THE AFGHAN PUZZLE

What to do with the new Afghan government formed after the return of the radical movement Taliban this summer? This question is still one of the most relevant ones in world politics because of its strategic importance for Afghanistan itself and the threats to the neighbouring countries, region and the world as long as the Taliban's remains unpredictable. After all, the movement is yet to provide a convincing evidence of its intention to ‘keep up’ with the civilisation.

Any help from the West?

More than two months have passed since the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, the Taliban government has not yet been recognised by any state. The international community shows its dissatisfaction with the Taliban having not abandoned many of their previous political practices, which so impressed the world at the turn of the millennium. Manifestations of this include, first of all, the brutal suppression of political opponents, ties with various extremist and terrorist organisations, total dictatorship in the social sphere, including the refusal to provide women with the right to education.

Only these facts are enough to confirm the failure of the previous twenty years in Afghanistan with the Western military presence and the US attempts to "democratise" the country. But now, after the Taliban’s re-establishment of its power, the increasing number of countries express their readiness to cooperate with the new Afghan government. This includes the European states and the US, whose sudden withdrawal from Afghanistan this summer was nothing but a collective fiasco of the concept of Euro-Atlanticism.

The West, and primarily the US, underlines the urgency of overcoming the emerging humanitarian problems that the Afghan people face in the ongoing dreadful era of changes. During the talks held in October in Doha, Qatar, both the United States and the European Union promised to provide Kabul with emergency assistance worth more than $1 billion. However, they don’t seem to recognise the Taliban, nor are they willing to trust them. Moreover, Washington did not unfreeze the $9.5 billion-worth reserves of the Afghan Central Bank in the US. The EU, despite its earlier agreement with the Taliban to resume its representation in Kabul, links this move exclusively with its intention to help the people of Afghanistan, not to recognise the new Afghan authorities.

Apparently, in the context of geopolitics related to Afghanistan, there is a de facto international consensus on the prematurity of recognition of the Taliban government due to fears that this move can otherwise cause the spread of chaos throughout Eurasia, and potential problems that the ‘new’ Afghan state can create for the neighbouring states. We do not know if this was part of the US plans to cease the military campaign in Afghanistan. But it is obvious that the neighbours of Afghanistan are puzzled as to how to prevent the Taliban from spreading to the entire region.

Pragmatism of Tashkent, fears of Dushanbe and tasks of Ankara

The post-Soviet states of Central Asia bordering Afghanistan express the greatest concern. Especially, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan seem the most vulnerable countries facing possible expansion of the Taliban since its triumphant return to Afghanistan. This threat is not just because of the immediate vicinity of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan, but also because of the presence of quite large ethnic Uzbek and Tajik minorities in Afghanistan with quite an impressive influence, including military. However, there are significant differences in the approaches of Tashkent and Dushanbe to the Taliban threat, mainly because of the political opportunities and economic potential of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

Tashkent regards the return of the Taliban from a purely pragmatic point of view, trying to further develop trade with Kabul and to implement a series of joint projects important not only for Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, but also for other states of the region. For example, in February 2021, Uzbekistan and Pakistan signed an agreement on the construction of a railway line that will connect the two countries through the Afghan territory. Apparently, the Taliban government assessed the signal for cooperation coming from Tashkent, which views itself as one of the leaders of the region, adequately. This was later confirmed by the visit to Uzbekistan of an impressive Afghan ministerial delegation representing various areas, including foreign affairs, defense, economy, health, and education. The parties agreed to create working groups to resolve issues of mutual interest, including the implementation of infrastructure projects, such as the construction of the Surkhan-Puli-Khumri power transmission line and the Termez-Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar railway route very important for the entire region.

In other words, Tashkent made it clear that it would not protest the inevitable, namely the reign of the new Taliban government in Afghanistan. On the contrary, it will try to get economic benefits from this cooperation. As for the political recognition of the Taliban, Tashkent is quite rational again. Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov said that the issue of recognition of the Taliban government was on the agenda and Tashkent intended to resolve it together with its allies, and partners, not separately.

Tajikistan has much less economic potential than Uzbekistan and expresses serious concerns about the possible direct aggression of the Taliban. By focusing on this potential threat, Dushanbe refused to approve the Taliban’s return to power from the very beginning. In response, a group of Tajik militants within the movement declared their intention to invade Tajikistan. Remarkably, one of them, Mahdi Arsalan, is the governor of several Afghan territories bordering on Tajikistan.

In case such threats become true, Tajikistan mainly counts on the assistance from the CSTO, of which it is a member. However, the severity of the Taliban threat forces Dushanbe to seek other allies as well. Apparently, one of them is Turkey. Thus, the Tajik and Turkish authorities discussed the possible signing of a military agreement between the two states during the visit of the chairman of the lower chamber of the Tajik parliament Mahmadtohir Zokirzodah to Ankara. The parties reached a preliminary agreement on this issue during the July visit of the Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar to Tajikistan.

Turkey is playing its own strategic ‘game’ with the Taliban. During talks with Taliban representatives in Ankara, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu stated that the movement "must form an inclusive government in Afghanistan if it wants unity and equality in the country." However, it seems that there is still no agreement on the service of the Turkish specialists at the Kabul International Airport. But Ankara is sending a clear signal that it is not going to remove the Afghan vector of its foreign policy. After all, Turkey is interested in the active involvement in the stabilisation of the situation in Afghanistan, strengthening its positions in Central Asia, as well as expanding the cooperation with the Turkic states of the region. To achieve these goals, Turkey is actively using the support from one of its strategic allies, Pakistan, which has traditionally had serious influence in Afghanistan. The latter factor also shows that the future configuration of relations of the world powers with the Taliban will depend primarily on the states directly bordering on Afghanistan. Therefore, the so-called Moscow and Tehran formats are interesting as a platform for discussing issues related to the relations between Afghanistan’s neighbours and the de facto Taliban government.

Formats of Moscow and Tehran

In the last decade of October, regular meetings were held first in Moscow and then in Tehran. The Taliban representatives joined the negotiations in Russia, but did not visit the Iranian capital. This gave rise to all sorts of rumours about the new Afghan government's distrust of Iran and the excessive caution of Iran itself, which, perhaps, did not invite the Taliban representatives to Tehran.

Representatives of Russia, Iran, China, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan took part in the negotiations in Moscow and Tehran. In addition to the Taliban, representatives of India, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan also joined the Moscow talks. Participants of the Tehran summit, who were exclusively foreign ministers, agreed to create a mechanism for regular meetings of special envoys for Afghanistan and representatives of embassies in Kabul.

Both formats express essentially similar ideas and initiatives. The neighbouring countries support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan, initiatives to unfreeze the assets of the Afghan Central Bank, calls on the UN to organise a donor conference, as well as the continuity of efforts to provide urgent humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. They also request the Taliban government pursue a friendly policy towards the neighbouring countries. All neighbouring countries are interested in the Taliban’s countering the Islamic State. This is one of the key aspects that unite the approaches of not only the neighbouring states, but of the entire world community, including the US and the EU.

Either way, what concrete steps can lead to the recognition of the Taliban by the world community? Participants of the talks in Moscow and Tehran confirmed the solidarity with the international community that the Taliban should form an inclusive government including the representatives of all political forces and ethnic groups of Afghanistan.

At the same time, it is obvious that the global struggle of the world's largest powers for influence in Afghanistan is getting increasingly stronger. Thus, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who joined the Taliban summit in Tehran online, called on the neighbouring states of Afghanistan to prevent the military presence of the US and NATO on their territories, which "are planning to move there after leaving Afghanistan." Apparently, this statement was addressed to Afghanistan's northern neighbours in Central Asia, the former Soviet republics. This means that Afghanistan, which has stirred up the international community with the return of the Taliban to power, will remain one of the significant regions of geopolitical confrontation in Eurasia. One of them, but by no means the only one.