ASAD'S DEFEAT

In Syria, the government of Bashar al-Assad has fallen. The question that naturally follows is what the future holds for the Arab country that has been torn by years of civil war. Will a peaceful phase ensue, leading to domestic political stability? The ongoing geopolitical tensions surrounding Syria, which have exacted a significant toll on the nation's citizens, may also begin to abate.

Damascus Conquered By Rebels

The fall of Damascus, a city historically significant in both Syrian and regional politics, marks the conclusion of the Syrian state model that began in 1963. The advent of the Baath Party (Arab Socialist Revival Party) to power following the 1963 coup marked the beginning of a new era. A subsequent coup within the Baath Party, in 1970, elevated Hafez Assad to a position of authority. His tenure as president commenced in 1971 and endured for the subsequent 29 years. Following Hafez al-Assad's demise in 2000, his son, Bashar, ascended to the leadership of the Baath Party and, by extension, the Syrian Arab Republic.

The Assad regime experienced significant challenges, culminating in a civil war that began in 2011 and was influenced by external actors seeking to expand their influence in Syria. The war resulted in the death of over half a million people and the displacement of an additional six million Syrians. Since 2017, a period of relative calm has prevailed in Syria, marking a temporary respite from the war. This respite came about due to the efforts of Bashar al-Assad, who, with the assistance of Russia and Iran, managed to suppress the opposition groups that had risen against him. These groups included forces infamous for their extremism and terrorism.

However, Assad's regime's triumphalism collapsed within ten days in late November and early December 2024. A sequence of key cities and regions, including Aleppo, Idlib, Hama, Homs, and ultimately the capital Damascus, were subsequently captured by anti-Assad forces. Consequently, Assad himself and his family sought political asylum in Russia.

For a period of several days, Syria was formally ruled by Mohammed Ghazi al-Jalali, the prime minister of the Assad government, from whom the opposition seized power.

The principal group responsible for Assad's downfall was Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which has its origins in the al-Qaeda terrorist organization. Advocating a Salafist-jihadist ideology, HTS emerged from Jebhat al-Nusra, the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda, notorious during the civil war for its brutality against followers of other religious movements. However, in recent years, the group has positioned itself as a proponent of Syrian nationalism. This transformation is attributed to the ideological distancing of its leader, Abu Mohammed al-Joulani, from al-Qaeda. Al-Julani has made clear his rejection of the goal of establishing a "world caliphate" and assured that he does not seek to impose the standards of radical Islamist movements on Syria.

Ten years ago, al-Joulani threatened that if Syria fell under the control of radical Islamists, there would be no place for Christians and Alawites (the latter being the backbone of the Assad regime) in the country. Now, however, amid the rebels' victorious advance on Damascus that led to Assad's overthrow, al-Joulani has made several statements attempting to reassure Syrians regarding tolerance toward all residents of the country, regardless of their ethnic and religious backgrounds. Furthermore, HTS does not require women in its controlled territories to cover their faces completely. Its set of rules also includes a provision stating that fighters must refrain from actions that could frighten children.

Al-Julani, who immediately after Assad's regime fell reverted to his birth name Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa, is also associated with the relatively calm and non-violent transfer of power from the former government to the rebels. Specifically, he prohibited his fighters from approaching state institutions that initially remained under Prime Minister al-Jalali's supervision until the formal transfer of power.

Nevertheless, members of ethnic and sectarian minorities in Syria have significant reasons for concern, as vital questions regarding Syria and its future remain unresolved. Namely, what kind of state do HTS and other military factions now controlling the country intend to create? Will that state be clerical, Islamist, or secular? Have al-Joulani and his supporters genuinely transformed from "jihadists" to nationalists, or is this portrayal merely a tactical interest focused on achieving power as swiftly as possible?

Another pressing question is whether the new Syrian government will retaliate against representatives and supporters of the former regime. Concerns about this issue were amplified by al-Joulani's statement revealing his intention to prosecute Assad regime officials responsible for torture and war crimes. The HTS leader pledged to publish lists of suspects and offer rewards for information about them.

Meanwhile, a new intra-Syrian conflict cannot be dismissed; those who fought Assad for years and ultimately succeeded in overthrowing him may find themselves at odds. How will relations evolve among the rebel forces that have now achieved a common objective? Beyond their shared goal of toppling Assad's regime, do they have a unified vision for what Syria should become and what path it will follow?

One of the most prominent armed groups opposing government forces during Bashar al-Assad's rule is the Syrian National Army. It is viewed as closely aligned with Türkiye and holds considerable influence in northern Syria. In southern regions of Syria, various rebel groups predominantly advocating secularism united with Islamists solely through their mutual animosity towards the Assad regime. Thus, whether forces previously opposed to Assad can find common ground on critical aspects of state existence is crucial for achieving lasting peace in Syria. Is Syrian society capable of overcoming the devastating civil war once and for all, or will it follow Iraq and Libya into chaos and new bloody conflict following the fall of a long-standing dictatorship?

These questions remain unanswered for now. A few days after seizing Damascus, the rebels established a new transitional government. Mohammed al-Bashir, head of the rebel administration in Idlib province, became the interim prime minister. The transitional government is tasked with governing Syria until March 1, 2025. By then, much may become clearer regarding external influences on the internal situation in Syria.

External Players

Undoubtedly, certain foreign policy circumstances played a significant—if not decisive—role in the fall of the Assad regime. Assad's primary allies—Russia and Iran—bound by their respective engagements in Ukraine and confrontations with Israel amid broader Middle Eastern conflicts—found themselves unable to support the "Baathist" regime as robustly as they did during the peak of the Syrian civil war due to severe declines in their own capabilities. This reality was not lost on opposition groups whose decisive offensive against Assad's forces was either planned or backed (most likely both) by major international actors, primarily the US and Israel, seeking a change in power in Syria.

Consequently, we can observe a significant weakening of Russia and Iran's positions in Syria. With Assad's regime's collapse, the future of not only the substantial Russian military presence in Syria since September 2015 but also two Russian bases on the Syrian Mediterranean—the naval base in Tartus and aerospace base in Hmeimim—is now uncertain. In 2017, Moscow and Damascus signed an agreement granting use of these bases until 2066; however, even the Kremlin acknowledges that their fate will now be determined by new Syrian authorities.

Similarly problematic is the presence of Russian troops stationed in Syria; Moscow risks losing all influence in Syria—previously considered a cornerstone of Russia's status as a great power—not to mention that failure in its Syrian campaign could result in almost complete exclusion from the Middle East region.

For Iran, the fall of Assad's regime effectively weakened its long-established "axis of resistance" against the West and Israel. By providing considerable support to Assad's government throughout the civil war, Iran not only prevented Syria from falling under control of "jihadists," primarily from the so-called "Islamic State," but also transformed Syrian territory into a central hub for this axis. Syria served as a corridor between Iran and Hezbollah—a Shiite paramilitary group based in Lebanon—which received arms and ammunition from Iran through Syrian soil.

However, Israel's recent military campaigns against Lebanon have significantly weakened Hezbollah; consequently, Iran and its proxy groups were unable to maintain Assad's hold on power again. Reports indicate that Iran and Hezbollah have withdrawn their units from Syria.

Conversely, Israel has intensified its operations within Syrian territory following Assad's ousting and has further consolidated its regional standing. Immediately after the regime change in Syria, Israeli forces seized control of the demilitarized buffer zone in the Syrian Golan Heights occupied by Israel during the 1967 Six-Day War. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that the agreement regarding this zone established between Israel and Syria in 1974 was no longer valid.

Additionally, Israel has targeted suspected weapons and missile production sites to prevent them from falling into extremist hands. These operations reportedly destroyed critical military facilities across Syria—including airports, air squadrons, radars, weapon depots, research centres, air defence systems, and naval vessels at Latakia port in northwestern Syria.

It is not only Israel that has recently engaged in military activities on Syrian territory; the United States announced it had struck more than 75 targets including locations held by Islamic State militants. Similar to Israel's rationale for its actions, the United States justified its strikes as efforts to prevent terrorists from exploiting political uncertainties arising since Assad's regime collapse.

Türkiye is another nation that has significantly strengthened its position in the region following this change in power in Syria and will likely play a decisive role in subsequent developments within the Arab country. Previously, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan urged Bashar al-Assad to negotiate with both Ankara and Syrian opposition forces to seek a peaceful resolution to the civil conflict; however, Assad declined these negotiations.

In contrast, facilitating return home for several million Syrian refugees sheltered within Türkiye is now a priority for Turkey. "Türkiye will provide as much assistance as possible to Syrians returning home. We will stand by our brotherly people in rebuilding their country," Erdogan stated.

It appears Ankara intends to assume a pivotal role in Syria's reconstruction while simultaneously defending its territorial integrity. "We cannot allow Syria to fragment again or turn Syrian territories into zones of confrontation," Erdogan remarked while expressing hope that "very soon" territories still occupied by terrorists from both the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) and Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) would be liberated.

It is crucial for Türkiye that the United States halts military support for Kurdish terrorist groups operating along Türkiye's northern border with Syria; thus upcoming months will test US-Turkish alliance as Washington must factor in Ankara’s security interests.

Overall, events unfolding across the Middle East have entered a critical historical juncture; recent developments in Syria are integral components amid tectonic shifts within regional geopolitics."