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European Union pushing for peace between Baku and Yerevan in line with agenda offered by Azerbaijan

Author:

15.04.2022

Brussels, April 6. Another meeting between the Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan was mediated by the President of the European Council, Charles Michel. Apparently, the meeting was productive mainly thanks to the serious preparatory work taken care of the day before.

It is with cautious optimism we note the agreement reached between the parties to begin work on a peace treaty that draws a final line under the region's conflicting past.

 

EU takes the lead

The April meeting between Ilham Aliyev and Nikol Pashinyan was the third opportunity for talks in the Brussels format initiated by Charles Michel.  The previous two talks in Brussels were held in December 2021 and February 4, 2022 via a videoconference, also joined by the French President Emmanuel Macron.

It is no coincidence that the EU is an active mediator in the negotiations, as Brussels sees the South Caucasus region as an important part of its neighbourhood policy, an integral part of the Eastern Partnership programme. Brussels believes that the further development of the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement is key to strengthen its strategic position in the region.

Earlier in December 2021, the Eastern Partnership summit approved the EU economic and investment plans for the states of the region. These include grant funds that will last until 2027. Brussels wants to use these funds to attract up to 17 billion euros of investments. The idea is that European support and guarantees would be sufficient grounds for private investors to participate in projects. Brussels is ready to allocate €2bn to Azerbaijan and €2.6bn to Armenia as part of its fund-raising initiative.

There is no doubt that the appropriate geopolitical and geo-economic conditions are necessary for the effective use of these funds.

An agreement to begin work on a peace treaty could draw a final line under the conflict, which lasted until September 27, 2020. It will also bring Azerbaijan and Armenia to a new stage of relations thanks to the establishment of diplomatic relations and the development of comprehensive economic ties.

A statement from President Michel following the bilateral meeting welcomes the desire expressed by both President Ilham Aliyev and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to move quickly towards a peace agreement between the countries. The statement underlined the importance of instructing foreign ministers to work on the preparation of a future peace treaty that would settle all the necessary issues.

It is safe to assume that the document will be drafted taking into account the following five principles proposed by the Azerbaijani side for the normalisation of relations:

  • mutual recognition of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of international borders and political independence;
  • mutual confirmation of the absence of territorial claims of states against each other and a legal obligation not to assert such claims in the future;
  • refraining from threatening each other's security in inter-state relations, from using threats and force against political independence and territorial integrity to other circumstances incompatible with the purposes of the UN Charter;
  • delimitation and demarcation of the state border and the establishment of diplomatic relations;
  • opening of transport and communications, establishment of other relevant communications and cooperation in other areas of mutual interest.

In a telephone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin after the Brussels meeting, Ilham Aliyev stated that Armenia had accepted the five principles proposed by Azerbaijan for the establishment of inter-state relations.

 

Delimitation and demarcation begins

In this aspect, the process of delimitation and demarcation of borders will be of key importance. It is expected that this will completely resolve border tensions and record mutual recognition of sovereignty and territorial integrity within internationally recognised borders.

It is important to note that to take the relevant decisions the parties were guided by previously signed and existing agreements, including the Trilateral Statement dated November 10, 2020, the Moscow Statement of January 11, 2021 and the Sochi Statement of November 26, 2021.

Following the Brussels meeting and building upon the principles of the Sochi statement, it was decided to hold a Joint Border Commission before the end of April. The Commission will be responsible for the delimitation of bilateral border between Armenia and Azerbaijan and ensure a stable security situation along and near the border.

During the previous summit in Sochi, the participants agreed to take steps to improve stability and security on the Azerbaijani-Armenian border, to work towards the establishment of the bilateral commission that would be ensure delimitation and subsequent demarcation of state borders with the consultative assistance of Russia at the request of the sides.

However, the Armenian prime minister has his own vision of the ongoing process. Pashinyan mentions a so-called dual mandate for the commission—delimitation and ensuring peace and stability along the entire border line, possibly through the Russian involvement. Considering that Pashinyan's wishes do not always match the reality, we yet to see whether or not the commission will indeed operate on the dual-mandate principle.

 

No more Nagorno-Karabakh and the Minsk Group

In fact, it is Nagorno-Karabakh and OSCE Minsk Group that became the real outsiders of the ongoing process. At least they are not even mentioned in the statement by the head of the European Council. Nor were they mentioned in the November 10, 2020 trilateral statement, or in all the other documents adopted since.

We can assume that after some time these titles will finally fade into oblivion and will only be found in sources that refer to events that preceded Azerbaijan's victory in the Second Garabagh  War.

In general, judging from the final statement, Charles Michel tried to avoid acute issues and focus on concrete agreements.

Yet the Armenian side has raised this issue during the negotiations. There is no doubt that the Armenian Prime Minister mentioned both the Minsk Group and the Armenians of Karabakh, as well as expressed his concern about the strengthening of the Azerbaijani army in Garabagh.

After the Brussels summit, Pashinian acknowledged that for Yerevan it was crucial to guarantee the security of the Armenian population of Garabagh, "to ensure their rights and freedoms, as well as the final clarification of the status of Nagorny Karabakh". According to Pashinyan, these issues are on the Armenian agenda, along with the involvement of the Minsk Group co-chairmanship, and Yerevan wants to see them as topics of negotiation.

It is amazing to realise how one can be so blind to the obvious! Amid insurmountable contradictions between Russia and the West, it is strange to expect even the functioning of the Minsk Group format. It is only Yerevan that persists in exploiting the ‘potential’ of existing circumstances. This could have gone on for an unknown amount of time, had it not been for Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's statement the day after the meeting in Brussels. During a press conference following the meeting with Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, Lavrov referred to the American and French co-chairs and said that they had "cancelled the three co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group and stated that they would not communicate with us in that format".

Apparently, the EU leadership has already determined to handle the process without relying upon such a rusty and dysfunctional mechanism anyway.

In general, Brussels has been very pragmatic, trying to avoid sharp angles in the final statement and reflecting the current mood within the European Union. Matching of the text of the final statement with Azerbaijan’s position further proves that the EU indeed acknowledges the new regional realities created by Azerbaijan.

 

Old games in new circumstances

This causes serious concerns in Yerevan, among the radical Armenian diaspora circles and their sympathisers in the Armenian opposition.

Thus, just before the trilateral meeting in Brussels, the opposition organised meagre protest rallies in Yerevan against possible agreements, while in Strasbourg more than 40 MEPs, apparently closely linked to Armenian diaspora organisations in Europe, applied to President Charles Michel to put pressure on Baku.

Authors of the letter demanded Mr. Michel to put pressure on Baku to make it withdraw to original positions in the temporary deployment zone of the Russian peacekeeping troops, and "to cease any action that could endanger the security and well-being of the indigenous Armenian population of Nagorny Karabakh".

For obvious reasons there was no reaction to this appeal. Pashinyan, however, considered this demarche of European parliamentarians very timely, as it gave his position at least some ground for asking to influence Baku on this issue. As expected, the Armenian leadership accused Azerbaijan of violating its commitments. But it seems that even Pashinyan assessed his chances of provoking Brussels to condemn Baku's actions as insignificant. Upon his return to Yerevan, the Armenian premier had to find excuses to prove that he did not raise this issue during the meeting, "since the Azerbaijani Armed Forces invaded into the zone of responsibility of the Russian peacekeeping contingent, this issue should be discussed with the participation of Russian partners. This is exactly what we are doing currently”. That’s how Pashinyan was trying to shift all the blame onto the peacekeepers indirectly accusing them of inaction.

As for the EU leadership, pragmatists in Brussels understand that the frequency of conflicting themes is inversely proportional to the success of the mediation success. Charles Michel therefore has focused on positive accomplishments and welcomed steps to restore the railway tracks, calling on both Armenia and Azerbaijan to find effective solutions to restore transport communications as well.

On behalf of the EU, Michel has expressed their readiness to support the development of communication channels, including in line with EU’s Economic and Investment Plan and through the use of the proposed economic consultation forum to identify common projects.

Azerbaijan is already actively working on these projects with its European partners. Armenia will be able to demonstrate its readiness to get involved in the process by concrete steps. As the saying goes, don't count your chickens before they hatch.



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