TEHRAN VS RIYADH

International events in and around Iran are heating up. Like the new escalation of tension between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which can lead to a major regional war.

Internal and external enemies

It all started with an American media report referring to sources in Riyadh and Washington, which mentions Iran's alleged preparations to hit the targets on the Saudi territory. The US military forces in the Middle East were put on alert in response to the information provided by Riyadh to Washington. The reason behind Tehran’s possible aggression against the kingdom is claimed to be the intention of the Iranian regime to distract the attention of fellow citizens from the growing protests within Iran.

Tehran is accusing one of its key rivals in the Islamic world of meddling with Iran's internal affairs. Iranian authorities are pushing the idea that US, British, Israeli and Saudi intelligence agencies are behind the planning and actual conduct of the protests that swept Iran after the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini in custody of the so-called morality police. Saudis are accused of publishing reports against the interests of Tehran through Saudi-owned or Saudi-sponsored global media outlets, including the London-based Iran International television channel.

The new aggravation of Iranian-Saudi relations has put an end to the intensification of bilateral contacts that began in 2021, which seemed to normalise the dialogue between Tehran and Riyadh. A series of negotiations initially demonstrated that the sides did not intend to focus on the course and causes of the latest phases of escalation. One of them was the execution in Saudi Arabia of the Shiite preacher Nimr al-Nimr and the 2016 attack on the kingdom's embassy in Tehran. The other, far more impressive and long-running, dates back to 2015, when the Saudi-led Arab coalition launched a military operation in Yemen against the Houthis, Shiite rebels backed by Iran. The escalation peaked in 2019, when Houthi-owned drones attacked Saudi Aramco's oil production facility in Saudi Arabia.

The Iranian-Saudi contradictions generally stem from the geopolitical roles of Tehran and Riyadh, with the former positioning itself as a Shiite centre and the latter as a Sunni centre. This is the main reason of the conflict between these two Muslim countries on various Middle Eastern fronts. In Iraq, Saudi-backed Sunni groups have fought against the Shiite-led government in Baghdad. And Syria has become the scene of a bloody confrontation, including between Shiite and Sunni militias, with Tehran and Riyadh respectively behind their backs.

The Sunni-Shiite division factor is also present in the confessional dominance over specific oil-production areas. For example, the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia is predominantly populated by Shiite Muslims, and the Saudi authorities have traditionally been wary of Iranian political influence there. Iran's Khuzestan province is predominantly populated by ethnic Arabs often suspected by Tehran of being aligned with Riyadh.

Despite all these problems, the prospect of normalisation of Iranian-Saudi relations seemed quite real until the start of the protests in Iran, which Tehran primarily blamed on the Saudis. The current situation also nullifies attempts to ensure détente on the Yemeni scene. Thus, the ceasefire agreement in force for some time was not extended by the Houthis, who accused Riyadh of undermining the agreement.

However, Tehran denies the reliability of information about Iran's intention to attack Saudi Arabia. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Nasser Kanaani dismissed claims that the Islamic Republic was preparing an attack on Saudi Arabia as groundless. Moreover, Ali Akbar Velayati, foreign affairs advisor to Iran's Supreme Leader and former foreign minister of Iran, expressed quite constructive views on this topic: "We are neighbours with Saudi Arabia and must coexist. It is necessary to reopen the embassies of the two countries in order to solve our problems in a more effective way.”

But does this mean there is no threat of war between Iran and Saudi Arabia at all?

The American position

It is still possible that Iran carries out a military operation against its external adversary because of the possible intention of the Iranian authorities to shift the focus of local discontent to ‘repelling external threat’, as well as to get a strong argument for suppressing ‘internal enemies’ by all means.

However, it is difficult to assume that Iran would dare launch a full-scale war against the Saudis, primarily because of the absence of a land border with Saudi Arabia. Therefore, Tehran's proposed military operation, if implemented, will most likely be limited to drone or missile strikes against certain Saudi infrastructure facilities. Strikes against pro-Saudi positions through the Iranian proxies in Syria and Iraq are likely as well. By the way, the American media outlets report that Riyadh released information about a possible Iranian attack not only on the Kingdom but also on the administrative centre of the Kurdish autonomy in Iraq, the city of Erbil, because of the relevant influence of Iraqi Kurdistan on the Kurdish element of pro-government demonstrations in Iran.

In any case, the US reacted to reports of a possible Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia by putting its military forces on high alert. The White House, the State Department and the Pentagon made statements about their readiness to defend the interests of their Saudi partner, despite the certain crisis in relations between Washington and Riyadh.

In July 2022, President Joe Biden visited Saudi Arabia, where he met with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. In fact, Biden had blamed the Saudi prince for the murder of the American-Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi back in 2018 during his presidential campaign. Nevertheless, Biden wanted to negotiate with bin Salman the increase of Saudi Arabia's oil production. Yet in early October, Saudi Arabia pushed through OPEC and together with other oil-producing countries, including Russia, a decision to reduce its oil production quota by 2 million bpd. This move was interpreted as Riyadh challenging the US, which just before the OPEC decision had agreed with other G7 countries to reduce Russian oil prices in three stages. After Saudi Arabia’s support for the reduction of its oil production quota, however, US policy circles suspected Riyadh of collusion with Moscow and openly advocated winding down the strategic partnership with Saudis, primarily in the military and technical cooperation (Washington supplies almost three quarters of the Saudi military arsenal).

However, the situation in Iran confirmed that the relations between Washington and Riyadh were still quite close. This makes it clear that if Iran does decide to attack Saudi targets with ballistic missiles or drones, the US will use it as a pretext to retaliate against Iran. In any case, American military assistance to the Saudis will be secured, including through targeted strikes on Iranian targets.

Thus, the US Central Command ordered air combat aircraft based in the Persian Gulf region to fly towards Iran "as part of the overall combat readiness of the US and Saudi Arabia". These include a fleet of F-22 fighter jets based in Saudi Arabia. In addition, Saudi Arabia hosts almost 2,500 US troops providing the Saudis with high-tech intelligence and training.

Washington makes it clear that its concerns with Saudi Arabia do not outweigh the strategic goal of containing Iran. Reacting to Tehran's possible anti-Saudi aggression, Washington may unambiguously strike Iran on the basis of considerations of indirect damage to the interests of Iranian-Russian military cooperation. The Americans may well assume that Iran, if it starts a war with Saudi Arabia, will have to stop supplying drones and missiles to Russia, which is using them against Ukraine.

On the other hand, the US may not be interested in waging a major war in the Gulf region because of its ongoing confrontation with Russia. After all, a full-scale war between Iran and Saudi Arabia would also have the potential to disrupt energy supplies from the Persian Gulf to world markets. And Russia will certainly use this possibility to its own advantage.

The overall course of the Iranian-Saudi escalation clearly follows the worsening external circumstances around a large-scale internal protest in Iran. The demonstration of Washington’s readiness to support Riyadh in the event of Iranian aggression, anti-Iranian propaganda in the international arena over Russia's extensive use of Iranian weapons, and the lack of progress on the development of Iran's nuclear programme at the Vienna talks indicate that the mullah regime of Iran will likely go through a series of series tests.