WHAT WILL THE STREET DECIDE?

Türkiye is once again providing the world’s television channels with a "revolutionary and dramatic" spectacle. Mass rallies opposing the incumbent President Recep Tayyip Erdogan have erupted across major cities, sparked by the arrest of Ekrem Imamoglu, the Mayor of Istanbul.

The protests are widespread. According to the Interior Ministry, more than 1,000 individuals have already been detained, including at least 12 alleged members of terrorist organisations. The number of injured police officers has surpassed one hundred. Erdogan has reacted harshly to demonstrators accused of throwing stones at police and desecrating a cemetery near one of Istanbul’s mosques, among other acts. Nevertheless, he has yet to explicitly threaten severe punitive measures.

Meanwhile, in the streets of Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and other major cities, demonstrators continue to clash with police, while experts speculate: what is truly unfolding? Who will gain the upper hand in this confrontation? How will this surge of political passion end—for the opposition CHP, the ruling AKR, and most importantly, for Türkiye?

Corruption or something else?

Ekrem Imamoglu was arrested on corruption charges as part of a large-scale anti-corruption operation involving at least one hundred individuals now facing trial. During a meeting with his supporters, Erdogan claimed that the details, once revealed, would "eclipse a Brazilian soap opera".

Imamoglu is considered Erdogan’s most formidable political rival. He was expected to be the opposition’s candidate in the presidential election scheduled three years from now. As the Mayor of Istanbul and a leading figure in the Republican People’s Party (CHP), his arrest has drawn intense scrutiny. Both domestically and abroad, analysts have long observed that "whoever controls Istanbul controls Türkiye". Erdogan himself began his ascent to national leadership from the mayoralty of Istanbul—first as Prime Minister, then as President. It is for this reason that the CHP’s victories in Türkiye’s major cities during the last municipal elections were interpreted by many as signalling the beginning of the end of the Erdogan era.

In this context, the temptation arises to declare that "the dictator Erdogan is attempting to eliminate his political opponent", to label the protests a "democratic uprising" and to cast some actors as heroes while branding others with shame. It is also tempting to resurrect early-2000s political clichés and frame the conflict as one between "Islamists" and secularists, especially given that the CHP was founded by Kemal Atatürk.

Conversely, one could interpret the protests as a thinly veiled attempt to orchestrate a "colour revolution" in Türkiye—a strategy that, as history shows, rarely yields lasting benefits for the targeted nation. This interpretation is supported by compelling arguments: under Erdogan, Türkiye has emerged as an independent actor on the international stage, a development that may be unwelcome to certain external power centres.

As some observers have noted, external players seldom empower democrats or liberals; they promote the obedient. This is a view Erdogan himself has alluded to: "While we are striving to deepen our engagement with society, certain forces are working to undermine it. Some are concerned by our efforts to expose the true motives of those who, hiding behind various masks, are using our country to serve their own interests. Hostile circles, opposed to Türkiye and its people, have weaponised these forces for their agendas," he stated during a meeting of the ruling party’s parliamentary group.

Azerbaijani Perspectives on the Turkish Protests

Azerbaijan undoubtedly has its own interpretation of the ongoing political turmoil in Türkiye. This is not solely due to shared experience with the consequences of "rally democracy" in cities like Baku, Ganja, and Nakhchivan. Rather, it reflects the depth of the bilateral relationship that flourished during Erdogan’s presidency. Türkiye’s unequivocal support for Azerbaijan during the 44-day Patriotic War and the signing of the Shusha Declaration on June 15, 2021—which formalised the military alliance between the two nations—are regarded as milestones.

Furthermore, the 2023 Turkish presidential elections remain fresh in Azerbaijani memory. While rumours and speculation can often be dismissed, Baku took note that CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu did not visit Azerbaijan in the lead-up to the vote. The controversy intensified when he presented a proposed Silk Road map that bypassed Azerbaijan in favour of Iran. This suggestion was met with considerable indignation in Baku, especially given Azerbaijan’s active role in the revival of the Silk Road through the trans-Caspian ferry crossing and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway. Experts widely criticised Kilicdaroglu’s plan as unfeasible, accusing him of attempting to undermine Azerbaijani-Turkish ties.

Then-Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu was sharply critical of this move. He directly accused Kilicdaroglu of trying to appease Armenia and Western powers. "Why should Azerbaijan’s interests be compromised? Is this a bid to please Armenia or Western countries? We fully understand the objectives of those attempting to isolate our brotherly Azerbaijan," his statement was widely quoted at the time. Though Kilicdaroglu later withdrew from active politics after losing the election, the sentiment lingered.

Nonetheless, despite all Azerbaijani sympathies, Imamoglu’s arrest and the public’s response remain Türkiye’s internal affair. Turkish citizens alone will determine the political consequences, based on their own national interests.

CHP v. AKP

Türkiye is home to a functioning democracy where mass street protests are hardly a rarity. Such events do not always lead to major political shifts. More often than not, student-led demonstrations fizzle out over time—especially with elections still three years away. Moreover, Erdogan has continued to secure victories in recent presidential races.

Still, some point out that Erdogan’s electoral margins are narrowing. In the most recent election, he won by a fraction of a percentage point.

Following CHP candidate Kilicdaroglu’s loss to Erdogan in the spring of 2023, internal turmoil began to brew among Erdogan’s critics. Observing political norms, Kilicdaroglu stepped down as party leader and withdrew from public life, igniting a leadership struggle within CHP.

Analysts now suggest that this phase has passed. Imamoglu’s arrest appears to have galvanised party unity. Shortly thereafter, CHP officially named him as its candidate for the presidency, as originally intended. However, experts caution that this was likely more a symbolic show of solidarity than a strategic move. Should Imamoglu remain incarcerated ahead of the elections, CHP will be forced to select a new candidate, potentially reigniting internal rivalries.

Forecasting how this political upheaval will influence public opinion is no easy task. Erdogan fatigue is becoming evident within Turkish society. The economic downturn, public discontent over the large number of Syrian refugees, and other factors are contributing to widespread frustration.

Yet it must also be acknowledged that under Erdogan’s leadership, Türkiye has ascended to the status of a regional power. The country has made remarkable progress in its defence industry, becoming one of the world's leading arms exporters. Among its signature achievements are the Bayraktar attack drones, which garnered global attention during the liberation of Garabagh. Additionally, under Erdogan, the concept of Turkic unity gained significant political traction, and Ankara expanded its influence east of the Caspian Sea.

Critics may argue that foreign policy achievements are unlikely to sway voters in a presidential contest. Domestic concerns such as inflation and social unrest are more pressing for the average citizen.

Nevertheless, one must not overlook that Turkish voters, despite a strong democratic tradition, are generally sceptical of street protests. Crucially, the AKP and Erdogan still hold a powerful trump card: the corruption allegations. It is improbable that Turkish law enforcement would have arrested Imamoglu without substantive grounds. And if Erdogan’s remarks about a "Brazilian serial" are any indication, the prosecution's evidence will be anything but trivial.

It is no surprise, then, that CHP has begun calling for early presidential elections. They likely recognise that sustaining their current surge in popularity will prove difficult. And the looming corruption allegations may ultimately benefit their opponents. Thus, the most consequential developments surrounding the "Imamoglu" affair may still lie ahead.