WHEN CORRIDORS END WITH A DEADLOCK

"Corridors end with a deadlock, while tunnels take us back to light", Vladimir Vysotsky once sang. The Lachin corridor, however, does not end with a deadlock, both literally and figuratively. Yet, the dramatic events unfolding on this road can either end in a stalemate or bring back to light the stalled process of normalising relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

The Lachin corridor has become the main source of media headlines in the South Caucasus since December 11. There is a group of Azerbaijani activists on the road to Shusha. Opposite is an impressive bloc of Russian peacekeepers equipped with armoured cars and personnel carriers. In fact, the so-called road crisis was triggered by a series of events related to a very important and serious topic for Azerbaijan—illegal extraction of minerals.

Uncontrolled plundering of mineral resources

Even before the 44-day war it was well known that the Azerbaijani territories occupied by Armenia had rich deposits of minerals, including copper, molybdenum, gold, building stone, etc. Illegal exploitation of deposits in most countries of the world is subject to serious penalties and property claims depending on the volume of financial and environmental damage. Despite the available satellite imagery proving the involvement, or rather complicity, of foreign companies in the plundering of Azerbaijani resources, illegal extraction has continued.

With the Patriotic War, Azerbaijan ended the Armenian occupation of its lands. It restored control over the gold mines of Vejneli, much of Soyudlu (Zod), etc.

Meanwhile, two mines—Gizilbulag gold mine and Demirli copper-molybdenum mine—are located in the area of the Garabagh economic region currently controlled by the Russian peacekeeping contingent. Apparently, the exploitation of the mines resumed after the war. Azerbaijani media outlets have repeatedly published photos of both the mining operations and the trucks carrying looted gold ore to Armenia via the Lachin corridor completely unhindered.

Today Azerbaijan has enough questions about the activities of the Russian peacekeeping contingent (RPC). Both the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence have repeatedly demanded the RPC command indicate in its press releases the names of towns and settlements of Garabagh according to the Azerbaijani legislation and administrative-territorial division, i.e. Khankendi instead of Stepanakert, Aghdere instead of Mardakert and Sugovushan instead of Madagiz. If initially the concerns of the Azerbaijani side were conveyed to the Russian military command through confidential channels, this time they were stated openly.

There are many questions about another sensitive issue—the regime of passing through the Russian checkpoint at the entrance to the Lachin corridor.

There have been issues before. According to the agreements, citizens of Armenia and Russia have the right to pass through the checkpoint freely. Citizens and nationals of third countries, however, must obtain permission from the Azerbaijani authorities. Nevertheless, a few months ago they ‘smuggled’ into Khankendi the French presidential candidate Valérie Pécrès. And used the same method for the former European MP Eleni Theocharous. Finally, Baku is still wondering how terrorists like Vova Vartanov infiltrate Garabagh.

Finally, it was the passage of 14 Iranian nationals to Khankendi that breached the tolerance of Azerbaijan.

Peaceful masons or saboteurs?

Fourteen Iranian nationals travelled to Khankendi on November 24, reported Azerbaijani media outlets. Since they did not get permission from Azerbaijan, the incident was considered a blatant violation of applicable laws. Moreoever, 12 of these 14 Persian visitors are from the town of Izeh, Khuzestan (Iran) predominantly populated with Armenians, with the Armenian language considered one of the main languages of the province. Most notably, the town is home to a secret base of Iranian secret services specialising in terror and sabotage.

Undoubtedly, the Iranians in Khankendi were not ordinary merchants trading carpets and date. Information about Iran's generous gift to Armenia was later leaked to the press. It turned out that Tehran had secretly dispatched 600 Iranian-made missiles to Armenia, including antitank guided missiles Dehlavieh (500 pcs) and Almas (100 pcs). Experts call these missiles ‘an ideal weapon for terrorists’, since they are relatively small, easy to handle and can hit tanks, armoured limousines or passenger buses. It is possible that the mysterious Persian guests came to Khankendi to teach the terrorist groups in the RPC-controlled area of Garabagh how to use the Iranian weapons.

This political tandem came as no surprise to anyone in Azerbaijan. Cooperation between Iran and Armenia has a long history, including through the security services of both countries. But how did the peacekeepers allow the passage of Iranians into Khankendi?

Unexpectedly, Azerbaijan won the ‘war of intelligence services’ in this incident with the Iranian nationals. Baku had photos of identity cards of Iranian visitors to Garabagh, as well as a photo of the minibus they used. General Andrey Volkov, commander of RPC tried to present the Iranians as ‘peaceful construction workers’, but nobody believed in his words. Why bring builders from Iran to Khankendi instead of hiring them from neighbouring Armenia? Was there large-scale construction work taking place in Garabagh that required foreign involvement? Finally, why were the same construction workers, who were supposed to stay in Khankendi until December 13, hastily removed from there two days after this information surfaced?

In short, there are enough complaints about the peacekeepers in Azerbaijan. Yet the trigger of events that followed was a different one.

The cost of disrupted monitoring

On December 3, officials from Azerbaijan's Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Economy and AzerGold arrived at the crossroads near the village of Dashalty. General Volkov turned up at the scene after several hours of waiting. The talks continued in Khankendi, also on December 7. The Azerbaijani side declared its intention to monitor the Gizilbulag and Demirli mines, to stop their illegal exploitation and assess the consequences of such exploitation. The sides agreed to hold the monitoring on December 10. However, when the representatives of the above Azerbaijani agencies arrived at the mine, they were blocked by very aggressive local Armenians. The group was soon joined by the well-known Russian oligarch Ruben Vardanyan, whose arrival at Khankendi stirred up the situation in the first place. This gentleman introduced himself as a state minister and demanded negotiations. The same situation took place at another mine, after which the Azerbaijani representatives had to return to Shusha. In response to this disrupted monitoring attempt Azerbaijani ecologists started a protest action on the Shusha-Khankendi road.

Looking for a way out of the corridor

Protesters demands’ are simple and straightforward: a meeting with General Volkov, monitoring of the mines, putting an end to environmental terror. In parallel, the Azerbaijani side expresses its readiness to allow humanitarian passage and to solve all the humanitarian problems of the people living in Khankendi. This was directly stated by the Azerbaijani officials. Everything now depends on the political will of the other side.

OPINION

INTERNATIONALLY BINDING ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION ON THE KHANKENDI-SHUSHA ROAD

One of the key questions amid the events unfolding in this region of Azerbaijan relates to the supposed actions of the Russian Peacekeeping Contingent (RPC).

First of all, the situation is specific in that both the RPC and the Monitoring Mission (MM) have no mandate approved by the participants. Neither is there a memorandum of understanding signed with the hosting state. Also, the legal basis for the deployment of this mission is based on the consent of the country's leadership to deploy it on the sovereign territory of Azerbaijan. It is worth mentioning that the local legal procedures have yet to be completed.

Three states are participants of the mission: Azerbaijan, as the host, as well as Russia and Turkey, as participating countries with respective military contingents. It is important to note that the mission is funded by all three participants.

According to the official position of Azerbaijan, the "Nagorno Karabakh conflict", which has been mediated through OSCE for 28 years, is over.

Today Azerbaijan has the following objectives:

- To eliminate the consequences of the armed aggression of the Republic of Armenia against Azerbaijan once and for all;

- To eliminate the consequences of the total ethnic cleansing committed by the Armenian armed forces against 857,000 citizens of Azerbaijan and to ensure the duly and safe return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their places of permanent residence;

- To ensure the political and legal reintegration of the Armenian population into the Republic of Azerbaijan in places of compact settlement.

RPC and MM have been invited to support the accomplishment of these objectives.

The reintegration process does not imply discussing with anyone any topics suggesting special legal privileges for the population reintegrated into the legal field of our state.

According to international practice, peacekeeping missions are limited in time and should not expect the transfer of any sovereign rights and extraterritorial powers by the host state. Therefore, the operation of such military-technical facilities as RPC and MM may not imply any actions that go beyond supporting the activities of the state bodies of Azerbaijan. The leadership of RPC and MM should understand and strictly implement this role and the obligations emerging from this situation.

Tofig Zulfugarov, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan