CRISIS SOLVED… CHALLENGES REMAIN...

Apparently, the situation in Kazakhstan is stabilising. Authorities have managed to bring it under full control, but there are still a number of important issues about the future developments in the largest country in post-Soviet Central Asia. They are closely related to both the configuration of the state power and its plans to solve the long-standing local political and socio-economic problems, as well as the external orientation of Kazakhstan.

Nuances of stabilisation

On January 19, the government cancelled the previously announced state of emergency in the cities of Nur-Sultan and Almaty, as well as in the regions of Almaty, Atyrau, Zhambyl, Kyzyl-Orda, and Mangistau, which was a convincing indication that the protests ended. Initially triggered by the increased fuel prices, protests then took on a purely political character and attracted not only peaceful demonstrators, but also certain forces who opted for riots and armed confrontation with the authorities.

Another important indicator was the complete withdrawal by January 19 of the troops of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) previously deployed in the country at the request of the Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev.

The video address to the nation by Kazakhstan's first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, was also an important sign of stabilisation. His prolonged silence and public disappearance were among the most intriguing factors during the escalation of the Kazakhstan crisis, which claimed the lives of 225 people. Despite all the conspiracy theories about Nazarbayev's silence, Yelbasy tried to deny many of them in his video message. First, he said he "did not leave" the country, and supported his successor’s programme of reforms "aimed at improving the welfare of the people". Nazarbayev confirmed that the incumbent president "has full power" and is the head of Kazakhstan's Security Council, and announced Tokayev’s election as chairman of the ruling Nur Otan party.

Thus, in his address to nation, Yelbasy principally confirmed that there was no confrontation within the government and the political elite of Kazakhstan. Meanwhile, the prevailing opinion among the experts is that Nazarbayev's address was the last act in the transit of power in the country. In this sense, it is worth mentioning the adoption by the Majilis, the lower house of the Kazakh parliament, amendments to constitutional laws. According to them, the first president of Kazakhstan is deprived of his lifetime posts of the head of the Security Council and the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan. Tokayev thereby cemented his position as the acting leader of Kazakhstan, and already began a purge within the internal power structures. Moreover, Nazarbayev's supporters and protégés, his relatives and representatives of his inner circle, who held high positions in state bodies and key business structures of the country, are losing their positions of power.

Will the removal of the Nazarbayev family from power bring a change in the ruling elite and the configuration of state power? It is too early to say something about any serious changes in this context. We can only assume certain social-economic reforms under the leadership of President Tokayev. During a meeting with the representatives of Kazakhstan’s business community, he said that the main cause of the unrest in the country was an "unacceptable gap between the incomes of the rich and the poor, which terrorists, militants and the conspirators tried to use for their own advantage. Therefore, Tokayev said, "there is a strategic task of deep transformation of the entire social order; we need real reforms that meet the expectations and interests of the citizens of Kazakhstan."

Perhaps we will more or less clearly see the announced reforms in the coming months. For now we can only say that following political stabilisation, it is the improvement of the socio-economic conditions of the majority of the population that can strengthen the foundations of statehood in Kazakhstan. The new government, which, in accordance with a presidential decree, is headed by the former First Vice-Premier, Alikhan Smailov, will play an instrumental role in determining the strategic vectors of development. From its first day in office, the new Kazakh government has been at the epicentre of discussions on both the political issues of domestic and foreign character.

Test for multi-vectorness

The appointment of Askar Umarov as Kazakhstan's Minister of Information and Social Development, caused public response. Some influential Russian politicians opposed the decision and referred to a number of controversial statements made by Umarov many years ago. In particular, the head of Rossotrudnichestvo Evgeny Primakov slid back to insults by calling the newly appointed Kazakh minister a ‘Russophobic trash’. He also said that his agency refused to work with or maintain any contacts with Umarov. The Russian media was teeming with stories that drew far-reaching geopolitical conclusions from Umarov's appointment, including criticism of President Tokayev, as he, contrary to expectations of Russian politico-expert circles, did not intend to replace the multivector course of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy with a pro-Russian vector...

Reaction of Umarov himself, who expressed his readiness to work productively with Russian partners, could not appease the angry side. Even the Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that "we should judge by the statements Mr. Umarov will make in his new status. Certainly, we need to work, interact and deepen cooperation with the ministers appointed by President Tokayev."

All these events suggest that the short-term deployment of CSTO troops in Kazakhstan, which many regarded as an indicator of Kazakhstan’s complete transition into the orbit of Russian influence, was not at all a turning point in the geopolitical struggle of global power centres for the 'heart of Eurasia'. European Parliament’s resolution on the recent protests in Kazakhstan also confirms that this struggle is not subsiding, but on the contrary, is entering a new, perhaps even more acute phase. The document calls for the launch of an international investigation into the Kazakh events as well as for the introduction of sanctions on Kazakh officials "responsible for the serious human rights violations committed during the protests in January 2022". The EU's "deeper political and economic relations" with Kazakhstan are made conditional on the latter’s "active commitment to democratic reforms".

The Kazakh Foreign Ministry issued a statement in response, which said the European Parliament’s resolution was "based on biased conclusions and data". The statement also indicated that it was inadmissible to adopt such documents until the official investigation initiated by the leadership of the Republic of Kazakhstan was over. Results of the investigation is reported to be presented to the international community.

Remarkably, the increasingly active Western interest in the situation in Kazakhstan (and even in the whole Eurasia),  makes the issue of Kazakhstan's geopolitical role in the strategic perspective more relevant. Obviously, the struggle for influence on this country will develop in the context of political and economic interests, first of all, of Russia, West and China as well as the position of Kazakhstan itself, whose foreign preferences under President Tokayev have yet to shape. Turkey, as well as the whole Turkic community, whose influence in regional politics will steadily increase, will play a significant role in this panorama of geostrategic interests.

All of these aspects will ultimately clarify whether Kazakhstan's policy of multivectorness continues under Tokayev. There is a direct link between Kazakhstan's domestic development priorities and the nature of its foreign policy.

Will Kazakhstan remain one of the drivers of Eurasian integration in the post-Soviet space?  Will the transition to the Latin alphabet be completed in Kazakhstan? What model of army building will Kazakhs prefer after the shocks the country has gone through, which proved the necessity of thorough transformations in power structures? What will be the fundamental economic principles in this largest Central Asian country in the future?

This is an incomplete list of challenges that Kazakhstan is now facing under the new realities as a result of the bloody events of January 2022. It is these realities that will ultimately define the fate of the sovereign state of Kazakhstan.