YEREVAN'S TURKISH MARCH

The International Diplomatic Forum in Antalya affirms its status as one of the most promising diplomatic platforms. Türkiye's influence in the world is growing and impossible to ignore. Moreover, with the outbreak of the Ukrainian war, Ankara has solidified its role as the foremost channel of dialogue between the West and Russia.

However, at the Antalya Forum-2024, the focus of attention differed. Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan arrived in the Turkish resort capital and engaged in talks with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. During the meeting, they discussed the process of normalizing relations between the countries.

Armenia's Special Representative for settling relations with Türkiye, Vice Speaker of the Armenian Parliament Ruben Rubinyan, announced in his interview with CNN Türk that Yerevan was prepared to open borders and fully normalise diplomatic relations with Ankara. He also expressed Armenia's expectation for a display of political will from Türkiye. However, he did not address Armenia's readiness for this.

Blockade?

The land border between Armenia and Türkiye closed in 1993 at Ankara's initiative in response to Armenia's occupation of the Kalbajar district of Azerbaijan. Türkiye was the first country to recognise the newly independent states after the USSR's collapse. Nevertheless, diplomatic relations between Ankara and Yerevan were never established due to Ankara's condition that it would only happen after the liberation of occupied Azerbaijani territories and the resolution of the Garabagh conflict.

Armenia has lamented the "blockade" on various international platforms, likening it to a continuation of the so-called 1915 genocide. Simultaneously, they consistently attempted to initiate opening the border without waiting for normalisation with Azerbaijan. They believed that "the civilised world will not tolerate Türkiye's keeping the long-suffering Armenia under blockade." The more pragmatic faction of the Armenian political sphere sought to reach an agreement with Türkiye independently of Azerbaijan, notably through initiatives like the "football diplomacy" of the late 2000s.

Despite air links between Armenia and Türkiye and road transport through Georgia for passengers and cargo, tensions persisted. Armenian nationalists created emotional video clips urging people not to purchase Turkish goods, which were prevalent in Yerevan's markets. Despite such actions, including uproar over "discovered" Turkish tomatoes, the border remained closed.

Today, it may seem that the primary obstacle no longer exists. Azerbaijan has restored its territorial integrity and liberated previously occupied lands through military means. With the 44-day war concluded and anti-terrorist operations in September 2023 completed, Azerbaijani flags now fly in Shusha and Khankendi. Azerbaijan is proposing formats like 3+3 (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia + Türkiye, Russia, Iran) and regional communication openings.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared at the official Diplomatic Forum opening in Antalya that Türkiye would proceed with normalising relations with Armenia in coordination with Azerbaijan. From a diplomatic perspective, Baku anticipates no surprises.

Just over a year ago, when Armenia dispatched rescuers to assist after an earthquake in Türkiye, experts began discussing "seismic diplomacy". This gesture recalled past instances where humanitarian aid to earthquake victims helped ease tensions between Türkiye and Greece.

But while experts once anticipated the swift opening of the border during the "football diplomacy," optimism has significantly waned today. The sole outcome from recent negotiations is a statement by Turkish special representative Serdar Kilic, hinting at a forthcoming meeting between the two countries' representatives, although the specifics of the date and location are still being deliberated. In light of this development, even the most ardent optimists refrain from speculating on the imminent border reopening.

Zangazur key from the Turkish border

In Armenia, and beyond, particular emphasis is placed on facilitating transit traffic across the Turkish border. This issue garners perhaps even more attention than the pursuit of diplomatic relations. Both Baku and Ankara regard the establishment of communications as a multifaceted endeavour and have no intention of implementing a gradual schedule. Undoubtedly, the linchpin to unlocking all currently obstructed communications in the region remains the Zangazur corridor.

The establishment of direct communication between western regions of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic is stipulated in the Trilateral Statement inked by Presidents Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan, Vladimir Putin of Russia, and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan of Armenia on the night of November 10, 2020. However, Armenia has yet to honour its commitments.

Yerevan may aspire to negotiate transit via Azerbaijan to Russia, inaugurate a railway line from Arazdeyen through Julfa to Iran, and revive traffic on the Kars-Gyumri route without utilising the Zangazur corridor. Nonetheless, this alternative is unlikely to gain traction in Azerbaijan or Türkiye. Contrary to common misconceptions, the Zangazur corridor actually presents a more favourable option for Armenia itself.

Following the de-occupation of the Araz River Valley, Azerbaijan has already consented to an alternate transport corridor through Iran. The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway commenced operations back in 2015, with construction underway for the Igdir-Nakhchivan line. While Armenia once held a monopoly on railway connectivity in the South Caucasus during the Soviet era, current transport routes circumvent its territory. Consequently, Azerbaijan and Türkiye exhibit little concern if Armenia's borders remain sealed.

Forgotten pitfalls

Since the mid-2000s, external experts have primarily fixated on Türkiye's demand for Yerevan to withdraw its troops from Azerbaijani territory. Yet, this issue does not stand alone. Besides levelling accusations against Türkiye regarding a contested "genocide," Yerevan also asserts territorial claims rooted in the Treaty of Sèvres and pledges made to Armenian leaders by Entente government envoys on the eve of World War I. Armenia continues to depict Mount Ararat on its coat of arms and espouses aspirations for the so-called Western Armenia, a region envisaged to emerge from six eastern Anatolian vilayets under the Treaty of Sèvres. There lingers a sense of expectation that over time, recognition of the "Armenian genocide" will be achieved, prompting the civilized world to uphold century-old promises and cede Turkish territories to Armenia.

In the summer of 2020, on the brink of a new conflict with Azerbaijan, official Yerevan escalated its grievances against Türkiye to a new pinnacle, as articulated by Armenian historian and diplomat Zhirayr Liparidian in his striking interview. Liparidian highlighted that "the Armenian president and prime minister made declarations on the anniversary of the Sèvres Peace Treaty, which could be construed as asserting territorial demands on Türkiye".

During Armenia's tenure within the USSR, this subject remained confined to Armenian political spheres. Nevertheless, following Türkiye's NATO accession, discussions surrounding the "six vilayets," "Western Armenia," and the like were not prominently featured in the USSR. Nonetheless, such dialogues were not stifled in Armenia either. These fanciful notions resonated notably within the Armenian diaspora. With the dissolution of the USSR and the emergence of an independent Armenia, the landscape underwent a drastic transformation. As long as Armenia-Türkiye borders remained shut due to Armenian hostilities against Azerbaijan, claims on Eastern Anatolia receded into the background. Furthermore, during Levon Ter-Petrosyan's leadership in Yerevan, there was a calculated decision not to formally endorse a return to Sèvres Treaty boundaries, yet the issue lingered on the agenda.

Within Armenia, demands for Turkish territories have assumed a status akin to a national emblem. This dynamic fundamentally alters the tenor of negotiations between Türkiye and Armenia. Ankara, for logical reasons, insists on Yerevan acknowledging these demands before contemplating border reopening. Simultaneously, after decades of fervour, relinquishing the age-old aspiration of Armenian nationalists for Turkish lands poses a formidable challenge for the Yerevan leadership. This political maelstrom may prove more formidable than renouncing claims to Garabagh.

Regrettably, these circumstances imply that swift normalization remains unlikely. This impasse can be attributed to Yerevan's steadfast adherence to century-old dreams and illusions, fostering an environment where progress is hindered by historical reveries.