SYRIAN SCENARIO FOR IRAN?

The increasing number of experts have been pointing recently to similarities between the ongoing events in Iran and those that took place in Syria eleven years ago. But there are some nuances worth mentioning. Political, religious and many other conditions in these countries are different. But the fact that the protest action is becoming increasingly violent, with the growing number of terrorist acts and armed attacks in the country, raises fears of possible escalation of the conflict and the possibility of civil war.

Authorities warn of civil war

In November, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian wrote on his Twitter account: "Israel and its Western allies have made plans for a civil war and the destruction and disintegration of Iran. But they must know that Iran is not Libya or Sudan.”

There were mixed reactions to Abdollahian’s statement. According to some Western experts, similar statements, where Iranian officials blatantly accuse foreign forces of starting a civil war, are in fact part of the government plan. That’s how Tehran is getting prepared for a forceful crackdown on the protests. However, the protests, now in their third month, have become more violent. The increasing number of armed attacks on government officials and holy places of worship of Iranians raise the likelihood of a civil war in the country.

Incidentally, following the October terrorist attack at the Shah Cherah Mausoleum in Shiraz, there were also reports of attempted arson attacks on the Imam Reza shrine in Mashhad and the home of Islamic revolutionary leader Ruhullah Khomeini. On November 23, it was reported of the arrest of a suicide bomber plotting an attack on another Iranian shrine in Shahr Quds near Tehran.

Will military intervention prevent a civil war?

Iranian military units are being deployed to Kurdish regions of the country, where protests and armed attacks are particularly violent, as well as to the Kurdish Autonomy in northern Iraq. Apparently, the Iranian authorities intend to extinguish flashpoints and divert the attention of the local public outside the country.

Although the protest wave has swept all regions of Iran, including the interior Persian provinces, Tehran and even religious and ideological centres like Mashhad and Qom, the northwestern and south-eastern provinces (Sistan-Baluchistan and Khuzistan) of the Islamic Republic mostly populated by ethnic minorities (Kurds, Baluchis and Arabs) remain the main risk areas.  Azerbaijanis are considered the fourth ethnic risk group in Iran. However, the protests in the Azerbaijani provinces of the country were mostly peaceful and did not escalate to the level of armed conflict.

Currently, the Iranian authorities are mostly focused on the Kurdish provinces. It is known that it was the death of Mahsa Amini, an Iranian citizen of Kurdish descent that cause the ongoing protests in the country. She was detained and taken to one of the police stations of Tehran on charges of failing to comply with the relevant dress code. Then Amini's condition worsened and she died on the way to hospital. The first protests began in Amini’s homeland, in Kurdish areas. Protests and armed clashes are currently most active in the Kurdish populated provinces of Kermanshah, Elam and West Azerbaijan.

In late November, Mohammad Qowsari, a former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), said he was dispatching armed groups to the Kurdish region of Iran to fight against local separatists. At the same time, Iranian Foreign Minister H. A. Abdollahian said that 76 terrorist and counter-revolutionary groups were operating in Iran’s Kurdish regions and received Israeli and American weapons from abroad.

On November 20-22, the Iranian army carried out another strike on the Iraqi territories mainly populated by Kurds. The previous attack, in October, targeted a few centres of Iraq's Kurdish autonomy, reported to provide support for Kurdish separatist organisations in Iran.

The main targets of the Iranian army are the facilities of the Free Life Party in Kurdistan (PJAK). Spokesman of the Iranian army addressed the population of Iraq’s Kurdish Autonomy advising them to stay away from Kurdish parties known to be in opposition to Iran and their facilities. At the same time, he warned of the start of ground operations in Iraq.

Why Kurds?

Currently, there are two hotspots of protests in Iran: the city of Zahedan mostly populated with the Baloch people, and the north-western predominantly Kurdish areas of the country. The October clashes in Zahedan claimed the lives of many people.

The most violent incidents took place in the Kurdish provinces of the country. As noted above, they are known as epicentres of first protests, which escalated into armed clashes between Kurdish fighters and the Iranian government forces, army and police.

According to foreign analysts, the change in the nature of popular resentment is a response to Tehran's excessive use of force. Events in recent weeks show that the situation in the Kurdish region is critical. According to independent sources, in November alone 98 Kurds and 59 policemen and soldiers were killed in armed clashes. Many of them were killed with firearms.

The risk of armed conflict

According to many Iranian experts, there has been a recent decline in peaceful protests and an increase in armed clashes. Now the authorities are trying to marginalise the protests and neutralise them through isolated special operations. But with street protests continuing in almost all regions of the country, albeit at a low level, this is a risky step. Even isolated special operations in any of the regions may provoke mass opposition.

Iranian officials understand that the violent suppression of protests and the emergence of armed conflicts entail the same degree of risks. Firstly, there are many people among the protesting crowd who, for a variety of reasons, are dissatisfied with the incumbent government. This has the potential to unite with anti-government forces at any stage of the popular uproar.

Secondly, these groups are supported from abroad either explicitly or implicitly. In other words, if the protest action turns into an armed insurgency this may lead to a sudden increase in protest sentiments. The number of weapons and ammunition confiscated in recent weeks clearly indicates the presence of serious external support and an attempt to unleash a civil war in Iran.

Escalation of violence, the excessive use of force can lead to more casualties and harsh international sanctions against Iran. On the other hand, Tehran does not want to end up in permanent isolation, completely deprived of international support. Therefore, the suppression of protests is carried out at a relatively calm pace, as the authorities do not want to resort to obvious violent measures to quell the protests.

What's next?

A number of experts believe that Tehran will first try to suppress protests in high-risk provinces. It is likely that unrest among the Kurds will be suppressed gradually, followed by the Baluchis and, finally, in major cities. At the same stage the authorities are likely to try to cause discord among the internal protest masses using the factor of external enemy intervention through Kurdish and other separatist centres. Unlike Syria, Iran has a longer and deeper understanding of the statehood traditions and values. Therefore, the factor of foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Iran, including external support to the armed separatist movements in the country, may strengthen the calls for unity. In other words, while suppressing Kurdish and Baluch rebellions in remote parts of the country, the Iranian government also seeks to pacify the population in major central cities.

That said, there are still risks. There is a danger that events could spiral out of control after the first military intervention. The use of excessive force by the military can provoke unrest in other regions and also lead to an extended international campaign against Tehran, given that the global mainstream media is focused on Iran anyway.

Parallel to the ongoing events in Kurdish provinces of Iran, protest actions can start in other parts of the country threatening to escalate into mass disobedience and armed rebellion. As a result, the authorities and the army will take harsher measures to suppress the protesters, which can spin the situation out of control across the country and lead to a Syrian outcome.

Thus, if we compare the events in Iran with similar processes in Syria and other Arab countries during the so-called Arab Spring, we can say that the first stage of the ‘revolution’, when the population for various reasons takes to the streets and protests against the authorities, is behind. Authorities relatively loyal during the first days of popular indignation, become tougher as the protests progress, hence resulting in irreconcilable confrontation. The next stage is an armed conflict and its gradual escalation into civil war.

Today we can see the first armed clashes in Iran. It appears that the government authorities will start suppressing the protest wave in the Kurdish regions first to prevent the process from turning into another mass disobedience and civil war. Further development of events will depend on the response of protesters in the Kurdish regions.

In any case, there are serious flashpoints in Iran that can fire up at any moment. There is a risk that small-scale, marginal protests can rapidly escalate into mass protests and national civil disobedience, or even civil war. Finally, the protesters are obviously dissatisfied with the current authorities, which intensifies the violent nature of protest actions. As history shows, small protests always entail a risk of escalating into armed clashes.