CHINESE SECURITY WEB

On February 21, 2023, a year after the outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine, China published a concept for a global security initiative. It is a set of principles proposed by Beijing to create a new diplomacy and security architecture competing with the established system of multilateral treaties, alliances and institutions promoted by Washington.

So far, the final contours of the initiative remain unclear. The aim of the concept is to assess, systematise and conceptualise various formats of cooperation with China's participation. In parallel, with the ongoing development of global political processes, Beijing will gradually specify the initiative's meaning, forming a global geopolitical web around itself. It will consist of various regional formats based on the China Plus formula as well as of a system of bilateral and multilateral relations enhancing China's position in various parts of the world. In doing so, the process itself may be more important than its results.

Even in the absence of clear political outcomes, the involvement of an increasing number countries in vague diplomatic initiatives may create a network of friendly international formats around China, contributing to the development of newer initiatives.

Central Asia as a model for the new Chinese initiative

The general contours of the new Chinese approach can be seen in the relations between China and the Central Asian states.

Thus, the China-Central Asia Summit was held in Xi'an on May 17-19, 2023 at the initiative of the Chinese President Xi Jinping. The event was attended by the presidents of the five Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

It was the first major Chinese diplomatic engagement of the year and the first face-to-face meeting between a Chinese leader and the leaders of all five Central Asian states on a state visit programme in the thirty-one-year history of Chinese-Central Asian relations.

Notably, the visits of Central Asian leaders to China was set a status of state visits. This means that a number of important documents were signed by the parties to upgrade and strengthen the political and legal framework of bilateral relations.

This is the essence of China's new security system based on the intertwining of Chinese interests with the long-term interests of regional states and the creation of a common and perspective economic agenda for all the parties involved. Beijing's calculation is simple. The Chinese economy is one of the largest in the world and it will likely become the largest economy on the planet. Therefore, the Chinese market will set the trends in multilateral cooperation. The Sino-centric global economic pole needs regional economies to supplement it, local economies that are closely linked to the Chinese market.

The new mechanism for cooperation between China and Central Asian states proposed at the Xi'an summit can and should serve this purpose. According to observers, the parties should begin to develop a strategy for a new economic dialogue. It is supposed to include targeted measures to ensure unimpeded trade, to increase the supply of finished products from the regional countries to China and to develop common space for industrial cooperation through the attraction of Chinese investment and technology.  There are plans to set up various mechanisms including the heads of ministries and various line agencies, which will regularly meet to agree various areas of cooperation in respective areas.

To some extent, China's aid package ($3.7b) provided to the Central Asian states can be viewed as an initial material basis of this strategy. In total, 143 documents signed during the visits are catering for China's cooperation with the Central Asian Five in various sectors. The total amount of investment set in these documents are estimated to be more than $50b.

Sino-Arab friendship

The Arab world is another promising market and an area of influence for China. Last December, the first China-Arab summit was successfully held in Riyadh. Similar to Central Asian states, the economy plays a leading role in shaping Beijing's new system of relations with the Arab world. It is no coincidence that one of the most important decisions of the summit was the establishment by China and the Gulf states of a joint investment centre.

The One Belt, One Road project is at the heart of long-term relations between China and the Arab states. As of today, China has signed cooperation agreements with 20 Arab states, as well as with the League of Arab States to develop this project. The joint projects—from the Central Business District in Egypt's new administrative capital to the 800MW Al Kharsaah photovoltaic power plant in Qatar—have a stimulating effect on the economies of countries with some 2 billion inhabitants.

Apparently, through the specific elements of its foreign policy in the Arab world, Beijing is trying to provide itself with a solid platform based on preferential conditions for a long-term interaction. One of such platforms can be the free trade area agreement between China and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which has been under discussion for nearly two decades.

China is keen to conclude lengthy talks as soon as possible, as this is not just a matter of prestige but also an important factor contributing to the development of a global China-centric economy. For the Arab monarchies of the Gulf, however, things are not so simple, as they are involved in regional economic integration models sometimes completely different from those offered by China.

For now, Beijing has to remain committed to the provisions of the final declaration of the first Sino-Arab summit, mainly known for a joint action plan covering the 2023-2027 period and focusing on continuing the dialogue and supporting international economic recovery.

But apparently this is not a limit for China. Beijing is willing to create such a regional environment that would make it possible to act as an influential element of the regional system and security.

A major manifest of China's new role in the Middle East was the resolution of the long-running stand-off between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which culminated in an agreement to normalise relations between the two countries thanks to Chinese mediation efforts.

Middle East, Iran, everywhere

Two months after the historic Riyadh summit, in mid-February 2023, the president of Iran visited China for the first time in two decades. The two sides concluded 20 agreements covering a wide range of bilateral issues. However, the Iran-China Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement signed in Tehran on March 27, 2021 remains the central document on the agenda.  Once again, the economy is the cornerstone element of bilateral relations.

Although China was expected to become a major investor in Iran after the conclusion of the Iran-China Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement, Beijing has scaled back its position in the country in 2022. It has focused more on investing in the infrastructure of the One Belt, One Road initiative, including into logistics hubs, border facilities, etc., which will contribute to its own export opportunities in Iran and the region in general.

In 2022, despite sanctions, the total investment attracted in Iran was $5.95b, of which Chinese companies invested only about $185m.

It is quite predictable that China will still continue relations with Iran, knowing well that the latter has little choice but to pursue the vector of cooperation with Beijing and Moscow as viable counterweights to political pressure from the West.

To some extent, the main reason behind President Ebrahim Raisi's visit to Beijing was the need to reduce the negative effect of Beijing's rapprochement with Arab countries. For Beijing, it is a good opportunity to balance the interests of regional players, including for the development of its own regional security system.

Perhaps, the most demonstrative format of Chinese cooperation with the Southeastern Asian, African and Latin American countries is the Sino-Brazilian relations. It is clear that Chinese foreign policy initiatives and formats are already an inescapable fact of global politics. It will be impossible to counter it with generic declarations and formal alliances.

Beijing is acting while the West is thinking

On June 2, the second EU-Central Asia summit was held in Cholpon-Ata, Kyrgyzstan located on the northern shore of the Issyk-Kul Lake. The first summit was held on October 27, 2022 in Astana, Kazakhstan, that is, less than a year (7 months) ago. Apparently, one can explain such an intensity of contacts by an increased rivalry between the power centres for influence in the region.

The summit took place two weeks after the China-Central Asia summit and less than a week after the EAEC meeting in Moscow attended by leaders from almost all the Central Asian countries.

Brussels seeks to limit China's influence in the region by encouraging investment and other cooperation with the EU.

Back in December 2021, the EU launched the €300b Global Gateway Initiative, regarded as a Chinese alternative to the One Belt, One Road. But the war in Ukraine and the accompanying energy and economic crises in Europe have delayed the implementation of these plans.

Leading Western countries and Japan launched the Global Infrastructure Investment Partnership in Germany in July 2022. At the Hiroshima summit, the parties confirmed their goals of raising up to $600b to fund projects through the Partnership for Global Infrastructure Investment, a rival of the Chinese One Belt, One Road project.

The only difference is that Beijing is acting while the West is still discussing.