CENTRAL ASIA ON FOCUS

Recently, Ankara has considerably strengthened the Central Asian vector of its foreign policy. Reciprocal visits of regional leaders to Ankara and the Turkish President to Central Asian republics have increased over the last few months. This suggests that the process is being stimulated by deep interests to strengthen the parties' positions amid the extreme global geopolitical turbulence.

Since November 2021, when Turkey assumed the presidency of the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States (CCTS) after the 8th Council Leadership Summit, Ankara has sought to bring new elements to its foreign policy in the region by strengthening it through cooperation in the military, political, technology and investment spheres.

Ankara-Nur-Sultan: new stage of cooperation

Obviously, Turkey attaches great importance to cooperation with Kazakhstan. Nur-Sultan is well aware of this. In the end of May, the Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev made his first ever state visit to Turkey. The main political outcome of the visit was the adoption of a joint statement on "enlarged strategic partnership”, which is essentially an upgrade to the existing strategic partnership agreement between the two countries, an attempt to adapt the existing one to new circumstances. President Erdogan underlined Turkey's support for Tokayev's reforms and the concept of the Second Republic, that is the construction of New Kazakhstan, as he mentioned. This demonstrates Ankara’s interest not only in maintaining the previous level of relations, but also in moving towards a closer partnership.

For Kazakhstan, such a partnership is necessary in terms of increasing its geopolitical resilience amid rising tensions in international affairs. The growing antagonism of the West with Nur-Sultan's key trade and economic partners, Russia and China, creates risks for the country's political and economic security. By building relations with Ankara, Kazakhstan is trying to create a balance of power and interests in the region with those states that, due to various circumstances, are trying to maintain constructive contacts with Moscow also being profitable partners for the West. Turkey is one of the independent actors in Eurasia, and Kazakhstan maintains as close relations with Ankara as with Russia, China or Western partners. Moreover, Turkey is a state ethnically close to Kazakhstan, which is part of the Union of Turkic States together with other countries.

Therefore, Nur-Sultan seeks to strengthen the Turkish vector of its foreign policy, which is supposed to be beneficial for the entire Turkic world. Blocking of the cargo route running from China to Europe through Russia makes the country's transit potential vulnerable. Thus, Turkey and Kazakhstan signed a number of intergovernmental agreements in Ankara on international combined transportation of goods, organisation of information exchange and simplification of customs control procedures. Earlier, Kazakhstan had reoriented a number of its transport flows from Russia to the Caspian region with access to Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey through the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, TCITR. At the same time, Kazakhstan is also interested in cargo deliveries in the opposite direction, using the capacities of its maritime ports in Aktau and Kuryk, which currently have a low throughput capacity (23%).

Earlier in March, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Georgia agreed to establish a joint venture to address end-to-end tariff setting, cargo declaration, application of unified IT solutions and consolidation of transit cargo.

Political-military dialogue: necessity and advantages

An important aspect of bilateral cooperation is the strengthening of political dialogue and intensification of humanitarian cooperation. One of the signed documents between Kazakhstan and Turkey was a memorandum on media cooperation. The visit demonstrated the similarity of the two countries' positions on the war in Ukraine. Perhaps the following statement by Mr. Erdogan well illustrates the outcome of the talks: "We have the same views on the peaceful resolution of the crisis on the basis of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. You also know that we have been working closely since the beginning to end the war in Ukraine. It has once again highlighted the importance of cooperation and cohesion of Turkic states on a bilateral level and under the umbrella of Turkic states." Interestingly, a number of prominent Russian media celebrities and politicians have earlier heavily criticised Nur-Sultan's position on the Ukrainian crisis and some decisions on appointments, particularly in the media. Thus, President Tokayev's visit to Turkey and the decisions adopted during the visit may be considered as yet another step distancing Kazakhstan from Russia. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan believes the development of relations with Turkey, Russia, China and other actors is a condition for strengthening its geopolitical and geoeconomic competitive advantages, which ultimately contributes to the consolidation of national sovereignty.

It’s important to note that the visit has also contributed to the strengthening of bilateral ties in the defence and security areas. The effectiveness of the Turkish military in the fight against terrorism, Turkey's support for Azerbaijan's defence potential and the liberation of occupied territories, as well as the demonstration of the advantages of Turkish drones have stimulated interest in cooperation with a growing number of countries. Kazakhstan is no exception.

During Mr. Tokayev’s visit, the defense ministers of Kazakhstan and Turkey signed an agreement on military cooperation. The January events in Kazakhstan demonstrated the vulnerability of Kazakhstan's armed forces, their lack of preparedness to deal with the challenges posed by the terrorist threat. Therefore, about $1 billion has been additionally allocated for defense purposes. It is known that most of this amount is intended to increase the number of special units of the Kazakh Interior Ministry, National Guard, Ministry of Defense and to purchase equipment. Ankara can provide considerable assistance to Nur-Sultan in this area. It is no coincidence that Ruslan Zhaksylykov, the Kazakh Minister of Defence, visited the Centre of Special Operations Forces of the Turkish Armed Forces and met with Suleyman Soylu, the Turkish Minister of Internal Affairs. Obviously, the idea was to explore the opportunities of Turkish assistance to the training of Kazakh's special forces.

In addition, there is an agreement on joint military exercises and military-technical cooperation.

The signing of a memorandum on military-technical cooperation between HK Kazakhstan Engineering Ltd. and Turkish Aerospace can be considered a breakthrough in this direction. According to the document, there will be a facility, a subsidiary of Kazakhstan Engineering, set up in Kazakhstan for the maintenance of ANKA unmanned aerial vehicles. This will ensure long-term cooperation in the joint manufacture of UAVs, as well as the transfer of technology and specialised maintenance training for the Kazakh army.

Apparently, the Kazakh market is quite promising for the Turkish defence industry, as it provides a long-term presence in Central Asia. Equally noteworthy is the protocol on cooperation in military intelligence signed by the presidents of the two countries.

Ankara and Tashkent: focusing on economy...

On March 29-30, the Turkish President R. T. Erdogan made a two-day official visit to Uzbekistan. The major item on his agenda was his participation in the second meeting of the high-level Uzbek-Turkish Strategic Cooperation Council. This body is responsible for adopting important policy decisions concerning bilateral cooperation between the member states. It was established back in 2018 during Mr. Erdogan's visit to Uzbekistan. The first meeting was held in February 2020 during Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev's visit to Turkey. The coronavirus pandemic and lockdown restrictions forced the parties to suspend the full implementation of the Turkish-Uzbek plans. The second meeting of the Council was supposed to adjust the current problems of bilateral cooperation to the difficulties caused by both the political and economic situation in the world.

It is no coincidence that, in order to intensify bilateral dialogue, the Turkish president has proposed that the Council should meet twice a year. This shows that there are serious issues and an intention to accelerate their resolution. The main objective is to increase the trade turnover from $3.6 billion in 2021 to $5 billion in the coming years. It is also planned to increase this indicator to $10 billion in the future.

To implement these plans, the parties need well-functioning and efficient logistics. The Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Caspian Sea-Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey corridor is seen as the main transport route. The Turkish side may also propose to use the Zangezur transport corridor in the future.

During the visit the parties agreed to strengthen the political dialogue. Ankara underlines its intention to help strengthen Uzbekistan's independent course. For Tashkent, however, relations with Ankara provide an opportunity to balance the interests of other external actors, the main ones being Russia and China.

Earlier, Uzbek Foreign Minister Kamilov made a statement on Uzbekistan’s position on the developments in and around Ukraine: "Uzbekistan recognises the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. We have not recognised the Luhansk and Donetsk people's republics". This coincides with Ankara's position, which considers it necessary to continue negotiations between Russia and Ukraine until a complete cessation of hostilities.

At the same time, Ankara and Tashkent are focusing on enhancing the sustainability of their international positions and strengthening the military component of cooperation. For example, a series of documents were signed during the official visit of the Turkish President to Uzbekistan, including an expanded framework military agreement between the two countries.

...and security

During the press conference following the talks, President Erdogan pointed to good opportunities for developing cooperation with Uzbekistan in the defence industry. He noted that Turkey's achievements in this area are evident, it has "great potential" and is ready to share it with Uzbekistan.

This may involve the production of certain types of weapons in Uzbekistan under a Turkish license, as well as the purchase by Tashkent of a large batch of weapons, including UAVs. In turn, the Uzbek Defence Ministry noted that the agreement would encourage the development of combat skills and military education, including the holding of joint exercises and training of the Uzbek military in the specialised universities in Turkey.

The rise of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, the Kyrgyz-Tajik border disputes, the January events in Kazakhstan and the interpretation of their possible negative impact on Uzbekistan voiced by the Belarusian president require strengthening Uzbekistan’s defence potential.

The visit coincided with the 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries. "Turkey has always been proud of being the first country to recognise Uzbekistan's independence followed by the opening of its embassy in the country,” Mr. Erdogan said.

Ankara believes that the bilateral relations will continue to be based on an equal dialogue with the utmost respect for the interests of both parties.

Turkish President noted that Ankara has been following with great interest the progress of reforms "resolutely and successfully implemented under the leadership of Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev over the past six years". Thanks to these reforms, it’s been possible to ensure the high level of relations between the two countries. For the Turkish leadership, the support for Uzbek reforms is also a key to the success of its ties with Uzbekistan.

Contours of integration

Thus, there is a potential to develop the common security contours in the region with the Turkish participation. Elements of this development can be seen in Azerbaijan and more recently in Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan's participation in this process creates prerequisites for military-technical cooperation among the Turkic states in general.

Other Turkic-speaking countries like Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan are also the important links in the Turkish regional policy. Despite the active cooperation of the two largest regional countries (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) with Turkey, Ankara is quite energetic in its political contacts with Ashgabat and Bishkek. At the beginning of May, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, Chairman of the Turkmen Khalk Maslahaty Milli Gengesh, and Mustafa Sentop, Chairman of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, discussed inter-parliamentary cooperation between the two countries by telephone. They also exchanged views on ways to improve cooperation between Turkmenistan and Turkey in politics, economy and culture. It is expected that the meeting of the leaders of both countries takes place this year. A similar meeting was agreed during a telephone conversation between the presidents of Turkey and Tajikistan on May 3, 2022. During the conversation, the leaders discussed the further expansion of the Tajik-Turkish cooperation in various areas of mutual interest. Earlier in April, Tajik and Turkish defence ministers, Sherali Mirzo and Hulusi Akar, signed a framework agreement on military cooperation between the two countries. The agreement takes the security relations between Dushanbe and Ankara to a new level. Finally, Turkey has developed a positive dialogue with Kyrgyzstan, which, in an attempt to keep up with the trend, is discussing with Ankara the possibility of holding a regular meeting of the Joint Strategic Planning Group between the foreign ministers of Kyrgyzstan and Turkey in the near future. Also, the leaders of both countries reached an agreement to hold a High Council on Strategic Cooperation this year too. All these factors demonstrate the growing and reciprocal interest of Turkey in Central Asia and Ankara's partners in Turkey.