PASHINYAN’S TURKISH MARCH

The visit of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to Türkiye is one of those events that draws the attention of political circles, experts, and journalists alike. And understandably so — it was the first visit in the history of the two countries conducted in the absence of diplomatic relations, and it took place against a rather intriguing backdrop.

Nikol Pashinyan visited Istanbul, held talks with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, visited the Blue Mosque, the Armenian Apostolic Cathedral, and met with local Armenians. Armenia and Türkiye agreed to continue the meetings and maintain dialogue. Observers and analysts concur: the Armenian Prime Minister’s visit to Türkiye alone is certainly not enough to break the ice and normalise relations. But as the saying goes, even the longest journey begins with a single step.

Among the expert community — particularly outside Azerbaijan — it is often assumed that the main obstacles to normalisation lie in Ankara and Baku. The idea that it is Yerevan which must first undergo its own path toward normalisation is rarely mentioned. Yet the root of the problem lies within Armenia itself — more precisely, in the traditional mindset and present-day behaviour of the Armenian establishment.

“Cautious Optimism”

At present, there is more reason for optimism regarding the normalisation of Armenian-Turkish relations than in previous years. It may come as a surprise, but the first country to recognise Armenia’s independence after the collapse of the USSR was Türkiye. More accurately, Ankara recognised all 15 former Soviet republics as subjects of international law, including Armenia.

In response to Yerevan’s aggression against Azerbaijan and the occupation of its territories, Ankara declared that as long as this status quo remained, there would be no diplomatic relations and the border would remain closed.

Armenia responded by crying foul over a so-called “blockade”, accusing Türkiye of all mortal sins, including the continued perpetration of the “Armenian genocide” — yet the border remained sealed.

Following Azerbaijan’s restoration of its territorial integrity, the main obstacle to improved relations between Yerevan and Ankara has been removed. Baku has already made it clear that it views this as part of the broader peace process in the region. It would seem that nothing now stands in the way of the long-awaited normalisation of Armenian-Turkish relations.

All the more so, considering that without it, Armenia simply lacks the means not only to develop but even to survive as a state.

Official press services regularly publish photographs of Armenian and Turkish representatives in conversation on the sidelines of international forums — evidence of significant progress.

When an earthquake struck Türkiye, Armenia sent rescue workers and humanitarian aid. That alone was enough to prompt talk among experts of “seismic diplomacy” — by analogy with the earlier “football diplomacy”.

Nikol Pashinyan has been actively promoting the concept of a “Crossroads of Peace”, based on the premise that the Armenian-Turkish border will be opened. Preparations are underway to open border checkpoints. All of this stands in sharp contrast to 2010, when, in the words of one Yerevan journalist, "politicians met, optimistic declarations were made, but no one bothered to fix the old border barrier."

But is everything really as promising as it seems?

The forgotten border

In the 1990s, having recognised Armenia’s independence within its existing borders, Türkiye voiced concern that Yerevan might lay territorial claims against it. And these concerns were not entirely unfounded. Talk of the “six vilayets” — the provinces which, under the Treaty of Sèvres, were to form “Western Armenia” — and assertions regarding the “Armenian genocide” were actively circulating in Armenian discourse. To be fair, it was mostly the political organisations of the Armenian diaspora that took the lead in this regard. Yet the Armenian intellectual class was not far behind. The USSR, while not explicitly endorsing these claims, also did not suppress such activity. For example, a monument to the “victims of the genocide” was erected in Yerevan as early as the mid-1960s. Annual marches began during that period as well, even though most unsanctioned rallies in those days were harshly repressed.

In independent Armenia, territorial claims against Türkiye were not openly declared. Nonetheless, Mount Agri (Ararat) continued to feature on the national coat of arms. Any attempt to cast doubt on the “genocide” narrative is regarded in Armenia as a criminal offence.

Armenia has repeatedly attempted to strike deals with Türkiye behind Baku’s back and to divide the united Azerbaijani-Turkish front — though these efforts have always failed.

The first overtures toward Ankara were made by Levon Ter-Petrosyan. In 2010, it was Serzh Sargsyan’s turn. Negotiations were held in Zurich, where the parties even signed bilateral protocols. These documents stated that Armenia and Türkiye would recognise the existing borders in the region and establish a joint commission to examine disputed historical issues.

However, Armenia’s Constitutional Court ruled that Yerevan would continue to promote its narrative on the “Armenian genocide”, and that no joint commission on the issue would be formed. Crucially, the court also upheld that Yerevan would not renounce its claims to “Western Armenia”. In response to this decision, Türkiye, naturally, withdrew its signature from the protocols.

Today, Ankara and Yerevan appear to be embarking on a process of normalisation from a clean slate. But so far, these are gestures rather than substantive decisions. The genuinely complex issues have not yet begun to be addressed. The matter of the border remains unresolved. It was established under the Moscow and Kars treaties, whereas Armenian political circles still advocate for a return to the Treaty of Sèvres.

Political analysts believe that the “border issue” was the very reason the US pushed so hard for Armenian-Turkish normalisation in the early 2000s. Any unsettled border poses a risk of armed conflict. Yerevan stood no chance of withstanding Türkiye alone. Yet Armenia is a member of the CSTO, and Türkiye is part of NATO, meaning that tensions rooted in the First World War era could, in theory, trigger a global confrontation.

Türkiye is not opposed to Armenians in Armenia “honouring their dead”, but it categorically rejects accusations of “genocide”. Ankara also insists that Yerevan stop lobbying for genocide recognition in third countries.

Now, an even more dangerous element has emerged — the glorification of terror. It is highly unlikely that Ankara will watch passively as Yerevan erects monuments to terrorists from the “Nemesis” group or elevates individuals like Monte Melkonian to the status of national heroes. All of these issues remain on the table — and have yet to be seriously addressed.

Is Pashinyan ready for peace?

Parliamentary elections are due in Armenia in 2026, and it will be difficult for the current Prime Minister to win. Pashinyan’s former popularity has all but vanished — particularly after losing two wars. There are no notable achievements in the economic or social spheres, and revanchist forces routinely accuse him of betrayal. Against this backdrop, the incumbent Prime Minister has little choice but to pursue a peace agenda and hope to extract some political dividends from the normalisation of relations with Türkiye and Azerbaijan before the start of the election campaign.

But is Pashinyan truly prepared for this?

The title of “peacemaker” was bestowed upon him almost immediately after his “barbecue revolution”. Yet the facts suggest otherwise: it was Pashinyan himself who, on the eve of the 44-day war, escalated tensions with Türkiye to a new level. Armenian-American historian and diplomat Gerard Libaridian stated as much in his widely discussed BBC interview: “…In the summer of 2020, the President and Prime Minister of Armenia made statements on the anniversary of the Treaty of Sèvres which can be interpreted as laying territorial claims against Türkiye.” In addition, it was during Pashinyan’s tenure as Prime Minister that a monument was erected in Yerevan to the terrorists of the “Nemesis” group.

One may try to convince oneself and others that, after losing two wars, Nikol Pashinyan has changed course and is now wholeheartedly committed to peace. But it is impossible to ignore that the Prime Minister has repeatedly used seemingly promising gestures to signal a desire for reconciliation — yet has consistently avoided taking the decisive steps that would actually move the process forward. This was the case during the 44-day war, regarding the withdrawal timetable. It remains the case in relation to the peace treaty with Azerbaijan.

It is not inconceivable that the process of normalising relations with Türkiye could also become another instance of “running in place”, which is gradually becoming Pashinyan’s signature political style.