NOT SUBJECT TO THE WEST

Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi's state visit to China hint at the strengthening of cooperation between the two countries. But can we assume that Beijing and Tehran are promoting their relations to a strategic alliance?

Nuances of practical cooperation

Objectively, Sino-Iranian cooperation has a good basis for expansion. In particular, China is Iran's key trading partner mainly based on energy relations. One of the main provisions of the 2021 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between China and Iran includes major purchases of Iranian oil by Beijing at a reduced price in exchange for Chinese investment in the Iranian economy worth up to $400b.

Nevertheless, the current level of trade is not so high to make Beijing and Tehran extremely happy. For example, according to the Chinese General Administration of Customs, Iran’s share in Chinese foreign trade in 2022 was only 0.25%. Therefore, the leaders of both countries express their intention to intensify Sino-Iranian cooperation. Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterated the Chinese government's readiness to support companies that would invest in Iran. President Raisi said Tehran aims to implement a comprehensive cooperation plan with China "based on mutual respect, mutual benefit and common gain".

During the visit, Iran and China signed 20 documents on bilateral cooperation and mutual understanding. Details were not disclosed, including on oil and gas projects to be implemented in Iran with the participation of Chinese companies. It is known though that the sides have held talks on the second phase of development of Iran's Yadavaran field in the West Qaroon basin, which is one of Iran's most promising oil and gas provinces. Incidentally, the first phase of the project was completed by China's Sinopec back in 2015.

Remarkably, the main purpose of Raisi's visit to China was to finalise the mechanism for the implementation of the twenty-five-year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement. However, there is an indirect link between this document and another agreement signed by Beijing—strategic partnership between China and Saudi Arabia. It was signed in December 2022 during the visit of Xi Jinping to Riyadh, and was hailed by the global political community as an important step by Beijing towards expanding its influence in the Arab world. To prove this, the parties adopted at the end of the China-Arab Gulf Cooperation Council summit a joint statement and action plan on strategic dialogue.

The Sino-Arab rapprochement has caused considerable resentment in Iran, which is competing with Saudi Arabia for influence in the Gulf region and throughout the Middle East. Perhaps Beijing has so hastily organised Iranian president's state visit to China in order to balance relations with its regional partners, who act as competing power centres within the Islamic world. However, the Sino-Iranian dialogue is much more interesting in the context of the key trend of contemporary global geopolitics - the struggle between the advocates of a multipolar world versus the unipolar hegemony of the US and the rest of the West.

The emphasis by Xi Jinping that China and Iran "support each other, enhance mutual strategic trust and confidently advance practical cooperation under the difficult circumstances of global, epochal and historical changes" is remarkable. But in fact the mutual attraction of Beijing and Tehran does not yet mean they are moving closer to an alliance-level relationship. There are serious reasons of geopolitical character associated with this.

Geopolitical affairs

Undoubtedly, both China and Iran view their friendly relations with each other primarily from a strategic perspective. As expressed by China Daily, in essence, the relations between Beijing and Tehran are "not subject to the West".

The ideological background of this thesis was explained by Xi Jinping himself. He stressed that Tehran and Beijing are "stalwart supporters of multilateralism and steadfast opposers of unilateralism and hegemony", hence Beijing's expressed support for Iran in its confrontation with the US and other Western powers. Following talks with President Raisi, Xi Jinping explicitly stated that China supports Iran in "defending national sovereignty and resisting unilateralism and intimidation". Moreover, the Chinese leader regarded his country's position as "opposing external forces' interference in Iran's internal affairs and undermining Iran's security and stability." That said, he alluded to the West's role in the development of protest movement in Iran, which has taken on considerable momentum in recent months.

But can Beijing's support for Tehran, and mutual interest in strengthening bilateral relations, lead to a strategic alliance between China and Iran against the US and the rest of the West?

It is clear that the US itself sees the rapprochement of the already traditionally friendly China and Iran as a new challenge to the West. It is also noteworthy that Raisi's visit to China coincided with the development of an unprecedented confrontation between China and the US - the mutual detection and destruction of some unidentified flying objects near their borders. But the beginning of the UFO-related escalation with the appearance of a Chinese balloon in the US airspace has only strengthened the evidence of the US political elite against China as the “enemy number one”. Hence, the new elements of the Sino-Iranian strategic dialogue during Raisi's visit to Beijing have been duly assessed in the US. In particular, the Senate leader of the Republican Party, Mitch McConnell, referred to the balloon incident as an indicator that "China is a clear adversary of the US". And China's "alliance" with Iran, in his opinion, was aimed at "helping Russia to fight against Ukraine".

The Russian-Ukrainian war is indeed present in practically all significant geopolitical processes on the world stage. The development of the Sino-Iranian dialogue is no exception; both sides position themselves as strategic partners of Russia, more or less openly express their disinterest in weakening Russia and hold the West responsible for the emergence of the "Ukrainian crisis". In practical terms, this is manifested, inter alia, in the supply of drones to Russia from Iran, as well as in discussions on the possibility of providing Moscow with military assistance from China.

We can therefore expect a potential synergy between China and Iran, both with each other and with other anti-Western centres, in confronting the US and the rest of the West. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) appears to be one of the key platforms for organising this joint struggle against Euro-Atlantic dominance in global politics and economics.

Incidentally, Raisi and Xi met in September 2022 at the SCO summit in Samarkand. At that time it was announced that China had officially invited the Iranian president to visit Beijing. Ahead of his visit to China, however, Raisi approved a new law on Iran’s membership in the SCO. Chinese political experts believe that the accession of Iran, one of the most important oil and gas producers, to the SCO will contribute to strengthening the organisation and, in particular, will have a great impact on cooperation in global energy security.

Beijing also supports Tehran on its nuclear programme. While opposing Iran's development of nuclear weapons, which is in fact consistent with China's status as one of the six international negotiators on the issue of Iran's nuclear programme, Beijing nevertheless encourages it in the development of the programme itself. Xi Jinping has pledged that China will continue to participate in the negotiations on the renewal of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), supporting Iran's "legitimate rights and interests".

However, despite all the factors that suggest a rather close Sino-Iranian bond, there are good reasons to believe that a strategic alliance between the two countries will not be achieved, at least in the short term, mainly due to China's position that it might seriously escalate a direct confrontation with the West.

An important aspect of this Chinese position is that Beijing, by all accounts, does not consider it appropriate to reduce relations with the West to a level that would jeopardise these relations in the economic sphere in the first place – this is the area where cooperation with the US and the EU continues is at the core of China's strategic interests.

Beijing's attitude towards the possibility of forming an anti-Western alliance on a Eurasian and more global scale should be considered in the same context—that is, with the participation of both China and Iran, as well as Russia, India and other countries that oppose a unipolar world in general. For China, problems with forming such an alliance are associated both with internal contradictions, such as, say, between China and India, and Beijing’s reluctance to act as a global leader of the anti-Western alternative, a hub combining forces opposing the Euro-Atlantic community.

In addition, as noted above, China in its relations with Iran also takes into account the interests of other influential Asian players, especially those that are developing no less substantial cooperation with Beijing than Tehran. This includes not only Saudi Arabia, but also Pakistan, which has its own "points of disagreement" with Iran.