GARABAGH, OCHLOCRACY AND COMMON SENSE

Just before the 44-day war, there was a widespread yet ungrounded belief in Armenia that if it demonstrated a high level of democracy, the international community would willingly reward it with Garabagh.

The Yerevan leadership has long been known for counting on someone else but Armenia fighting for Armenian territorial dreams. Initially this was expected from Russia. Then the focus shifted to Iran. Now Europe is in the spotlight.

It seems Yerevan has made tangible progress in this area, given the deployment of a mission of the EU observers in Armenia, an EU parliamentary delegation's visit to the country, regular statements from France in support of Yerevan, Paris' promises to dispatch fifty armoured personnel carriers to Armenia... But!

Today, even the Armenian experts regretfully admit that the European "friends of Armenia", including France, have no real means to influence the situation. The EU parliamentary delegation's visit to the border with Azerbaijan, the starting point of the Gorus-Lachin-Khankendi road in Azerbaijan, has been ironically called a "helmet show" in Armenia. Neither Azerbaijan nor Armenia is within the jurisdiction of the European Parliament. So there is no point in expecting any effect from the trip of European MPs and their posing in helmets at the border.

Even the scandalous export of defence commodities from France to Armenia does not live up to expectations. The deal cannot be compared neither by scale nor by efficiency with the Russian supply of arms. France does not transfer anything that can be compared to the Russian Iskander missile systems. The amount of transaction is not comparable either. French analysts admit that even the touted APCs are unlikely to help not only to achieve a military advantage, but even to even out the balance of powers, as they were produced almost 50 years ago.

Yerevan realises that France is not demonstrating the necessary determination on the international stage either. It is being boldly squeezed out even of former colonies in Africa. To expect Paris to hold its foot in Armenia would be naive. Being yet another geopolitical failure and a loss of Armenian votes for Macron, its consequences can be catastrophic for Armenia though.

The sad part is that in the current situation, amid a lost war and growing diplomatic pressure, Armenian authorities simply do not have a workable scenario on how to behave and how to avoid further trouble. The recent events in the country's parliament confirm these words once again.

What did Pashinian say?

Theoretically, the Armenian prime minister has revealed many interesting details, including about the ceasefire talks during the 44 days of war, his 60 telephone calls to President Vladimir Putin during the same period, and even when exactly he signed the trilateral statement on Garabagh. But as the experts noted, Pashinian vastly exaggerated the situation in his favour. He did not disclose many of the really key circumstances. He did not say a word about his own steps, which, in fact, ruined the negotiation process and made the war inevitable. These includes his dancing in Shusha, his notorious statement about Garabagh being Armenia and the appointment of hawks like David Tonoyan or Vagharshak Harutyunian to key positions in his team. Nor did Pashinian recall Araik Harutyunian's inauguration in Shusha. Moreover, the Armenian prime minister did not mention the fact that humanitarian ceasefires in Garabagh were disrupted due to Yerevan's fault and most often as a result of missile attacks on residential areas of Azerbaijani towns. To say that this undermines the credibility of his other "revelations" is to say nothing. And it is clear that Pashinian was first and foremost dealing with domestic political problems.

The Generals' Case as interpreted in Armenia

Pashinian's ranting in the Armenian parliament was simply an attempt to answer the question: "Could Armenia end the war under less difficult conditions?" We have yet to know whether the prime minister succeeded in convincing the parliamentarians, and by the same token the electorate, that as the head of government and commander-in-chief he had done his best. In fact, Pashinian mostly tried to prove that everyone but he were responsible for the defeat of Armenia in the Second Garabagh War.

In any case, Pashinian's attempts to blame Armenia's defeat on "useful idiots" in the army, as he described the top generals, deserve serious attention.

Prime minister tried to assure everyone that his generals were deliberately deceiving him, reporting him something completely different from what was actually happening, etc. The level of fakery demonstrated by the Armenian army during the 44-day war was unprecedented indeed. It is quite possible that officials of the Armenian Defence Ministry, Artsrun Hovannisian and Shushan Stepanian, did not convey the truth to the public, but they must have reported the real situation to decision makers. However, Nikol Pashinian claims that they lied to him, too.

Meanwhile, his statements raise serious doubts. Suffice it to recall that Onik Gasparian, then the Chief of Staff of the Armenian army, claimed that on the third or fourth day of the war he realised that the war was lost. He reported this to Pashinian, who ordered him to continue the war.

These are all internal Armenian affairs. But one can notice different approaches in Baku and Yerevan. In Azerbaijan, the issue of Garabagh ceased to be a topic of internal political debate back in the 1990s. The high level of trust in the government and the president, a clear state strategy, military development left no room for internal political discussions and mutual accusations. In Armenia the situation is completely different. Hot news from Armenia tagged Garabagh confirm the statement of Jirayr Libaridian, the Armenian historian, politician and diplomat , who warned in his sensational interview that democracy, as it is interpreted today, has very little to do with flexibility, compromise and even common sense. Especially since it is not so much democracy as ochlocracy. Either way, this is the conclusion that one can draw from the hearings of the Armenian parliamentary commission on the circumstances of the 44-day war, particularly the statements made in front of this commission by Nikol Pashinian.

Garabagh and the settlement process between Armenia and Azerbaijan are not simply topics of internal political struggle in Yerevan. They form a field for scoring points. And in such a situation Nikol Pashinian, who was and remains the leader and hostage (!) of Yerevan's ochlocracy, simply will not risk making the much-needed and expected compromises. There is still no visible party of peace in Armenian politics. Pashinyan, who has been mistakenly seen as one of the representatives of this party of peace, is essentially competing with local revanchists in radicalism.

Pashinian will have to negotiate on Garabagh not with France, not with the European Parliament and certainly not with local politicians. He will have to negotiate with Azerbaijan. And on Baku's terms based entirely on international law and post-war realities. Yerevan politicians' unpreparedness does not change anything in reality.