THREE OPTIONS OF ISRAEL

Despite Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's serious attempts to solve the domestic issues that have originated soon after the announcement of the infamous judicial reforms and resulted in protests with thousands of disgruntled people taken to streets in various parts of the country, Iran remains at the top of the Israeli agenda. Tel Aviv has for nearly a decade been stating pre-emptive strikes against Iran's nuclear infrastructure, given the latter's potential to acquire its own nuclear weapons soon.

Oddly enough, the main obstacle to Tel Aviv in this matter has been the US, because Israel waging war against Iran right now would mean Washington opening a new front in the Middle East. This is why Israel did not risk attacking Iran even under the Donald Trump administration.

Risks of the traditional method

In February 2023, the US and Israel conducted joint military exercises in the Mediterranean targeting Iranian nuclear power plants. In the course of the operation, military aircraft from both countries practised a series of air raids using bunker-destroying bombs. However, experts believe that the US-Israeli command could just as easily have hoped for an opportunity to deter and force Tehran to negotiate on the nuclear issue as part of that exercise.

According to many experts, including the recent Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analysis, protests against judicial reform in Israel have weakened Netanyahu's power. As a result, Israel may well postpone its plans to attack Iran. It is true that Netanyahu would be happy to bomb Iran's nuclear reactors in order to divert public attention to a military operation. But divisions within the government, coupled with a weakening of his power, are seriously hampering the initiative. This view was also reflected in the February 23 CIA report leaked to the Israeli media last month.

It is also clear that should Iran succeed in enriching uranium to 90%, which is enough to obtain a nuclear weapon, Israel would probably have no choice but to destroy the relevant facilities of its adversary. In this respect, it is Washington that is more concerned with Israel's military preparations than Tehran. Because an Israeli attack on Iran will eventually involve the United States in the war as well, which Washington is reluctant to do, apparently. For this reason, the US authorities are monitoring every Israeli move related to Iran very closely.

Another factor weakening the possibility of direct Israeli military intervention is the Middle East reconciliation process initiated by China. On March 10, a landmark event took place in Beijing with the direct mediation of the Chinese authorities: the reconciliation of two Middle Eastern countries that have been at odds for more than seven years, Iran and Saudi Arabia. A week later, Iran announced reconciliation with the United Arab Emirates. We can safely assume that these two events effectively put an end to the process of great enmity that has defined the system of political relations in the Middle East over the past seven years.

The Iran-Arab reconciliation also resulted in Israel losing its Arab allies against Iran. It is unlikely that Arab countries will directly support Israel in a possible war, but the anti-Iranian front formed with US support can be considered to have disintegrated. China has thus become a real actor in the Middle East.

Back in early April, Chinese and Israeli foreign ministers Qin Gang and Eli Cohen had a telephone conversation in which the latter asked Beijing to influence Tehran to end its nuclear programme. This can be seen as a response to media reports circulating about Chinese mediation efforts between Iran and Israel. Incidentally, neither side has ever refuted them. Perhaps China have taken such an initiative, but it did not materialise anyway. But even the mere existence of such a request from the Israeli side indicates that China is becoming an influential player in the region, and Israel takes this fact for granted.

Despite efforts by Washington and Beijing, an Iranian-Israeli conflict is becoming increasingly inevitable. In parallel with Israeli military exercises in the Mediterranean Sea, Iran is also preparing for a military conflict with Israel by supplying weapons to Syria. Last year, regional media outlets published information about Iran transferring various types and amounts of weapons and equipment (including drones) to Syria through various channels, including passenger aircraft. It is no secret that this factor is behind the Israeli attacks on Damascus and Aleppo airports.

Tehran plans to respond to Israeli strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities from Syria, Lebanon and Palestine in an attempt to redirect the situation into a major Middle East conflict. It seems that Tel Aviv has no effective alternative to this Iranian plan other than bombing Quds Brigades bases in Syria. The Tehran-backed attack at the end of March on a US military base in the Syrian district of Tanf showed the ineffectiveness of Israeli airstrikes and the presence of significant Iranian resources in Syria.

It is clear that an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities can lead to retaliation and eventually a major conflict and war. This turn of events is therefore seen as an exceptional option, even under a right-wing Israeli government. In other words, confronted with the risk of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, Israel's last resort may be bombing the nuclear facilities of Iran to stall Tehran's activities in this direction for at least a decade or more. A military operation similar to the one carried out by the Israeli Air Force against the OSIRAC reactor in Iraq in 1981 is also possible. However, this operation is risky. In addition to a direct counterstrike, Tehran can organise a large-scale retaliatory strike against Israel through forces it backs in the Middle East. Therefore, the likelihood of such a scenario is very low right now. The only thing that might increase that probability is a confirmed information on Iran having nuclear weapons. But there is no such information available for now.

A series of assassination attempts

Israel currently has two main "weapons" against Iran - attacks on its nuclear and military facilities, and the organisation of protests, ethnic separatism and armed conflicts that can weaken the Iranian regime from within.

In recent years, Israeli intelligence has conducted a number of operations in Iran targeting the country's nuclear and military industries, particularly missile and drone manufacturing facilities. In January 2023, an attack was staged against a drone plant in Isfahan. The Iranian Defense Ministry confirmed the bombing with small drones from Iranian territory, while stating that the operation was unsuccessful. Thus, one of the UAVs was shot down in mid-air and two were disabled. However, American sources claim the success of the action, with the target having been seriously damaged. Overall, over the previous ten years, the Israelis had conducted numerous clandestine operations against Iran, including assassinations of Iranian nuclear specialists.

A second effective weapon of Israel and its allies can be the efforts to weaken the Iranian regime from within, including mobilising discontented groups in the country to increase instability. In this case, unlike the option of a direct military attack and the risk of starting a war, the allies will not obstruct Israel, but can instead provide intelligence and information support.

The unrest that began last September and lasted more than three months after the death of Iranian citizen Mahsa Amini revealed the presence of very strong protest resources in the country, the mobilisation of which could have serious consequences for Iran's ruling regime.

Despite Israel's apparent loss of its serious supporters following the recent Iranian-Saudi reconciliation, it is clear that this line of counter-offensive against Iran will continue with the support of Western countries. In April, Israel invited Reza Pahlavi, son of the last Shah of Iran, to the country, which indicates that he is likely to be another weapon of Tel Aviv against Tehran in the coming years.

Some claim that the Shah's family is unlikely to return to power in Iran. On the other hand, the main drawback of the movement against the current Iranian regime is the lack of an alternative leader – a person or a focal point that could unite or represent the various groups of the disaffected at least during the protests. Perhaps that is why Reza Pahlavi is needed now. It is known that during talks in Tel Aviv he asked the Israeli authorities to support the protesters against the Iranian regime.

Reza Pahlavi's visit to Israel might also clarify to what extent he fits the role of supposed leader. But in any case the protests against Iran's ruling regime will become more intense in the near future. Unless, of course, Iran makes a rapid breakthrough on the nuclear issue, which can lead to the outbreak of a sudden war.