REFORMATTING CENTRAL ASIA

Dynamic developments in Central Asia demonstrate that the Russian-Ukrainian war has seriously affected both the system of international political relations and the processes in certain regions of the world. In this context, the recent visit to the region by the US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken was certainly remarkable.

Affaire d'honneur between Washington and Moscow

During his visit to Central Asia, the high-ranking American guest stopped in two major countries, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. He demonstratively reaffirmed Washington's commitment to support the territorial integrity and independence of these countries, hinting at possible threats from Russia.

Certainly, the visit did not go unnoticed by the Russian side. Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, said during his visit to Baku that Moscow welcomed plans to transform the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) into a full-fledged pan-Eurasian security structure, replacing the "irrelevant OSCE". These words can be considered a curtsey towards Kazakhstan, which is the initiator and main political "sponsor" of the meeting.

To some extent, Lavrov's statement can also be interpreted as an intention to diminish the effect of his American counterpart's visit to the region, who particularly emphasised on Washington's interests in the region to be pursued in partnership with its leading partners.

On the other hand, it is important for Moscow that the US and leading NATO states do not take part in the CICA, which makes the platform more effective for promoting the ideas and values of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in the pan-Asian geography, where Russia plays an instrumental role.

In the emerging political ecosystem of the region, all participants regard CICA as a platform for the materialisation of the interests of Asian countries in the first place. For Kazakhstan, important partners in this process are not the US, but China, Russia, India, Türkiye and other Asian giants.

The visit of the American secretary of state coincided with Kazakhstan's preparations for parliamentary elections and was the first since the re-election of Kassym-Jomart Tokayev as president of the country. To some extent, it was a demonstration of support for the political course pursued by the Kazakh leadership.

Astana and Tashkent have not supported Russian actions in Ukraine, preferring to support the latter's territorial integrity instead. However, they continue to distance from the risks of being directly involved in the conflict between the West and Russia.

For Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, it is important that the US understands Russia's place and role not only in the economic agenda, but also in other aspects of regional security. This understanding is largely present, albeit with a focus on its own interests. For example, Washington has exempted from sanctions the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, which is transporting the Kazakh oil to the West through Russia. At the same time, the US insists that these countries must comply with the basic parameters of the sanctions regime imposed on Russia.

During a joint press conference with Blinken, Kazakh Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mukhtar Tleuberdi, noted the difficulties associated with sanctions. Stating that the economies of Kazakhstan and Russia "have been interconnected for a long time," the Kazakh minister said the two countries were part of the Eurasian Economic Union as well.

"Sometimes it is very difficult to manage how we can ensure free trade in goods and services without borders. Yet, we have tried to avoid sanctions being evaded by Russia or other foreign companies," the Kazakh minister said.

Meanwhile, Blinken noted that the US has made "significant success" in strengthening ties with Kazakhstan, particularly in recent years, and would look for practical ways to do more with other Central Asian countries.

Priorities for Central Asia

The strengthening of ties between Washington and the Central Asian Five was discussed separately in the traditional C5+1 meeting of the US Secretary of State with the foreign ministers of the region.

Despite the formal character of the meeting, Secretary Blinken could define Washington's foreign policy priorities, emphasising US support for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the states in the region.

Donald Lu, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, said before the trip that the State Department's "primary objective" was to "show that the US was a reliable partner" as opposed to Russia.

At a joint press conference with his Kazakh counterpart, Blinken welcomed the country's acceptance of more than 200,000 Russian citizens who fled the country after the war began last February, as well as the delivery of food, clothing and other humanitarian aid to Ukraine. The same is true of other regional actors who have welcomed tens of thousands of Russian citizens over the past year.

However, Russia is not the only cause of US concern in the region. Another, no less important geopolitical competitor of Washington is China. Therefore, by building its relations with Central Asian states, the US seeks to reduce Beijing's economic influence in the region by promising support for the economic plans of the Central Asian states. However, this support is mainly declared, with the exception of those areas in which American companies are actively involved, primarily the energy sector.

In Tashkent, Blinken discussed with the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bakhtiyor Saidov, increasing US investment. Uzbek-American joint ventures have been operating in Uzbekistan for several years. American companies in Uzbekistan specialise in the automotive industry, petrochemicals, textiles and light industry, and the production of food, construction materials and services. Since both the volume of American investment and the number of US companies in Uzbekistan is low, Tashkent and Washington are exploring the possibility of increasing the pace of cooperation.

In recent years, especially after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, Uzbekistan's role in Afghanistan has increased significantly. Washington is interested in Tashkent as a mediator on the Afghan issues. However, there is no talk yet about the practical use of Tashkent's potential in the Afghan direction.

Amid the increasing strategic competition between the US and China, losing ground in Afghanistan could benefit the US adversaries. Although the US and its allies, like the rest of the world, refuse to recognise the Taliban-led government, Beijing and Moscow are actively establishing communications with Afghanistan's new leadership.

The US may also have interests in the country in these circumstances. Therefore, Tashkent can be used as a platform for political dialogue with the new Afghan authorities or their representatives. After all, there are active ISIS cells in the country that pose a security threat to US interests in the Middle East and Central Asia.

The growing tandem

Certainly, the Central Asian actors are not going to become a battleground for the global power centres either. They articulate their position more loudly these days.

On March 3, the Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev met with his Kazakh counterpart Tokayev in Shymkent, Kazakhstan. According to official reports, the parties discussed the implementation of agreements reached following Kassym-Jomart Tokayev's state visit to Tashkent in December 2022.

The leaders of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan then signed the Treaty on Allied Relations, as well as the Treaty on Border Demarcation. These documents create the basis for the establishment of a common security system with military-political, economic and humanitarian components.

Both sides have been implementing a joint format of military exercises for some time now. The military component of alliance between the two countries is expected to develop further in the coming years.

The strengthening Kazakhs-Uzbek tandem has the potential to become a leading factor in the Central Asian politics. Also, as part of the Turkic cooperation, we can see the emergence of two conventional poles of Turkic interaction: the Azerbaijani-Turkish tandem in the west of the Caspian and the Kazakh-Uzbek tandem in the east. Thus, the future of this important regional geopolitical format also depends on the effective interaction of these poles of Turkic integration.

At present, the Uzbek-Kazakh tandem is developing intensely, including in terms of infrastructure. Above all, it is about the establishment of close economic ties.

Currently, the parties are discussing the prospects for increasing mutual trade turnover, attracting investment, and developing cooperation in various sectors, including industry, energy, agriculture, transport and logistics.

Last year, the mutual trade turnover between these countries exceeded ₼4b, breaking a historical record. There is now an agreement not to slow down the pace, bringing trade turnover up to $10b in the near future. This ensures macroeconomic stability and contributes to the economic foundation of the emerging union between the two countries.

Undoubtedly, external players are closely observing the ongoing processes. For those centres of power that seek to strengthen their influence in Central Asia, the strengthening of relations between Astana and Tashkent can become an obstacle to their interests if they do not comply with the rules of the game being set by Astana and Tashkent. Apparently, such rules will be shaped directly by the countries of the region.