TURNING THE PAGE OF WAR

The South Caucasus is witnessing events unfold at a dizzying pace. Units of Russian peacekeepers are withdrawing from Garabagh. On the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia, specifically in the Gazakh section, the inaugural border pillar has been installed.

Experts concur that these are momentous occurrences. Baku and Yerevan have commenced the processes of delimitation and demarcation of their border, marking a critical stride towards the realization of enduring peace.

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has consistently underscored the necessity to close the chapter on the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. This appeal is now materializing into action.

Peacekeepers depart

The retraction of the Russian peacekeeping forces from Garabagh is both an anticipated and extraordinary development. The trilateral statement, inked on the night of November 10, 2020 by Presidents Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan, Vladimir Putin of Russia, and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan of Armenia, detailed the deployment of a Russian peacekeeping contingent along the contact line in Nagorno-Garabagh and the Lachin corridor, comprising 1,960 servicemen with small arms, 90 armoured personnel carriers, and 380 vehicles and special equipment units. It was decreed that the peacekeepers' tenure would span five years, with automatic renewal for subsequent five-year terms, unless a party expressed intent to terminate the provision six months before its expiration. In essence, the peacekeepers were slated to remain in Garabagh until at least November 2025.

Yet, the circumstances have shifted dramatically. The covert introduction of mines, weaponry, professional agitators, and terrorists into Garabagh, Yerevan's vengeance schemes, and the illegal junta in Khankendi's actions, culminating in a mine explosion by a sabotage unit on an under-construction motorway, were intolerable for Azerbaijan. Consequently, on September 19-20, 2023, following counter-terrorism operations, the Armenian Armed Forces' faction was vanquished, and the junta declared its dissolution. With the new status quo, the Russian peacekeepers in Garabagh found themselves without their intended roles: there were no longer any armed factions to separate. Discussions of any "special," "deferred," or alternative status became baseless. "The withdrawal of peacekeepers aligns with the evolved regional realities post-Armenia's acknowledgment of Azerbaijan's 1991 borders," stated Dmitry Peskov, the Russian presidential spokesperson. "The geopolitical landscape has transformed, leaving no further duties for the peacekeepers."

The peacekeepers' exit, coinciding with Ilham Aliyev's official trip to Moscow, did not strain Azerbaijan-Russia relations. The transition was executed swiftly, efficiently, and professionally, catching many off guard.

Furthermore, Armenia's active discussions to replace Russian peacekeepers in Garabagh with other forces have become moot.

Azerbaijani politicians and analysts assert: a definitive conclusion has been reached in the Garabagh conflict. The war chapter has been turned, and peacekeepers are departing Garabagh precisely because genuine peace has been established.

Any state begins with borders. So does peace

During the peacekeepers' withdrawal from Garabagh, the South Caucasus's information space buzzed with a new development. Azerbaijan and Armenia are taking strides to resolve border delimitation issues. As reported, on 19 April 2024, the eighth meeting of the State Commission on State Border Delimitation convened, chaired by Azerbaijani Deputy Prime Minister Shahin Mustafayev and Armenian Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan. In this initial phase, the reintegration of four villages in the Gazakh region back into Azerbaijan was agreed upon.

Furthermore, experts have highlighted the significance of achieving border delimitation and village restitution without intermediaries, indicating that both parties are independently advancing the peace process.

Pashinyan's border challenges

The return of the four border villages to Azerbaijan was bound to receive mixed reactions from the radical political factions of Armenia. The Armenian authorities made concerted efforts to sway public opinion. Nikol Pashinyan visited the border regions multiple times, engaging with locals and promoting a straightforward message: Armenia's security is best ensured within internationally recognised borders, and amicable relations with neighbouring Azerbaijan are preferable to conflict. However, his message did not resonate with all. In the Tovuz district, known in Armenia as Tavush, vociferous protests erupted against the perceived "land surrender," complete with roadblocks and governmental accusations. Opposition figures, including past leaders like former Defence Minister Seyran Ohanyan and ex-President Serzh Sargsyan, who has called for Pashinyan's removal, are frequenting the demonstrations. The church is also playing a prominent role in these protests. The opposition has even proposed that church leaders assume protest leadership, given the negative public sentiment towards the Garabagh clan's elite.

Political analysts are divided on the potential threat these protests pose to Pashinyan's leadership and the peace process between Baku and Yerevan. On one hand, Armenia's current prime minister has showcased remarkable political resilience. He retained power during the tumultuous period of November-December 2020, following Armenia's defeat in the 44-day war. During that time, an incensed mob ransacked the parliament in Yerevan, personal items vanished from the prime minister's office, and the present foreign minister, Ararat Mirzoyan, suffered a severe beating. Pashinyan also emerged unscathed from a comical coup attempt led by the now-former Chief of General Staff of the Armenian Armed Forces, Onik Gasparyan. Nonetheless, this does not imply that his grip on power is unassailable.

Experts suggest that Pashinyan's political endurance owes partly to the absence of a compelling and charismatic opposition leader, with the populace showing disdain towards various former officials. The emergence of such a leader could change the political landscape. The case of Svetlana Tikhanovskaya in Belarus exemplifies how even a seemingly ordinary individual can rise to political prominence.

Currently, with external forces yet to intervene, Pashinyan's actions are causing friction not only with Moscow but also with Western entities. Armenia is anticipated to articulate its foreign policy direction more explicitly.

In such a context, Moscow, Brussels, Paris, and Washington might hold influential cards. This unfolds in an Armenia that, despite its modest size and economic challenges, boasts a long history of political strife and unrest.

The gravest threat to Pashinyan is the opposition from the church, a formidable entity within Armenia and its diaspora. Echmiadzin, with its financial means and global ties, is well-positioned to mobilise its congregation against the government.

It's important to recognize that calls for retribution may not resonate as they once did. The aftermath of two lost conflicts compels Armenian voters to reconsider the costs of contentious claims over Garabagh, Javakheti, and Eastern Anatolia. The pursuit of new territories has tragically expanded the Yerablur military cemetery, leaving an indelible mark on the nation's psyche.

Moreover, any governmental transition in Armenia must honour existing agreements—border delimitation, acknowledgment of Azerbaijan's territorial sovereignty, and the abandonment of claims to Garabagh. Thus, Pashinyan's successor would inevitably have to adopt a similar diplomatic approach, as Yerevan cannot risk another conflict with Azerbaijan—a sure path to devastation. This may explain why opposition groups, despite their posturing, hesitate to decisively unseat Pashinyan, allowing him to undertake the unenviable task of drafting and signing a peace accord with Azerbaijan."