RED LINES INTACT

Turkey and Iran are making efforts to warm up bilateral relations that have cooled down enough in recent years. In this regard, it is important to mention the recent visit of Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu to Tehran on November 15. Both sides have clearly demonstrated an intention to normalise bilateral relations.

During the negotiations, Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi stated the significance of improving the Iranian-Turkish relations to the level of mulltilateral cooperation. At the same time, Raisi noted that with the preparation of an agreement on long-term cooperation, relations between the two countries could grow to an international level. According to the Iranian president, good-neighbourly relations will serve peace and stability in the region and Tehran is ready to further develop cooperation in the fight against terrorism and organised crime.

It is interesting that in the context of cooperation with Turkey, the Iranian President also mentioned Azerbaijan. “Iran's relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan are more than good-neighbourly relations. They are based on strong ties rooted in ancient religious and cultural traditions,” Mr. Raisi said.

In turn, Mr. Cavusoglu assured his vis-a-vis that his government intended to deepen cooperation with Iran. Regarding Ankara's foreign policy in the Caucasus, the Turkish Foreign Minister noted Ankara’s willingness to intensify cooperation with Iran to develop trade relations and strengthen stability in the region.

By the way, during the Tehran summit, it became known that the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also planned to visit Iran soon, which means Iran and Turkey will develop bilateral relations further.

Unifying and disconnecting factors

At different stages of history, these two centuries-old neighbours have suffered from difficult and protracted wars, which severely affected their relations, making them not always smooth and warm. But Ankara and Tehran have always, even at the most critical moments, respected mutual red lines, trying not to go beyond certain limits in foreign policy relations.

Unlike other Middle Eastern countries, Turkey and Iran have established their current borders themselves, without the involvement of any colonising European power. These boundaries were officially recognised in the 1639 Zukhab Peace Treaty between the Safavid Persia and the Ottoman Empire, when “many of the modern states were not on the map yet,” as former Turkish President Abdullah Gul said.

Even at the height of tensions between the US and Iran, Turkey, despite NATO membership, maintained a normal level of cooperation with Iran. Relations between the two states further developed and intensified after the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in Turkey in the early 2000s. Many observers believe this was due to the development of political Islam during that period.

However, it was political Islam that worsened relations between the two countries. It all started with the latent struggle between Iran and Turkey for leadership in the Muslim world, while the so-called Arab Spring, in particular the Syrian conflict, intensified this rivalry. Relatively rapid transition of the conflict to hot phase has clearly demonstrated that Iran supported the government of Bashar al-Assad, as opposed to Turkey, which supported the Syrian opposition. Despite the dialogue between Ankara and Tehran at the initial stage of the conflict to resolve the situation, later the parties launched a counter-propaganda campaign and openly declared their positions.

Despite Iran’s persistence in following this policy to this day, President Hassan Rouhani, who replaced his more radical predecessor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2013, has maintained a more moderate foreign policy line. This helped restart relations between Ankara and Tehran. On the initiative of Moscow, Iran and Turkey have even joined the trilateral talks to resolve the Syrian conflict, which took place in Astana and then in Sochi. Thanks to this joint interaction, it was possible to achieve significant progress in resolving the Syrian conflict.

With the exception of the Syrian conflict, Ankara and Tehran have had a common position and worked closely on issues related to situations in Egypt, Sudan, Qatar, and other regions. In particular, following the referendum on the establishment of the Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq in October 2017, Ankara and Tehran have closely worked together to support Baghdad and prevent the rise of Kurdish separatism. That’s how they were able to prevent an attempt by Massoud Barzani to create an independent Kurdish state in Iraq.

By the way, the Kurdish issue is as sensitive as unifying factor for both Iran and Turkey. Since the Kurdish separatism threatens the territorial integrity of the two countries, Turkey and Iran can establish a common ground on the Kurdish issue in both Iraq and Syria, although they have maintained warm relations with various Kurdish groups for years.

Finally, the issue of influence in the South Caucasus, rather Turkey's activation in the region after the 44-day war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, has also contributed to the cooling of relations between Ankara and Tehran. If earlier Tehran and Ankara had limited influence and political views, for example, on Syria or the Persian Gulf, now the limit of these differences also covers the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Resetting relations

Obviously, despite occasional yet serious differences in their views on regional politics, these two non-Arab Middle Eastern neighbours need each other. Therefore, even in the most tense periods of relations, Tehran and Ankara have never burned bridges. During the most severe period of sanctions against Iran, Ankara continued to work with Tehran in various fields, including trade and energy, regardless of the Western embargo.

Recent events have demonstrated that Iran will have to accept the new foreign policy agenda and regional activity of Turkey, as well as the consequences of these actions. On the other hand, while recognising the political and diplomatic power of Tehran in the region, Ankara does not want to see its neighbour as an obstacle to its expanding influence to the East. On the contrary, the Turkish government is looking for an opportunity to cooperate with Tehran at some point to pursue common interests.

At the same time, Iran, which is constantly under the threat of war, needs to maintain reliable relations with its large neighbour—Turkey. In other words, the new political realities make it necessary that Tehran maintain friendly relations with Ankara.

It is clear that the policy of pressure on the South Caucasus, especially on Azerbaijan, launched by the foreign policy team of the new Iranian administration, has failed. It turned out that even Russia—a traditional ally of Iran—did not support its southern neighbour, given the new realities emerging in the region. And Tehran, which considers itself the second influential actor in the South Caucasus after Russia, is practically left alone.

Obviously, political dimensions in the South Caucasus have changed. If Tehran does not come to terms with the new reality, it may find itself left behind the ongoing regional political and economic processes in the region. In addition, the rapprochement of Arab countries and Israel and the risk of war against Iran increase the importance of Ankara to Tehran. That is why Tehran is trying to normalise relations with its western neighbour—the ally of Azerbaijan.

Thus, the visit of Mevlut Cavusoglu to Tehran, negotiations with the Iranian leadership, as well as the planned visit to of President Erdogan to Iran suggest the possibility of reaching important agreements during the visit.

A few days after Cavusoglu, Deputy Prime Minister of Azerbaijan, Shahin Mustafayev, also visited Tehran and held meetings with high-ranking Iranian officials, which indicates the unfolding of a new period of cooperation in the region.