ZANGEZUR CORRIDOR: WHO STANDS IN OPPOSITION?

The political dormancy in the South Caucasus has drawn to a close as summer fades. Once again, the spotlight falls on the restoration of communication links between Azerbaijan and Armenia, with particular emphasis on the Zangezur corridor. Intriguingly, the primary voices in this dialogue are not Baku and Yerevan, but Moscow and Tehran.

The Zangezur corridor emerged as a pivotal issue on November 10, 2020, when the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Russia, alongside Armenia's Prime Minister, put their signatures to a joint declaration. This document stipulated: 'All economic and transport connections in the region shall be reinstated. The Republic of Armenia pledges to ensure the safety of transport routes between Azerbaijan's western regions and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, facilitating unhindered movement of people, vehicles, and goods in both directions. The Border Service of Russia's Federal Security Service will oversee these transport links'". It seems almost surreal now, but in the immediate aftermath of this trilateral accord, many analysts viewed the Zangezur corridor's inauguration as little more than a formality. Conventional wisdom at the time even suggested that Armenia, perpetually bemoaning its 'blockade', was the party most eager to see communications restored without delay.

Unforeseen Problems

From the outset, Azerbaijan has steadfastly advocated for the fulfilment of the trilateral statement's provisions: the establishment of rail and road connections along the Soviet-era route, under the vigilant eye of Russian FSB border guards. This thoroughfare nearly abuts the Iranian frontier, where Russian 'green berets' maintain a border zone in Armenia. Baku harbours reservations about entrusting the transport corridor's security to Armenian forces. The wounds from the late 1980s, when Armenian militants disrupted the Meghri railway segment at the Garabagh conflict's inception, remain raw. Indeed, Nakhchivan found itself in the grip of a severe transport blockade as early as 1989. Azerbaijan is resolute in preventing a recurrence of such events. This stance reflects not Baku's caprice, but Yerevan's contractual obligations. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan has expressed willingness to refrain from making the Zangezur corridor a distinct clause in the prospective peace accord.

Türkiye's President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has also framed the corridor's inauguration as the denouement of a peace agreement.

Baku and Ankara anticipate that the Zangezur corridor will substantially abbreviate and streamline the route between Azerbaijan and Türkiye. However, as Ilham Aliyev elucidated in spring, "While the term 'Zangezur corridor' isn't explicitly mentioned, the trilateral statement of November 10, 2020 unequivocally mandates a transport link between Azerbaijan's eastern regions and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, with Russian border forces ensuring its security. This document bears the signatures of President Putin, Prime Minister Pashinyan, and myself. For over three years, Armenia has effectively contravened this provision." He further remarked: "Now, they appear to be seeking an exit from this commitment. This is untenable. They are obstructing the establishment of road connections with the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. Such conduct is, undoubtedly, disheartening".

Armenia's behaviour has indeed taken a perplexing turn. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov recently drew attention to Yerevan's mercurial stance. Addressing MGIMO students on September 2, Russia's top diplomat touched upon the normalisation of Baku-Yerevan relations. He emphasised that "normalisation must occur within the broader context of resolving all outstanding issues in the South Caucasus, particularly the Garabagh situation". Lavrov referenced the document inked by the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Russia, along with Armenia's Prime Minister, on the night of November 9-10, 2020, which stipulated the restoration of transport links between Azerbaijan proper and Nakhchivan: "Both rail and road connections will be re-established, with security provided by Russia's Federal Security Service border troops. I was taken aback by a recent interview with Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan, wherein he dismissed accusations of Armenia impeding progress as falsehoods and claimed the situation was being misrepresented. This is bewildering. Armenia initially rejected the motorway proposal, insisting solely on railway connections. Azerbaijan, seeing no rationale for this, acquiesced to our mediation. Subsequently, Armenia reneged on Russian border guards' involvement, despite explicit provisions in the agreement. We found this incomprehensible. They proposed handling security themselves. The Azerbaijanis contend that the prevailing mistrust and animosity are too pronounced for them to feel secure traversing Armenian territory en route to Nakhchivan".

Unexpected Response

Logic would have dictated anticipating indignant reactions from Yerevan. Instead, attention abruptly pivoted to Iran. Tehran summoned the Russian ambassador to its Foreign Ministry, confronting him with the query: "How come? Surely Russia is aware of Iran's opposition to the Zangezur corridor!" This was swiftly followed by a leak to Tasnim, a news agency with ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Tehran is convinced that the Zangezur corridor "would constitute an unacceptable NATO incursion into the South Caucasus." Iranian officials deem Lavrov's statements ill-timed, given the ongoing efforts to forge a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty between Russia and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Tasnim reports that Russian officials were thoroughly briefed by high-ranking Iranian counterparts and were cognisant of Tehran's unambiguous stance against a corridor linking Nakhchivan with Azerbaijan. This position, Iran maintains, precludes any unforeseen developments. Tehran asserts that international norms prohibit prioritising the security and geopolitical interests of South Caucasus nations over those of other states. Iranian experts now profess bewilderment at Russia's apparent willingness to leverage the Zangezur corridor to resolve its issues with Armenia. Tasnim posits that opening the Zangezur corridor would "seal off one of Iran's gateways to Europe and diminish its neighbour count". The agency then issues what amounts to an ultimatum: "Should any nation believe it can resolve its challenges by igniting a new conflict on foreign soil, global security will be compromised, and perpetual chaos will ensue." Iran contends that the Russian Foreign Ministry is misguided in thinking that addressing Armenian issues through the "mythical Zangezur corridor" serves their interests, emphasising that this corridor will not materialise against Tehran's wishes.

Behind the Curtain

Russia's insistence on opening the Zangezur corridor is understandable. The trilateral statement of November 10, 2020, following the OSCE Minsk Group's apparent failure, cemented Moscow's position as the primary mediator in Baku-Yerevan normalisation efforts. This document facilitated the deployment of Russian peacekeepers in the region. However, the landscape has since shifted dramatically. In the wake of Azerbaijan's counter-terrorism operations in September 2023, Russian peacekeepers withdrew from the area. Yerevan's clandestine manoeuvring has ushered in new mediators - the European Union and the United States - whose involvement has already proven problematic.

The matter of unblocking communications remains virtually the sole arena where Moscow retains its moderator role. This is partly due to the aforementioned statement, which tasks Russian border guards with securing the future corridor. Moreover, it's worth noting that Russia maintains ownership of Armenia's railways.

Baku seeks a dependable transport link to its exclave. Tehran's intransigence, however, raises questions. It's not just the Tasnim news agency that opposes the Zangezur corridor. Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, characterised it as "detrimental" to Iran during his meeting with Pashinyan. This stance persists despite the corridor posing no tangible threat to Tehran or altering its number of neighbours.

Armenia's persistence on this issue remains enigmatic. Without the Zangezur corridor's inauguration, other transport routes will remain closed. Azerbaijan refuses to entertain vague "alternative routes" that are seasonally impassable and lack adequate security measures. Yerevan's proposal to delegate corridor security to private entities is particularly baffling, especially considering the trilateral statement's explicit provision for Russian Federal Security Service border guards, not Armenian private military companies.

Yerevan's obduracy evokes the warning of Azerbaijan's President Aliyev that such actions could permanently relegate Armenia to a geopolitical cul-de-sac. "Should the aforementioned route (Zangezur corridor) remain closed, we have no intention of opening our border with Armenia elsewhere. Consequently, they stand to incur greater losses than gains," Ilham Aliyev cautioned in January of this year.

To this, we would merely add that such warnings warrant timely and serious consideration.