghanistan plays an instrumental role in the geography of both organisations, it so happened that the choice of the venue closest to Afghanistan also had a symbolic meaning.

CSTO summit and tension

The first of the two planned events was the CSTO summit, which was attended by all heads of member states, except the Russian President Vladimir Putin. Earlier, he announced his decision to isolate himself for some time due to a large number of coronavirus patients around him. Russia was represented at the summit by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.

The meeting of the CSTO leaders took place in a rather difficult period. According to experts, the CSTO is going through hard times in its history - not only because of the increased challenges along the perimeter of the organisation's borders, but also due to the growing contradictions between the members themselves. Thus, for the first time in many years, a conflict of interest over the disputed sections of the border between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan resulted in an open armed confrontation. Although the conflict was handled relatively quickly, its unsettled nature continues to create uncertainty on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. Some difficulties remain in the dialogue between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, which also periodically create border tensions.

In addition, Yerevan’s constant appeal to its allies for help in resolving the border conflict with Azerbaijan creates another problem. Other parties to the treaty, which have friendly relations with Baku, do not share Armenia's position, which is the reason why Yerevan is dissatisfied with the effectiveness of the organisation as a whole.

Thus, the transfer of the chairmanship of the CSTO to Armenia in the coming year raises a lot of questions in Azerbaijan. It is obvious that in its new capacity, Yerevan will intensify efforts to involve the CSTO in the processes taking place on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. Yerevan is trying to cajole the CSTO member states to secure their support on the border issue, and to place the military contingent of the organisation opposite the positions of the Azerbaijani side. According to the plan of the Armenian would-be strategists, regardless of the functions of a possible CSTO contingent, it will act on the Armenian side, which means it will act as a buffer with Azerbaijan.

At the same time, Armenia can interpret in its own interests the decision on the composition of military and special forces contingents of the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces of the CSTO from a different point of view.

Yet Yerevan's intentions alone are clearly not enough. It requires collective will of all parties to the agreement, which is in fact abscent. Earlier, CSTO Secretary General Stanislav Zas clearly expressed the opinion of other member states that Yerevan can count on the organisation's assistance only in case of obvious aggression from Baku. But, apparently, the CSTO Secretariat does not observe such threats.

In his address to the delegates of the Dushanbe summit, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan transparently hinted that "the logic of the development of events in various regions within the CSTO's zone of responsibility clearly shows the need to update the organisation's crisis response mechanisms.” Speaking about different regions, he made it clear that he meant also Armenia and the need for a "crisis response" to the situation on the border with Azerbaijan.

Pashinyan's statement that it is necessary to upgrade and increase the potential of collective forces of the CSTO with "modern and new, including unmanned vehicles" clearly shows that Yerevan is still thinking of attempts to involve the organisation in its military-political plans regarding not only Azerbaijan, but possibly Turkey.

CSTO’s Afghan mission

Obviously, the rest of the CSTO members are interested in other issues, particularly the situation in Afghanistan. Everyone understands that Azerbaijan does not pose a threat either to the organisation as a whole or to its individual participants. The organisation is in no hurry to get involved in military-political swindles of Armenia with dubious benefits. But the situation in Afghanistan is a permanent threat to security, particularly that of the Central Asian member states of CSTO. And this threat is constantly growing.

During the last summit, CSTO finally developed an algorithm of actions with respect to Afghanistan. It is focused on the creation of effective protection against the risks posed by terrorist groups in Afghanistan, and the establishment of an effective shield against a possible inflow of refugees. This approach is reflected in the joint statement of the member states titled On the situation in Afghanistan. Along with declarative statements about the urgent need to stop violence and start an inter-Afghan dialogue, the statement contains a thesis confirming the determination to use the resources available to the CSTO to ensure the security of its members.

Recently, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan held a joint military exercise on the border with Afghanistan. Exercises demonstrated, first of all, what it might look like to use all the necessary resources to ensure the security of the borders of Central Asian states with Afghanistan. And it was also a message to those forces in Afghanistan and beyond, which could test these lines in the very near future.

It is worth mentioning that CSTO considers Uzbekistan as a key regional player, although the latter is not a member state. It is no coincidence that the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev attended the CSTO summit as a guest. Uzbekistan, along with Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, has a common border with Afghanistan. Tashkent maintained close ties with the leadership of the Afghan Uzbeks, one of the largest ethnic communities in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan has one of the most capable armies in its region and an effective security system. All these factors, as well as the serious economic interests of Uzbekistan in Afghanistan, its proximity to all Central Asian countries, plus a status of a border state, make Tashkent an indispensable partner for all interested in normalising the situation both in Afghanistan and around it.

The greatest threats to the CSTO member states are terrorist groups based in Afghanistan, which try to create radical religious regimes in the neighbouring states. It is no coincidence that the President of Kyrgyzstan Sadyr Japarov openly stated that the establishment of a state based on religion in the region would negatively affect the situation in the CSTO member states. At the same time, he underlined the importance of dialogue with the new authorities in Kabul. Russian President Vladimir Putin, who addressed the meeting participants via a video communication, also underlined the need for such holding a dialogue. The idea of a dialogue with the Taliban was also supported by the President of Kazakhstan K.-Zh. Tokayev.

While CSTO hopes for a possibility of holding a political dialogue with the new Afghan government, the organisation expects to ensure at least some predictability and direction in the actions of the Taliban in relation to Afghanistan's northern neighbors. At least in this case, the words and actions of the CSTO may be more targeted and somehow influence the behaviour of the Taliban.

But Afghanistan was not the only topic discussed at the summit. The issues raised by the heads of state also demonstrated the difference in the interests of the CSTO member states. Each of them tried to draw attention to the essence of processes taking place in their regions. However, their reflection on the processes taking place far away from the epicentre of common interests was recognised by the other participants with restraint but not materialised in any specific decision. Particularly, this concerns the proposal of the Kyrgyz President to develop a mechanism of actions in the event of an attack by one country, a CSTO member, on another, or the statements of the Belarus President on the tension on the western borders of the CSTO. Simply put, the member states treated the tensions on the Belarusian-Lithuanian and Kyrgyz-Tajik border with understanding, but remained unresponsive, as usual.

SCO or 8+1

While the last CSTO summit was an important stage in the development of this organisation, then the SCO summit in Dushanbe can be called historical for a variety of reasons. Firstly, it was an anniversary event - the organization turned 20 years old. Secondly, the SCO admitted Iran as the ninth full member of the organisation. Thirdly, Dushanbe and Tehran restored their relations. But we cannot tell for now how long this ‘honeymoon’ will last. Obviously, Tajikistan no longer prevents Iran from expressing its desire to defend its position within the pan-Asian security system, which the SCO is rapidly transforming into.

In general, the absence of the leaders of Russia, China, and India at the summit (perhaps, Xi Jinping considered his visit to the Tajik capital inappropriate in the absence of the Russian president, while the Indian prime minister decided not to visit Dushanbe due to the absence of both of these leaders) did not affect the essence of discussions and decisions adopted therein. Although it somewhat lowered the status of the event. Like the leaders of the CSTO, the heads of the SCO states also decided to focus on the Afghan issue. But the tone and focus of discussions were different this time.

While the contradictions between the CSTO states do not cause tangible damage to the security system within the organisation and the problems along the perimeter of their external borders are more relevant, we can see an opposite picture in the SCO. For a number of SCO leading states, the main risk factors are the actions of the SCO dialogue partners.

Thus, in recent years, the Indo-Pakistani and Indo-Chinese contradictions have seriously aggravated, which cannot but have a negative impact on the dialogue within the SCO. It is no coincidence that the SCO leaders differed in their views on the seizure of power in Afghanistan by the Taliban and the issue of cooperation with them.

Imran Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan, who has the closest ties to the Taliban of any of its neighbours, said the priority is “to prevent a humanitarian and economic crisis. We must remember that the previous government was heavily dependent on foreign aid, and its elimination could lead to economic collapse.”

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is more cautious in matters of dialogue with the Taliban, but an active supporter of actions to create a “security shield” around Afghanistan.

It is noteworthy that with the admission of Iran to the SCO, the anti-Western and anti-American tone in the activities of this organisation has noticeably increased. The problems of dialogue between the leading SCO countries and the West have a serious impact on the nature of their decisions. Thus, the relations between Russia and China with the US that have worsened in recent years and months, as well as the conflict of interests between Washington and Tehran, contradictions between Pakistan and the US have been ultimately reflected in the text of the final SCO declaration.

The SCO leaders said the West and the US have a responsibility to help prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in Afghanistan, as the years of Western aid to the former Taliban-swept government have yielded nothing.

President Vladimir Putin blamed the US and NATO for the current situation in Afghanistan and called for the unfreezing of the assets of the central bank of Afghanistan, which were blocked after the Taliban seizure of power. He made it clear that without access to funds, Afghanistan's new rulers would be tempted to turn to the drug and arms trade.

He was also supported by the Chinese leader, who, without naming the US, said that “some countries” should take due responsibility for the future development of Afghanistan, since they were the instigators of the situation.

The Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev also called on other countries to unfreeze Afghanistan's assets held in foreign banks to facilitate dialogue with the Taliban government in Kabul, Reuters reported.

Only Narendra Modi, who in recent years has become noticeably closer to Western countries, in particular the US and UK, using them as a counterbalance to China and Pakistan, has shown considerable caution in his statements. “The biggest problems in this region (the region of the SCO countries) are related to peace, security and a lack of trust,” he said in his speech. Perhaps, Mr. Modi also meant the lack of trust between the SCO states themselves, which can only increase with the admission of such a complex and peculiar partner as Iran to the organisation.

However, we will find out how fair were these statements only in the coming years, which will not be easy for the SCO.