AMIDST WAR

As expected, Georgia did not get a license to become a full-member of the European Union, nor did it become a candidate for accession to the organisation at the EU summit in Brussels held on June 23. On the other hand, Ukraine and Moldova obtained the long-promised status and now continue their walk toward European integration.

Many analysts believe this happened due to Tbilisi’s position on Ukraine, which it doesn’t actively support to avoid confrontation with Russia. Earlier, Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili even complained that the Georgian government did not allow her to visit Ukraine and Moldova for fear of Moscow's angry reaction.

It is well known that the war in Ukraine has had a significant impact on the global political agenda. Especially, on the countries and regions in the immediate vicinity of the conflict zone. In addition to being a post-Soviet territory suffering from various conflicts remaining there since the collapse of the USSR, South Caucasus is also bordering with the Black Sea, with its northern part regarded as the current theatre of military operations.

Georgia-Ukraine: a complex dialogue

During the first weeks of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, there remained a high probability of indirect involvement of Georgia, which is seen as Ukraine's main political partner and like-minded country. Same as Kiev, Tbilisi had long been a recipient of US military assistance and was considered by NATO strategists to be a stronghold of the alliance in the region. However, from the very first days of the conflict, Tbilisi chose to distance itself from any actions that could entail a harsh response from Moscow. Georgia did not start demonstratively building up its army on the border with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Nor did it take any military action at all that Moscow could perceive as a threat. Tbilisi also refused to impose unilateral sanctions against Russia, stating they would be contrary to Georgia's interests.

The sensitivity of this issue for Georgia can be seen from the volume of Georgian-Russian trade turnover, which has increased 23.2% since 2020 reaching more than $1.6 billion in 2021. This makes Russia Georgia's second largest trade partner. Moreover, the export of Georgian finished products to Russia enables the development of the real sector of the national economy. There is currently no alternative to the Russian market for Georgia on a number of areas.

In addition, Russian citizens also play a significant role in the development of the country's tourism sector. In terms of the total number of trips made by Russian tourists to Georgia in 2021, Russia became the second country, behind Turkey. Before the pandemic, Russia was the first in terms of the foreign tourists visiting Georgia.

The number of Russian citizens who moved to Georgia for an indefinite period of time as temporary migrants has noticeably increased. Among other things, money transfers to Georgia from migrants working abroad are one of the most important sources of currency for the country and income for the population. The lion’s share of this money traditionally comes from Russia. Although the current economic difficulties in Russia and the disconnection of many Russian banks from SWIFT have significantly reduced the volume of money transfers, Russia is still a leading country in terms of the outflow of money remittances. Therefore, the position of the Georgian authorities towards Russia looks quite understandable.

Yet Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili, speaking in parliament on 27 May, stated that his country would not allow "any company or individual under [American and European] sanctions to operate illegally in Georgia, nor would they allow Georgia to be used to circumvent sanctions. Among the political motivation behind the move is an important internal factor. Firstly, there are contradictions with the Ukrainian leadership, which supports the former president of Georgia Mikhail Saakashvili and his supporters considered the main opponents of the current government. Secondly, Tbilisi is afraid of being drawn directly into the conflict, hence turning the country into yet another platform for a military-political confrontation between the West and Russia.

They remember well the lessons of the 2008 war and accuse the former leadership of the country of instigating a military scenario, which resulted in Georgia’s complete loss of control over 20% of its territory. Apparently, the Georgian authorities now consider it unacceptable to repeat the same mistake and provoke a new conflict. Obviously, Tbilisi is not going to abandon its strategy of rapprochement and then full membership of the EU and NATO. At the same time, it is acting according to the situation trying not to speed things up. On May 20, Tbilisi and Washington signed the Defense and Deterrence Enhancement Initiative (GDDEI) in Tbilisi, which defines the military cooperation between Georgia and the US for the next ten years. This is rather an institutional, framework document defining the implementation of further steps towards rapprochement between Tbilisi and Washington.

The same applies to the procedure for completing the two parts of the questionnaire on Georgia's accession to the EU, which was handed over to the European side on May 12. While demonstrating its desire to become part of the EU, Tbilisi is trying not to push the issue so as not to irritate both Moscow and Brussels. Considering the negative reaction of the Russian side, as well as the sceptical stance of Brussels, Tbilisi wants to strike a balance in order to go along the lines of Western policies, while at the same time to get maximum benefits from good neighbourly relations with Russia.

Armenia. When no options available

Armenia is the only country of the region that has completely distanced itself from Ukraine since the start of the conflict and openly expressed public support for Russia's actions in Ukraine. At official level though Yerevan supports the territorial integrity of Ukraine and considers Donbass and Crimea the Ukrainian territories.

At the same time, neither Kiev nor the West has rebuked Yerevan for its position on the Ukrainian crisis. Perhaps they realise that Armenia's exclusive dependence on Russia prevents it from making any obvious moves indicating a discrepancy in its approach to the Ukrainian issue.

Russia ranks first among foreign trade partners and investors in the Armenian economy. In 2021, mutual trade turnover between the two countries grew by almost 13% compared to 2020 and reached $2.6b. Armenia's borders with Turkey and Iran are guarded by Russian border guards, with the 102nd Russian military base located in the country. Russia almost entirely supplies Armenia with natural gas, fuel and lubricants. Money remittances from Russia to Armenia have traditionally been one of the most important sources of foreign income for the country. This fact is enough to get an idea of the nature of relations between Yerevan and Moscow. It also makes clear the limits of Armenia in pursuing a more convenient policy towards the Kremlin's political opponents. Under these conditions, Yerevan tries to engage in dialogue with the West and Russia without particularly touching on sensitive topics. And the influential Armenian diaspora in the US and Europe acts as a facilitator of dialogue between Armenian and Western governments, explaining the sensitivity of Yerevan's position. After all, Armenia is, on the one hand, trying to deepen its engagement with the West and even pursue a cautious integration with the EU and, on the other hand, is trying to exploit Russia's potential as a guarantor of the country's military and energy security.

The general mood in the Armenian society mirrors that of the Armenian political elites. There are supporters of Russia's actions as well as those who support Ukraine. Moreover, Armenia is the only country in the region where supporters of Russia openly demonstrate their support for the Russian military operation in Ukraine. Perhaps because there are many Armenians whose relatives live and work in Russia, or those who are moved by purely opportunistic political considerations. For example, the remnants of the Armenian separatist regime in Garabagh, which temporarily hosts the Russian peacekeeping contingent, openly advocate the recognition of the independence of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. A significant part of the pro-Russian Armenian opposition is sympathetic to the actions of the Russian army. For example, they hold rallies in Yerevan and Khankendi in support of the Russian military operation in Ukraine.

Azerbaijan. Balance of interests

Azerbaijan also maintains neutrality. However, this neutrality has specific characteristics. Baku explicitly supports Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty. At the end of April the President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev recommended the Ukrainian authorities to defend its territorial integrity by all means as did Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is the only of the three South Caucasus republics, which renders substantial economic assistance to Ukraine. Baku continues to provide Ukraine with fuel and lubricants. This move is appreciated not only in Kiev, but also in the West, which considers Baku a rather independent player, which coordinates its actions with its own long-term interests. Even if there is a possibility of pressure from Moscow.

Yet all these factors do not rule out a sustained dialogue between Baku and Moscow. In particular, the bilateral intergovernmental commission has plans to increase trade turnover and intensify transit-transport cooperation. Russia is one of Azerbaijan's top three trade and economic partners, while Ukraine ranks in the top ten.

More than 70% of Azerbaijan's agricultural exports go to Russia. At the same time, over 90% of wheat enters the country from the Russian Federation, while Azerbaijan's share in Ukraine’s total oil imports was 70.8% in 2021.

Furthermore, Azerbaijan sees Moscow as an important partner in resolving the remaining issues in Garabagh. Also Baku considers any extrapolation of the confrontation between the West and Russia on the basis of the war in Ukraine to be unacceptable to the regional reality, especially in terms of creating preconditions for a military confrontation in the region. This creates risks of a new war, a new conflict, which could have fatal consequences for the South Caucasus as a whole.

Therefore, Baku remains committed to its policy of sustainable dialogue with all global and regional centres of power. By balancing the interests of external interests in the region, Azerbaijan is trying to act as the main factor levelling the emergence of conflicts. Baku is not willing to join NATO or the EU, nor does it wish to become a member of the CSTO and the EEU, strengthening its position in the Non-Aligned Movement.

Baku makes it clear that in the case of the Garabagh conflict the Western countries were not so categorical in defending the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and its right to liberate the lands occupied by Armenia. Washington, Brussels and other European capitals considered the so-called republics of separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk illegal entities within Ukraine and Crimea as the territory annexed by Russia, while calling the separatists of Garabagh as 'fighters for self-determination', sometimes viewing the unrecognised Nagorno-Karabakh Republic as a future participant in the negotiation process with Baku. Azerbaijan resolved the long-standing conflict through its own efforts and now readily agrees to mediation efforts by both Moscow and Brussels, given that European diplomacy accepts post-conflict realities. Baku also insists that the criteria applied by the EU to Ukraine should also be relevant to solving problematic issues with Armenia.

Avoiding the risk of becoming an arena of confrontation between Russia and the West, Azerbaijan is also trying to create a safe environment for the implementation of its oil and gas projects, with the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Southern Gas Corridor being the core initiatives. Therefore, the West acknowledges Azerbaijan's efforts. At the same time, Moscow realises the serious political, economic and environmental consequences of the conflict for the region and its interests in the Caspian Sea. Therefore, it is reluctant to complicate the dialogue with Baku. Russia also takes advantage of communication lines running through Azerbaijan, which help smooth out existing or perspective contradictions in the process of dialogue.

In general, the processes taking place in and around Ukraine are actively discussed in all the three South Caucasian countries. Most of the people wish the hostilities ended as soon as possible and express sympathy for the Ukraine.