Author: Natig NAZIMOGHLU
Socio-political stability in Georgia has gone through another test after the recent municipal elections in the country. The ruling Georgian Dream party reserved its positions and secured the support of half of the voters. The opposition, however, achieved relative success in the elections for mayors of large cities, and the second round of elections is thereby expected. The sudden arrival and arrest of former president Mikhail Saakashvili added more uncertainty to the general picture though. Despite his long absence in the country, Saakashvili confirmed that he remained an important factor in the internal political processes in Georgia.
Movement vs. Dream
Municipal elections again demonstrated how rickety the socio-political stability in Georgia is. Situation has significantly deteriorated after last year's parliamentary elections, when the opposition, primarily the United National Movement (UNM) founded by Saakashvili, boycotted the work of the parliament, claiming significant violations during the elections. The EU then intervened in the situation. Thanks to the mediation of the President of the European Council Charles Michel, Gerogian Dream and UNM agreed to hold early parliamentary elections should the ruling party received less than 43% of the votes in the local elections in 2021. Although both the authorities and the opposition subsequently withdrew from the agreement, 43% of the votes has been considered a test for the Dream since.
On the eve of the elections, UNM expressed confidence that they would put an end to the nine-year rule of the power founded and actually controlled by the billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili. However, they failed in their calculations.
Georgian voters elected mayors and deputies of sakrebulo – representative bodies in 64 municipalities, including 5 self-governing cities. The election results turned out to be ambiguous: on the one hand, the ruling Georgian Dream received almost 47% of the vote, while on the other hand, its candidates for mayor of self-governing cities (municipalities), including Tbilisi, failed to win in the first round. This can be considered a success of UNM, although in proportional voting it lagged behind the ruling party by 16%.
In general, Dream and UNM confirmed that they were the largest political parties in Georgia, since the party led by the former Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia (For Georgia) and created just four months ago took the third place and received only 7.8% of the votes.
The struggle for the post of the mayor of Tbilisi will be of fundamental importance in the second round of the mayoral elections, merely because about a third of the country's population lives in Tbilisi. In the second round, the struggle will unfold between the candidate of the Dream Kakha Kaladze and the chairman of UNM Nika Melia, with 45% and 34% of the votes secured in the first round, respectively. The current alignment of political powers will also clarify the second round of mayoral elections in the other four self-governing cities: Rustavi, Kutaisi, Poti, and Batumi.
Meanwhile, the very process of voting, which took place on October 2, was generally calm, which can also be confirmed by the reaction of international observers. Representatives of European institutions, whose opinion is a priority for Georgia, which is pursuing a Euro-Atlantic course, although they stated that “the process was damaged by widespread accusations of unequal conditions, pressure, and bribery of voters,” they called these elections competitive and democratic.
The Mikhail factor
In principle, everything would have gone more or less smoothly if not for Mikhail Saakashvili. Having his name associated with Georgia's radical turn towards the West, Saakashvili unexpectedly returned to Georgia after eight years of living in a foreign country. It can be assumed therefore that his return will influence the further development of internal political events in Georgia.
Saakashvili arrived in Georgia just before the municipality elections. In recent years, he has lived in Ukraine, held various posts in this country, including the governor of Odessa, and is currently the head of the Executive Committee of the National Council of Reforms. On October 1, Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili announced the arrest of the former president. He was taken to a custody in Rustavi, where he immediately began a hunger strike.
Although Saakashvili's supporters demanded for his release, President Salome Zurabishvili categorically rejected the possibility of his pardon. Moreover, the authorities have expanded the list of "crimes committed by Saakashvili." In addition to having been convicted in absentia, particularly for exceeding his powers when he was the president of the country and pardoned the convicted murderers of businessman Sandro Girgvliani, beat MP Valery Gelashvili, Saakashvili is facing a charge of illegal crossing of the state border.
Saakashvili considers himself a political prisoner. But as a citizen of Ukraine, he requested a meeting with Ukrainian consul in Georgia. The existing situation thus became a test for the relations between Tbilisi and Kiev. In fact, since the first day of Saakashvili’s arrival to Ukraine, these relations have been slightly marred by the Saakashvili factor. And there is no any other, more compelling reason for the worsening of relations between the two countries, where the “colour revolution” won.
Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky, responding to the arrest of Saakashvili in Georgia, assured that he would use every opportunity to release him and return to Kiev. Tbilisi, however, views the situation from a different angle. Although the head of the Georgian Parliament Kakha Kuchava expressed confidence that "nothing will aggravate the Georgian-Ukrainian relations", he added: “Detention of Saakashvili should become a good example showing that there is no room for provocations in Georgia.”
After several days of hunger strike, Saakashvili nevertheless interrupted it. But all his actions – from his sudden arrival in Tbilisi and the alleged arrest to his refusal to return to Ukraine to the expression of his intention to continue the political struggle to "ensure fair elections, freedom and democracy” – show that they were not a result of a spontaneous decision.
Apparently, Saakashvili’s intention is to ensure his live presence in Georgian politics, as opposed to his virtual presence during the last eight years. However, his chances will depend not only on the determination and readiness of the ruling party to oppose his plans, but also on how well Saakashvili's return to Georgia fits into the plans of the West.
Certainly, one cannot expect yet another ‘revolution’ in Georgia, since, unlike in 2003, when the US and the EU provided total support for the ‘Rose Revolution’, their Georgian policy in 2021 is completely different. Washington and Brussels, perhaps, would like to see Saakashvili return to power in Georgia as a hardcore pro-Western politician, but they see no reason to risk the future of their influence in this South Caucasian country. After all, half of the population certainly does not accept the former president and stands up for the Georgian Dream. Plus, the West already faces a number of ‘non-obvious factors’ in the region, given the Russian-Turkish cooperation under the new reality emerged in the South Caucasus after Azerbaijan's victory in the 44-day war.
Georgia remains the only island with an unambiguous Euro-Atlantic policy in the new regional conditions. The Dream government follows the same policy, albeit not in such a defiant form as it was during the presidency of Saakashvili. Despite the general positive attitude of the West towards the former president Saakashvili, the US and the EU have no serious reasons to be unhappy with the current Georgian authorities. That is why both the US and the EU do not make a serious choice between the Dream government and Saakashvili's supporters.
Meanwhile, considering the possible strengthening of the Saakashvili factor, the West will push Georgia to early parliamentary elections, which may become decisive for the fate of its power. But we are going to see how realistic this perspective is a little later. At least after the second round of municipal elections. They will show whether the Georgian Dream strengthens its dominant position in the country, or whether the internal political crisis grows even more, followed by an actual split of the population in two groups: supporters of the Georgian Dream, which has been ruling the Georgian government for nine years and those of the disgraced former president, who is still willing to be on top of the ruling elite.
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