ANKARA STARTS AND WINS

The fall of the Bashar al-Assad government in Syria has led to an unprecedented strengthening of Türkiye's position and the growth of its influence, not only in the Middle East but also in North Africa and the Horn of Africa. This shift is poised to reshape regional dynamics and reformat the system of regional relations.

Trying on a New Role

In fact, the Turkish leadership has achieved a form of redemption for the setbacks of the early 2010s. At the onset of the Arab Spring, Türkiye had placed its bets on the Muslim Brotherhood, only to face growing hostility from key regional states, particularly Egypt, following the Brotherhood's defeat. Ankara's support for Doha during the Qatar crisis further isolated Türkiye in the region and strained its relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

However, Türkiye gradually shifted away from its hardline stance of supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, which eventually led to the restoration of relations with the aforementioned countries. This does not mean that the past decade and a half has been a loss for Türkiye. On the contrary, the country has made significant strides.

Over the years, Türkiye has solidified a political alliance with Qatar, securing the deployment of its military contingent on the peninsula. It has supported the Syrian opposition by establishing a security belt along the Syrian-Turkish border and strengthened ties with the Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq, aligning with the Barzani government against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Türkiye has also elevated its relations with the UN-recognized interim government of Libya to the level of a strategic ally.

Türkiye's influence has extended to the Horn of Africa as well. In February 2024, the central government of Somalia and Türkiye signed a 10-year defense pact. Under this agreement, the Turkish Navy is tasked with protecting Somalia's territorial waters, a nation embroiled in both internal and external conflicts. Prior to this, Türkiye had already been involved in humanitarian and infrastructure projects in the strife-torn country.

Türkiye operates the largest embassy in Africa, located in Mogadishu, Somalia's capital. It has also established a training centre there, which functions as a de facto military base capable of training up to 700 cadets. Turkish companies manage both the Aden Adde International Airport in Mogadishu and the city's seaport.

Ankara's Role in the Horn of Africa

Türkiye's exclusive influence in Mogadishu has facilitated the resolution of a bloody territorial dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia, further enhancing Ankara's standing in the region.

After losing access to the sea following the end of its long-standing conflict with Eritrea in 2018, Ethiopia sought to regain maritime access by exploiting the instability in neighbouring Somalia. In early 2024, Addis Ababa established relations with Somaliland, an unrecognized breakaway region of Somalia, in exchange for access to the Red Sea via the port of Berbera. Mogadishu viewed this move as a threat to its sovereignty and responded by signing a treaty with Egypt, Ethiopia's long-time rival.

Türkiye, leveraging its strong position in Ethiopia as the country's second-largest foreign investor, actively mediated the dispute. Ankara also found support from Cairo, particularly in light of the recent normalization of relations between Türkiye and Egypt.

The culmination of these efforts was the “Ankara Declaration between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Federal Republic of Somalia, with the assistance of the Republic of Türkiye,” signed on December 11, 2024. The declaration was formalized during a meeting in Ankara between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud, and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali.

The leaders of Somalia and Ethiopia reaffirmed their respect for each other's sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity, as well as their commitment to the principles enshrined in international law, the UN Charter, and the Constitutive Act of the African Union. They acknowledged the potential benefits of Ethiopia's secure access to the sea while respecting Somalia's territorial integrity.

The declaration stated: “Ethiopia and Somalia also agreed to work closely together to conclude mutually beneficial commercial arrangements through bilateral agreements, including contracts, leases, and similar means that will enable the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to benefit from reliable, safe, and sustainable access to the sea under the sovereign jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of Somalia. The Parties agreed to commence in good faith technical negotiations for these purposes, with the assistance of Türkiye, no later than the end of February 2025, and to conclude and sign them within four months.”

Türkiye's mediation was warmly received, and the parties agreed to resolve any differences over the interpretation and implementation of these commitments peacefully through dialogue. Following the meeting, President Erdogan announced that Türkiye, Ethiopia, and Somalia would jointly decide on future steps and implement projects aimed at fostering peace and prosperity in the region.

Ankara and New Military Alliances

The resolution of the Somalia-Ethiopia conflict coincided with the fall of Bashar al-Assad's government in Syria, where the new transitional government, led by Ahmed al-Shara'a (Julani), is seen as a close ally of Türkiye.

Türkiye's growing authority and influence have also positioned it as a potential mediator in the Sudanese civil conflict. In early January 2025, Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Yousef stated that Türkiye's proposal could end the country's 20-month-long civil war.

In December 2024, President Erdogan held a phone conversation with Sudanese army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, offering Türkiye's assistance in bringing “peace and stability” to Sudan. Erdogan assured al-Burhan that Türkiye was ready to help resolve disputes and prevent Sudan from becoming “an arena for foreign interventions.” On January 4, Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister Burak Akcapar met with al-Burhan in Port Sudan, where the Sudanese leader expressed his support for Türkiye's initiative.

The UAE, which has backed the opposition Rapid Support Forces in Sudan, also endorsed Türkiye's diplomatic efforts. The UAE Foreign Ministry stated, “The UAE is ready to cooperate with Türkiye and supports all its diplomatic initiatives to end the conflict in Sudan and find a comprehensive solution to the crisis.”

While it is too early to draw definitive conclusions, Türkiye's efforts are likely to yield positive results.

Either way, it is obvious that Ankara is confidently pushing its rivals in the eastern part of the continent. And its confidence is bolstered by its strengthened position in Syria. Türkiye and the new interim government in Damascus have already reached a number of significant agreements on military co-operation and strategic partnership. One of the key points was an agreement to build two large military bases in the Homs desert and north of Damascus. It is envisaged that these bases will be used, inter alia, to deploy advanced air defence systems designed to counter the increasing frequency of Israeli Air Force strikes.

From Syria to Libya

It is believed that the Turkish army will withdraw from Idlib after the completion of the operation to liberate northeastern Syria from PKK terrorists and the People's Self-Defence Units. Control will be handed over to the new Syrian army, an important step in restoring Syria's territorial integrity.

Türkiye's growing role in Libya is another significant development. The country has been embroiled in a renewed conflict, with fierce fighting between the National Transitional Council (NTC) forces and supporters of the late dictator Muammar Gaddafi over the city of Sirte.

NTC forces have gained control of most of Sirte, Gaddafi's hometown, and are preparing for a major offensive on Bani Walid, another stronghold of pro-Gaddafi forces. Previous attempts to capture Bani Walid, located 400 kilometres southwest of Tripoli, have failed due to strong resistance.

Sirte holds strategic importance in Libya's civil war, partly due to the nearby Jufra airbase, located 300 kilometers to the north. Reports suggest that Jufra hosts 14 MiG-29 and Su-24 aircraft, making it a potential alternative to Russia's Hmeimim airbase in Syria.

If Sirte is captured by government forces backed by Ankara, Moscow may be forced to reconsider its plans for Jufra. Additionally, Sirte is considered the gateway to the “Libyan Crescent,” which accounts for 60% of Libya's oil exports.

The situation in Libya differs from that in Syria, as Libya is part of North Africa rather than the Middle East. In Libya, Moscow is dealing with rebel factions rather than a centralized government. These factions are less predictable in their alliances than the Bashar al-Assad government was. For instance, General Haftar has shown a preference for aligning with Egypt, the UAE, and even France, particularly in light of the fate of the former Syrian leader.