A COUP WITHIN THE TALIBAN?

Back in August 2021, when the Taliban seized the power in Afghanistan, they promised stability and security for the citizens. But so far they have failed to end the violence that has plagued Afghanistan for more than 40 years.

Apart from the reactionary nature of the Taliban regime and the lack of major popular support, the main reasons for insecurity in the country is incompetence of the Taliban in state governance. After all, unlike in the 1990s, the Taliban inherited a well-established system of governnance.

Benefits and challenges

The advantage of the Taliban in those years was that they seized power at a time when Afghanistan was in a state of full-blown civil war and absolute chaos. In such an environment, the organisation with no experience of governing even a small area, suddenly began to dominate almost all of Afghanistan.

Their strong side was strengthening order and security in a country torn by civil wars. However, the Talibs faced problems such as a lack of state structures, war with strong and active opposition groups, and, finally, the unrelenting pressure of international sanctions. As a result, they failed to build a nationwide system of state administration.

Compared to that failed attempt, the Taliban now have two advantages and only one problem. This time they have at their disposal functioning state structures formed over the last twenty years using billions of dollars of external resources. The other advantage of the Taliban's current position is that there is no real powerful opposition force within the country.

No other opposition group in Afghanistan is as capable as the Taliban of controlling all areas of the country and more or less maintaining national public order. Although the Taliban appoint laypeople as heads of most authorities, usually mullahs, they still leave experienced people at lower levels of the administrative hierarchy.

The Taliban succeeded in collecting taxes and customs duties even more than the republican administration they deposed. They succeeded in purifying the customs system from corruption and in collecting income tax from small industries and guilds to large enterprises, successfully extracting years of unpaid taxes from debtors.

The only serious problem of the Taliban is their inconsistent policies on human rights issues, such as the prevention of girls and women from receiving education and working, respectively. In addition to causing timid internal protests, this problem has also sparked international outrage and led to the Taliban government still not being officially recognised by anyone.

However, the majority of countries that considered the Taliban a terrorist group before they seized power in Afghanistan have now established some level of relationship with the organisation. In particular, some neighbouring and regional countries are engaging with the Taliban government through their political missions in Afghanistan. Western countries are acting in a similar way, trying to change Taliban's behaviour by granting concessions. The US attitude towards the Taliban suggests that Washington too has informally accepted the Taliban as rulers of Afghanistan and is trying to influence them through compromises.

There is no trust

Some believe that the armed struggle against the Taliban has been incompletely successful for a number of reasons.

First, the Afghan people have no desire to start a new civil war. As a result of the decades of fruitless wars the ordinary people, who were the main victims of conflicts, now do not want to go through the same trials and tribulations again.

Secondly, and this reason in some ways echoes the first, the Afghan people do not trust the leaders that have ruled the country for the past decades. For twenty years, the disreputable activities of Afghan politicians have severely stifled the motivation of the people. The uncertainty of prosperity prospects after the Taliban makes people prefer the bad current situation to an unknown future.

Fragmented political activity led by unpopular figures leaves people with no hope. This third reason is the lack of unity among the political and military forces opposing the Taliban. Political opponents of the Taliban are the same ones that have been in power in the past. They did not have unity in the past and therefore will not have it in the future. These forces can chant the same slogans, but in practice each has a different agenda.

Slight irritation

After the withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan, most local politicians fled the country. The only real armed opposition force in the early months was the National Resistance Front (NRF) led by Ahmad Masood, son of Ahmad Shah Masood. But he too was unable to hold Panjsher province and fled with other leaders to Tajikistan.

For a while there was no sign of resistance to the Taliban. There were only sporadic armed conflicts, initiated by the local population or by terrorist organisations operating in the country, such as the Islamic State in Khorasan (ISK), etc.

Last spring, the NRF stepped up its activities in Panjsher and Andarab. A little later, information began to emerge about the establishment of various opposition groups to the Taliban inside and outside the country.

In March, the Afghan Freedom Front emerged co-led by former defence minister and chief of the General Staff Yasin Zia. He was an aide to Ahmad Shah Masood in the 1990s.

Last October, the Afghan National Movement for Peace and Justice (ANMPJ) announced its establishment. It claims to have brought together hundreds of Afghan politicians of all nationalities and political leanings. Its founders included former foreign minister Hanif Atmar and former intelligence chief Masoom Stanekzai.

The Supreme Council of National Resistance for Saving Afghanistan has also announced itself recently. It consists of Marshal Abdul Rashid Dustum, former vice-president, the Hazara leader Mohammad Mohaqiq, and the former speaker of Afghanistan's lower house of parliament Mir Rahman Rahmani, former foreign minister Salahuddin Rabbani, etc.

There are other attempts to organise resistance to the Taliban as well. It is not only the lack of coordination that prevents them from becoming an effective fighting force. Among other things, the insurgent groups need external support. But so far no country is in a hurry to help the new anti-Taliban movement.

In the short term, these groups are likely to be little more than a minor annoyance to the much better armed and numerically superior Taliban militia.

Little chance

Either way, experts believe that the opposition has little chance of winning another civil war. A real challenge to the Taliban power may emerge if significant factions break away from the organisation as a result of a coup or frustration over the collapse of the economy and the sharp decline in the revenues of some factions. As a possible outcome, various Taliban factions will soon or later try to divide Afghanistan into spheres of influence.

The Taliban has always been known for striving for cohesion within the movement. But after seizing power in 2021, internal divisions became more acute. Some influential Taliban leaders have become openly critical of the country's course. They want to maintain long-term control over Afghanistan and understand that they will not succeed if the economy collapses, international isolation increases and foreign resources dry up.

For example, Sirajuddin Haqqani, Acting Interior Minister, stated that the Taliban's "monopolisation" of power was "denigrating" their entire system. He did not name the emir, but it was clear who he was referring to. Mohammad Yaqoob, Acting Defence Minister and son of Mullah Omar, the founder of the movement, said the Taliban should listen to "the legitimate demands of the people". The deputy prime minister and several other ministers made similar remarks.

Rumours began to circulate about plots against the emir and that Taliban factions were entering into open conflict. In early March this year, the Taliban leader Emir Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada called a cabinet meeting in Kandahar at which Hidayatullah Badri, Acting Finance Minister and representative of key tribal and factional interests, allegedly tried to resign in protest of the Emir's administration of the country. There were rumours that the entire "dissident" camp tried to do the same.

Nevertheless, a month passed and there were no major setbacks in the Taliban's modus operandi that would have manifested itself in day-to-day irregularities. By the end of March it was announced that Badri had been appointed head of the country's central bank, which can hardly be called an outcome of a rebellion against the authority of the Emir.

With his near-absolute power, Emir Hibatullah Akhundzada has repeatedly ignored the views of other Taliban factions oriented towards international recognition. The more the West criticises his decisions, the more he and his associates feel right. Akhundzada is immune to criticism from other Islamic countries, organisations and even scholars. He regards his version of Shariah as the only correct interpretation of the Hanafi Islam.

An internal coup is extremely risky and can entail the execution of organisers. A coup requires unity of action among the Taliban leaders who do not trust each other. At least for now, that possibility is miniscule.

Much less risky is the change in power that the unhappy members of the organisation appear to initiate currently. This is the restoration of the Rahbari Shura, the governing council of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, in which decisions are made by consensus within the Shura and then approved by the Emir. Since coming to power in 2021, Hibatullah has virtually abolished this deliberative body and usurped the power in the country.