ZANGEZUR CORRIDOR AND ARMENIAN OVERTURES

"We made a concrete proposal to Azerbaijan, a solution that takes into account both the position of Armenia and Azerbaijan. We proposed that there should be railway cargo traffic from Western Azerbaijan (Eastern Zangezur. - Ed.) to Nakhchivan and back through the territory of Armenia, via Meghri, because the restoration of other sections of the railway with Azerbaijan—I mean in Tavush—requires significant investment. But on the same principle: from Yeraskh to Meghri via Nakhchivan," Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated during a press conference in Yerevan. He also expressed hope that Baku would accept the proposal. "Of course, cargo transportations should be within the jurisdiction of our country," he added.

How much do the Prime Minister's words align with the truth and the spirit of the agreements? Also, will Baku agree to the Zangezur corridor in exchange for a route through Nakhchivan?

Another Twisting of the Truth

Firstly, the territory of Armenia remains within the borders of the former Soviet Union at the time of its collapse, and Meghri and Yeraskh are not separated by a border but are connected through Armenia. Why should cargo go through Azerbaijan when it can safely travel through Armenian territory? What is Pashinyan afraid of? The 300,000 Azerbaijanis who were ethnically cleansed in the late 1980s, as well as the 100,000 Azerbaijanis displaced to Western Zangezur (so-called Syunik) and Goycha, have yet to return. These Azerbaijanis were resettled under Decree No. 4083 of the USSR Council of Ministers, dated December 23, 1947, "On the resettlement of collective farmers of Azerbaijani nationality and other Azerbaijani populations from the Armenian SSR to the Kura-Araz lowlands of the Azerbaijan SSR," signed by Stalin between 1948 and 1953. It should be noted that the ethnic cleansing was carried out at the state level, with the inherent cruelty of Stalin's regime. In fact, it was a deportation of Soviet citizens from their historical lands by their own government, orchestrated by one of the leaders of the Soviet Union, the well-known Anastas Mikoyan.

Secondly, the security of transport communication between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic is guaranteed by the Republic of Armenia, in order to ensure the unimpeded movement of citizens, vehicles and goods in both directions. This is outlined in the trilateral Statement of November 9-10, 2020, which was also signed by Pashinyan. This is not contested, and no further conditions are required of Armenia to fulfil this obligation. Any other demands made of Armenia must be considered subsequent to the fulfilment of this condition, or perhaps not at all. It is a fundamental legal principle, recognised by even a first-year law student, that if a "condition for the cessation of hostilities" outlined in a declaration is not fulfilled by one party, the other party is also exempt from fulfilling that agreement.

Moreover, if Armenia has "frozen" its membership in the CSTO and is not paying membership fees, it is unlikely that the CSTO is obliged to fulfil its military-political obligations towards Armenia. Automatically, these obligations are also considered "frozen." In such a case, Azerbaijan may decide to independently fulfil Point 9 of the November 2020 trilateral statement, just as it did with the four UN Security Council resolutions, and unblock the Zangezur corridor. No one would have legal grounds to prevent it from doing so.

Thirdly, historical and contemporary evidence indicate that the reliability of the Armenian word and the authenticity of its leaders' signatures are questionable. This is exemplified by the Prime Minister of Armenia's endorsement of an international document, which has resulted in obligations that have not been fulfilled for almost five years. Subsequently, attempts have been made to negotiate, even attributing non-existent conditions to Azerbaijan, in an effort to bolster the perception of a "peace-loving position." This behaviour demonstrates a lack of respect not only for the individual concerned, but also for the state he represents.

Delaying the Peace Process and Revanchism

It is evident that Nikol Pashinyan's statements and "initiatives" are intended to delay the process of concluding a peace treaty. He has stated that the Armenian Constitution contains no territorial claims against Azerbaijan, yet simultaneously claims that the Azerbaijani Constitution "claims territory from Armenia." Pashinyan has also acknowledged the necessity to amend Armenia's constitution, as the country has no future in its current form. Without providing any clear perspective, he then presents the "Crossroads of Peace" initiative to the world, the realisation of which is impossible without Azerbaijan – a fact Baku is well aware of. Pashinyan understands this perfectly: his sole goal is to delay the process and buy time. The strong influence of revanchist forces, which have not abandoned their hopes, on the Armenian Prime Minister is evident. The influence of the aggressive Armenian diaspora on the leaders of their respective countries regarding arming Armenia and providing it with assistance is frequently reflected in global media and social networks. The refusal of many representatives of the Armenian community in Washington to participate in a meeting with Pashinyan on February 3 this year is also perceived ambiguously.

Another indirect confirmation of this revanchist spirit is the statement by Garo Paylan, a Turkish politician of Armenian origin and former deputy of the 27th Turkish Parliament from the Peoples' Democratic Party. He stated that Armenia, under the guise of normalising relations with Azerbaijan, is buying time to purchase arms from France and the US, and that "Armenia needs three to five years to counter Azerbaijan." It is also notable that Paylan was awarded a medal by former Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan in recognition of his contributions to the Armenian diaspora.

In addition, satellite images of territories in the Kalbajar, Basarkechar, and Goycha districts have been published online, revealing new Armenian firing positions. These positions, equipped with heavy weaponry, are located just a few kilometres from the conditional border. The equipment deployed at these sites belongs to Armenian military units stationed in the Basarkechar district and the village of Zod. Some of the equipment is camouflaged, and the deployment of air defence and offensive weapons cannot be ruled out. Such firing points are established along the entire conditional border. In the opinion of observer missions, can this contribute to strengthening peace in the South Caucasus?

Confrontation or the Zangezur Corridor?

Arming and preparing for new aggression, as seen in Armenian actions, are paired with statements attempting to portray Pashinyan's peaceful aspirations. However, these aspirations do not align with Point 9 of the Trilateral Statement, but rather seek to bypass it and introduce new approaches. They do not indicate a readiness to relinquish territorial claims against Azerbaijan, either in Armenia's constitution or in practice, but rather reinforce revanchism and the escalation of confrontation. Each new initiative or "idea" from the Armenian authorities, the extension of terms, and the expansion of missions along the border only serve to exacerbate confrontation and distrust. Pashinyan's proposal to exclude the EU observation mission from certain parts of the border undergoing delimitation is nothing more than an attempt to pressure Azerbaijan during negotiations and border demarcation. It is clear that such a policy does not contribute to creating a peaceful atmosphere in the South Caucasus or advancing negotiations on a peace treaty.

At the same time, the opening of the Zangezur corridor, followed by other communications in the future, and the involvement of Armenia in transnational projects, alongside the normalisation of relations and the building of trust, could strengthen stability and peace in the region.

When to Repent

The mistrust that neighbours hold towards Armenia has been generated by Armenia itself throughout the entire process of resettling Armenians on Azerbaijani territories, carrying out ethnic cleansing, expelling Azerbaijanis from their ancestral lands, and creating mono-ethnic Armenian zones in the Caucasus. This distrust will not disappear even if Armenia is "pressured" into signing a peace treaty. The mentality must change; Armenia must begin to think differently and learn to coexist with other nations.