EURODREAM MERCHANTS

Armenia continues to pursue a pro-Western course. The country's parliament has approved, in the first reading, a draft law initiating the EU accession process. The document was backed by 63 MPs from Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's Civil Contract faction. Seven deputies from the opposition faction I Have Honour voted against it. According to Armenian media, there were no abstentions, while Russian publications reported that another opposition faction, Armenia, did not participate in the vote.

Armenia's Ambiguous EU Aspirations

At first glance, the so-called Euro-initiative appears to be formally structured and serious. The civil movement Platform of Democratic Forces spearheaded the initiative, gathering 60,000 signatures in support of the document within two months. On January 9, 2025, the Armenian government reviewed and endorsed the proposal. Now, the relevant draft law has passed its first reading in parliament. The document declares that the Republic of Armenia "announces the beginning of accession" to the EU, reflecting the will of its people and setting the objective of making the country "safe, secure, developed, and prosperous."

However, from the outset, Yerevan has engaged in, to put it mildly, political manoeuvring. Back in January, while discussing European integration, Nikol Pashinyan stated: "The adoption of the law does not mean Armenia's membership in the European Union in the direct sense of the word. Reaching this point and making a decision at this stage cannot be done at the level of a law or even a government resolution. A decision on this issue can only be made through a referendum; there is no other option. According to our Constitution, Armenia can only become a member of the European Union if a referendum is held and a sufficient number of participants vote in favour under the prescribed procedure."

Now, it seems there may not be a referendum after all. This was suggested by Arman Egoyan, an MP from Pashinyan's Civil Contract, who stated: "We currently have a valid legal framework with the EU—the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA). The adopted law means that we should maximise the use of this treaty in our relations with the EU while also working towards establishing a new legal framework." This raises the impression that Pashinyan’s circle has decided to "slow down the Euro train." Tigran Abrahamian, secretary of the opposition faction I Have Honour, is not far from the truth when he remarks: "It seems that Armenia is entering a process with no real prospects."

European Dreams vs. Eurasian Realities

There was a time in the post-Soviet space when the term "Euro-Atlantic integration" carried a kind of magical appeal. That is no longer the case. European integration has proven to be a lengthy process, laden with bureaucratic hurdles imposed by "old Europe" and, most importantly, offering no clear pathway to EU membership. When the Eastern Partnership programme was first launched, it was envisioned that former Soviet states would eventually join the "European family." However, a kind of "glass barrier" was later erected in front of them. While EU officials have not explicitly stated that these countries are unwelcome, no meaningful steps towards integration have been taken either. Discussions about a "moratorium on enlargement" remain a constant topic within the EU, and Brussels has shown little intention of admitting new members.

Then there is Russia’s position. Moscow has described Armenia’s decision to join the EU as its "sovereign right," but has also issued subtle warnings about the costs involved.

Firstly, Armenia is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Back in January, the Kremlin made it clear that Armenia cannot belong to both the EU and the EAEU simultaneously. Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated: "It is simply impossible to be members of two different organisations. There is a single customs space here, a shared zone for the free movement of goods, services, people, and capital, with different regulatory norms." Moreover, Armenia benefits from its EAEU membership, receiving oil, gas, and even rough diamonds from Russia at domestic prices—amounting to billions of dollars in economic support. Leaving the EAEU would mean losing these privileges instantly.

Additionally, nearly all of Armenia’s critical infrastructure—railways, gas and electricity networks, cellular communications—is owned or managed by Russia under concession agreements. Moscow effectively maintains this infrastructure at its own expense. A slight increase in tariffs or a halt in Russian investment in Armenian railways and power grids could trigger an "infrastructure disaster." This is not to mention potential "internal political" or "hybrid" countermeasures from Moscow. Armenia’s dependence on Russia remains too deep for Yerevan to make drastic geopolitical shifts.

Armenia has already had a brush with European integration. Under Serzh Sargsyan’s leadership, the country was negotiating an association agreement with the EU. At the time, there was much enthusiasm about the European choice and European perspectives. Europe, eager to expand its influence, turned a blind eye to Armenia’s occupation of 20% of Azerbaijan’s territory. No European official told Armenian representatives that before dreaming of EU integration, they needed to withdraw from foreign lands.

The agreement was set to be signed in November 2013 at the Vilnius Summit. However, on September 13 of that year, Sargsyan was summoned to Moscow. After a very "informative" conversation, he announced that Armenia would instead join the Eurasian Union. By then, he had little choice—Armenia could not afford to buy gas at global market prices. Brussels was left stunned, unprepared for such an abrupt reversal.

Then, as now, the EU showed no willingness to compensate candidate countries for the costs of breaking ties with Russia. European policymakers maintain that if a country chooses the path of European integration, it is their decision and their burden to bear.

Thus, before making bold declarations about European integration, Armenia must first reduce its economic dependence on Russia. Secondly, it must build a solid economic foundation for EU cooperation. While Armenia’s trade figures may show a "surge" in imports and exports, much of this is merely a means of bypassing sanctions against Russia via Yerevan. Armenia is not taking concrete steps to lessen its economic reliance on Moscow. While there have been some gestures in military and security matters, they have been largely symbolic. In reality, Armenia’s only military agreements are with Russia and the CSTO. By all rational calculations, it is far too early—and too risky—for Armenia to proclaim EU accession.

'Eurodream' Trading

Pashinyan's team is not naive. The Prime Minister’s current pro-Western posturing has a simple explanation: amid the Ukraine war and its geopolitical fallout, Russia is unable to provide Yerevan with the same level of aid and military support as before. Thus, Pashinyan has turned to the West in search of new allies. However, it appears he has not achieved the desired results. The mostly pro-Russian Armenian opposition has been quick to ridicule his efforts. While their bias is evident, their criticisms are not easily dismissed.

In this context, Pashinyan needs a high-profile, attention-grabbing gesture directed at the West. The logical first step would be to withdraw from Russian-led integration projects. However, he lacks the political will to take such a leap, and Armenia as a state is unprepared for such a drastic move. Thus, the only remaining option is symbolic gestures—such as the draft law on EU accession—despite knowing full well that "this process has no real prospects."

Perhaps Pashinyan’s main audience is not European politicians but his own electorate. The domestic political landscape today is far from what it was in the spring of 2018, when the "kebab revolution" brought him to power. Back then, hopes were high. Today, he faces the reality of a lost war, the return of previously occupied Azerbaijani territories, the dismantling of the separatist junta in Khankendi, and the difficult prospect of signing a peace treaty with Azerbaijan. Yerevan understands that Azerbaijan will not back down and that Baku is the driving force behind negotiations. In this scenario, Pashinyan needs a boost in popularity. What better way than to repackage the "Eurodream" and sell it to his voters at a premium—even if it remains just that: a dream.